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Summary
" In “A Lecture on Ethics,” Ludwig Wittgenstein explicitly  adopts some of 
G.E. Moore!s ideas: “My subject, as you know is Ethics, and I will adopt the 
explanation of that term which Professor Moore has given in his book 
Principia Ethica.”  Despite this reference, Wittgenstein!s and Moore!s parallel 
views on ethics have not been explored or appreciated much.  What is more, 
nobody  saw that Wittgenstein also presents an improved version of Moore!s 
argument against moral naturalism.  This dissertation seeks not only  to 
demonstrate that Wittgenstein!s argument against moral naturalism is similar 
to Moore!s well-known open question argument; it also argues that 
Wittgenstein!s argument is better.  This argument is based on the idea that 
someone who knows all natural facts would not know whether something is 
morally  good.  Wittgenstein!s argument anticipates and even improves on one 
contemporary  version of Moore!s argument, which poses a problem for at 
least one type of moral naturalism.  Despite some marked differences in the 
views of moral naturalists, most of them are inclined to say that someone who 
knows all natural facts would also know everything there is to know about 
moral goodness.  This makes Wittgenstein!s argument against moral 
naturalism especially  relevant for contemporary moral naturalists. 
Wittgenstein!s argument is also relevant to full information accounts of moral 
goodness, which are widely  prevalent today.  The imaginative possibility  that 
Wittgenstein presents can be philosophically  substantiated in a way that casts 
doubt on the adequacy  of such full information accounts of moral goodness 
for vindicating moral naturalism.  
" In some respects Wittgenstein!s argument against moral naturalism is 
similar to Frank Jackson!s knowledge argument against physicalism. 
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Wittgenstein!s argument features someone who knows all natural facts but 
does not know whether something is morally  good while Jackson!s argument 
features someone who knows all physical facts about color vision but does 
not know what it is like to see a red.  The similarity  between the two 
arguments and the fully informed characters in them will be explored through 
a discussion of a distinct type of moral disagreement.  A precursor of this type 
of disagreement is featured in Terence Horgan and Mark Timmon!s revival of 
Moore!s argument against moral naturalism.  In this type of moral 
disagreement the disputants agree about the natural features of the matter 
under discussion, but disagree about what moral conclusions to draw from 
these natural features.  Because of this type of moral disagreement, someone 
who knows all natural facts can fail to know whether something is morally 
good.  However, there is at least one important difference between 
Wittgenstein!s argument and Jackson!s.  The latter is built around 
phenomenal properties, the existence of which cannot be doubted.  The 
former, on the other hand is built around moral properties, which are by  no 
means indubitable.  Because of this difference, the knowledge argument and 
Wittgenstein!s argument against moral naturalism establish contrasting 
metaphysical conclusions.  Whereas the knowledge argument establishes the 
discrete metaphysical existence of phenomenal properties, Wittgenstein!s 
argument establishes that moral properties are not natural in a way  that casts 




! Most people think that knowing whether something, say capital pun-
ishment or physician assisted suicide, is morally  good depends on knowing a 
lot of facts about the moral matter in question.  Roughly, the idea is that the 
more we know about the deterrent effect of capital punishment or all the dif-
ferent consequences that arise from legally  permitting physician assisted sui-
cide, among other things, the better equipped we shall be to judge whether it 
would be good to adopt policies that permit these.  This general idea fits well 
with full information or ideal advisor accounts of moral goodness.  According 
to those who propose these accounts, moral goodness is determined by what 
an individual, or a community  composed of individuals, who are fully  and viv-
idly  informed about themselves and their environment would want.   Because 
of what they know these individuals are in a position to advise their non-
idealized selves what to do.  Sometimes the same idea is expressed in terms 
of what one would do if one were well-informed, calm, cool and collected.  
! But most people also think that being fully  informed alone does not 
guarantee knowledge about moral goodness.  If I say that it is possible for 
someone to be fully  informed about the relevant moral matter, calm, cool and 
collected but ignorant about whether say capital punishment is morally  good, 
nobody  would balk at my  imaginative proposal.  Even philosophers who are 
partial towards full information accounts of moral goodness might be willing to 
accept this under-described proposal without many  qualms.  It is easy  enough 
to come up with a story  that could explain away  the possibility  of being fully 
informed about something yet ignorant about that thing in some morally  rele-
vant way.  Or so it seems.  It is both interesting and puzzling that there is a 
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tendency  to think such an explaining away  could be done easily  without look-
ing more closely  at the merits of the different explanations that can be given. 
On closer inspection the possibility  of knowing all natural facts but still being 
morally  ignorant may  not be so easy  to dismiss.  It could spell trouble not only 
for full information accounts of moral goodness but also for different forms of 
naturalistic moral realism, moral naturalism for short.1  In this dissertation a 
new argument against moral naturalism built around the imaginative possibil-
ity just described will be discussed and defended.
! The new argument against moral naturalism comes from a relatively 
old source: Ludwig Wittgenstein"s “A Lecture on Ethics.”  Neither at the time 
of its delivery  in 1929 nor in the years following its appearance in print in 1965 
has this article affected debates on ethical theory.  At the time when Wittgen-
stein"s ideas were fashionable the lecture on ethics together with Wittgen-
stein"s other unpublished writings were widely read; but only as one of Witt-
genstein"s writings.  After the height of interest in Wittgenstein"s so-called later 
philosophy, or what was then called ordinary  language philosophy, the lecture 
on ethics became a forgotten period piece.  It is possible that the argument 
against moral naturalism contained in the lecture escaped notice because the 
interest in Wittgenstein"s philosophy  was already waning in the 1960"s,2 when 
it was published in the Philosophical Review.  What happened was unfortu-
nate.  Wittgenstein"s lecture contains some ideas that have much to contrib-
ute to some debates on ethical theory.  This dissertation seeks not only  to 
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1 Since virtually  all ethical theorists adhere to a naturalistic world view, the 
convention of using the term #moral naturalism"  to refer to those moral theo-
ries that hold that there are objectively  existing moral facts and properties and 
that these are natural facts and properties will be adopted here.  More on 
moral naturalism in the following pages.
2  P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein!s Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Phi-
losophy (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), p.1.
demonstrate that the argument against moral naturalism from Wittgenstein!s 
lecture is similar to G.E. Moore!s well-known open question argument; it also 
argues that Wittgenstein!s argument is better. 
" The new argument against moral naturalism is Wittgenstein!s in the 
sense that it originates from some remarks that he makes in his lecture on 
ethics.  It is unclear whether Wittgenstein himself intended his remarks about 
someone who knows all natural facts but does not know whether something is 
morally  good to be taken as an argument against moral naturalism like 
Moore!s open question argument.3   It is also unclear how or whether the 
ideas presented in “A Lecture on Ethics” are related to statements about eth-
ics in the Tractatus or to those remarks that have implications for ethics in the 
Philosophical Investigations.  Since this lecture was given at the beginning of 
Wittgenstein!s so-called middle period4--the time when he had already  begun 
to turn away  from ideas contained in the Tractatus but has yet to fully  realize 
and develop the ideas that culminated in the Investigations--asking how it is 
related to his more well-known but diametrically  opposed ideas is very 
thought-provoking.  Inquiring further into these questions could prove to be 
very  interesting and highly  significant for Wittgenstein scholarship.  The pre-
sent work, however, does not pursue this inquiry.  The main concern here is 
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3 There is no direct evidence in Wittgenstein!s published writings that indi-
cates that he took his remarks in LE as a new version of Moore!s argument 
against moral naturalism.
4 What is sometimes referred to as Wittgenstein!s #middle period! begins in 
1929 when he returned to philosophy  after having been a schoolteacher for 
some years and ends around the time he wrote what is known today  as The 
Blue and Brown Books, which he finished dictating in 1935.  This part of Witt-
genstein!s philosophy is set apart from his late and early writings because “it 
gradually  became clear that his writing during the intervening years ... could 
not simply  be understood as a rejection of one view  and the adoption of an-
other ... [so it became] natural to speak of this further body of writing ... as 
#Middle Wittgenstein!.” [David Stern, “The #Middle Wittgenstein: From Logical 
Atomism to Practical Holism,” Synthese 87 (1991): p. 203.]
not exegetical.  The discussion of Wittgenstein!s argument against moral 
naturalism that follows is mainly  focused on philosophical considerations. 
Some ideas from “A Lecture on Ethics” are taken as a springboard for dis-
cussing a new and interesting way to argue against moral naturalism.  
No discussion of moral naturalism, or indeed of metaethics is complete 
without  any  consideration of Moore!s open question argument.  Thomas 
Baldwin goes so far as to say  that twentieth-century  British ethical theory  is 
unintelligible without reference to Moore!s Principia Ethica.5  Although virtually 
everyone in the last eighty  or so years rejects Moore!s moral non-naturalism, 
his argument against moral naturalism remains of interest to ethical theorists.6 
After the heyday  of ethical intuitionism during the first three decades of the 
last century, the open question argument was taken to show that moral natu-
ralism is problematic because it cannot account for the prescriptive or emotive 
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5 G.E. Moore (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 66.
6 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1903).  Hereafter this work will be referred to as PE.  
According to Thomas Hurka, PE came in “the middle of a sequence of 
ethical writing that runs roughly from the first edition of Sidgwick!s Methods of 
Ethics in 1874 to Ross!s Foundations of Ethics in 1939.”  [“Moore in the Mid-
dle,” Ethics 113 (2003), p. 600.]  From 1874 to 1939 the moral non-naturalism 
developed by Moore, Rashdall, Ross, et. al., was a widely accepted ethical 
theory.  In the next twenty  years it was rejected in favor of antirealist accounts 
of moral values, which were then called moral non-cognitivism (Baldwin, 
Ibid.).  When philosophers began posing objections against non-cognitivism in 
the 1950s moral naturalism again gained many proponents.  At first only Aris-
totelian forms of naturalism gained new ground; G.E.M. Anscombe, P.T. 
Geach and Philippa Foot all promoted this view.  But later on philosophers 
like Richard Brandt, Richard Boyd, and many  others developed different 
forms of moral naturalism.  Today  there are those who argue for a new kind of 
moral non-naturalism.  But those who develop this view  eschew many fea-
tures of Moore!s metaethical position.  See Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Real-
ism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003).
dimension of morality.7  At the same time it became evident that Moore!s me-
taethical position demands an extravagant metaphysics and epistemology.8 
The existence of non-natural moral properties does not sit well with the world 
picture afforded us by the natural sciences.  So until about 1960 considera-
tions arising from the open question argument were accepted as reasons for 
going for an antirealist construal of moral facts and properties.9  Later devel-
opments in philosophy  of language and in the notion of conceptual analysis, 
however, induced many to rethink the implications of the open question ar-
gument.  In the last few decades some ethical theorists began to think that 
Moore!s argument against moral naturalism can be debunked in ways that 
show that moral naturalism is plausible.
" At the very  least, some contemporary  philosophers think that what!s 
important about the open question argument has something to do with an in-
sight about a unique feature of moral terms and concepts that is neutral be-
tween moral naturalism, which is a form of realism, and antirealism.  In their 
landmark article entitled “Toward Fin De Siècle Ethics: Some Trends,” Dar-
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7 R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), pp. 81-
6.
Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1944), p. 25.
8 J. L. Mackie took the most singular approach towards the extravagant 
metaphysical and epistemological demands of Moore!s moral non-naturalism. 
Mackie conceded the point about the peculiar evaluative, prescriptive, intrin-
sically action-guiding aspectes of non-natural moral properties.  But he 
pointed out that this picture does not fit at all with our scientific, i.e. naturalis-
tic, understanding of the world.  Thus, according to Mackie, a position like 
Moore!s implies that there are no objective values.  Ethics: Inventing Right 
and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 32-5.
9  Several people have pointed out that the historical beneficiary  of 
Moore!s argument against moral naturalism are the different forms of moral 
antirealism: Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, “Toward Fin de 
siècle Ethics: Some Trends,” Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 119-20.  See 
also Paul Bloomfield, “Opening Questions, Following Rules,” Metaethics After 
Moore, Ed. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006) pp. 169-90.
wall, Gibbard and Railton refer to this feature of moral terms and concepts as 
normativity, or action-guidingness.  They  also say that the significance of the 
normativity  of moral terms and concepts is really  what Moore!s open question 
argument uncovered.  When we ask of any  naturalistic analysis of moral 
goodness on offer whether it is good, we are really  asking if, all things con-
sidered, we should devote ourselves to promoting whatever it is that such an 
analysis takes to be good.10  Darwall, Gibbard and Railton also say  that the 
significance of Moore!s argument against moral naturalism lies in its discovery 
of an argumentative device that “implicitly  but effectively  brings to the fore 
certain characteristics of "good!.”11  Since there is nothing that prevents natu-
ralists from appropriating such characteristics for their own ends, Moore!s ar-
gument does not really threaten moral naturalism.
# Moral naturalists believe that moral properties are natural properties.12 
They  also believe that the correctness of sincerely  uttering a statement that 
features a moral predicate depends on the instantiation of natural properties. 
As naturalists see it, true moral beliefs are acquired through empirical means. 
Moral naturalism combines the attractiveness of believing that there are moral 
properties with the advantages of adhering to a naturalistic world view.  Belief 
in moral properties is vouched for by  philosophical tradition and common 
sense, while adhering to a naturalistic world view is parsimonious.  But natu-
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10 “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics,” p. 117.
11 Ibid.
12 After this point I will only  talk about moral properties.  If moral natural-
ism is true, true moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties.  A 
good candidate for a moral fact is 'Slavery  is wrong.'  This statement attrib-
utes the property  of moral wrongness to slavery.  So a moral fact expresses 
an instantiation of a moral property.  Moral properties denote an objective 
quality  or attribute of persons, actions or states of affairs.  So talk of moral 
properties is shorthand for all these, and of moral facts.
ralists do not understand what it means for moral properties to be natural in 
the same way.  
! Some naturalists think that moral properties are reducible to natural 
properties; but others deny  this.  Richard Brandt and Peter Railton are among 
those who think that moral properties are reducible to natural ones.  Accord-
ing to them moral properties are coextensive with natural properties.  Railton 
points out that it would be odd if moral properties were natural but also sui 
generis.13  He goes on to say  that what is morally good is determined by facts 
about “what would rationally  be approved of were the interests of all poten-
tially  affected individuals counted equally  under circumstances of full and vivd 
information.”14  In the same vein, Brandt says that what is morally  good can 
be identified with “which state of affairs would be wanted, in a long-range 
view, for their own sake by a person who was fully  factually  informed.”15  
Although he has different views on conceptual analysis, Frank Jackson also 
believes that moral properties are reducible to natural ones.  Unlike Brandt 
and Railton, Jackson thinks that moral properties are a function of what ma-
ture folk morality  takes to be relevant in determining which morally  evaluative 
properties are which descriptive properties.16 
! On the other hand, Richard Boyd, David Brink and Nicholas Sturgeon 
believe that although moral properties are natural properties, the former are 
not reducible to the latter.  The non-reductive moral naturalism of Boyd, Brink 
and Sturgeon consists in the belief that there are facts "as hard as any in 
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13 Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986): p. 171.
14 Peter Railton, Facts, Values and Norms, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003), p. 22.
15 Richard B. Brandt, Facts, Values, and Morality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p.9.
16 Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual 
Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), pp.129-38.
arithmetic or chemistry! that there are certain rules of conduct and disposi-
tions of character that are appropriate for human beings.17  Despite these dif-
ferences in the moral naturalist camp, most naturalists are inclined to say  that 
someone who knows all natural facts would also know everything there is to 
know about moral goodness.  Most moral realists would  likewise be inclined 
to say  that someone omniscient about natural facts would be omniscient 
about moral matters as well.  This confluence of opinion on what someone 
who knows all natural facts would know  about moral matters makes an argu-
ment based on fallible omniscience effective against virtually  all forms of 
moral naturalism and most versions of moral realism.    
" Antinaturalists deny  that moral properties are natural.  The argument 
against moral naturalism from Wittgenstein!s “A Lecture on Ethics” takes is-
sue with the claim that someone who knows all natural facts would always 
know whether something is morally good.  Wittgenstein thinks that it is possi-
ble for a person to know all natural facts without knowing whether something 
is morally  good.  For the sake of brevity, call this possibility  fallible omnis-
cience and the compilation of all natural facts a world book.  Darwall, Gibbard 
and Railton identify  Wittgenstein!s lecture on ethics as the locus classicus of 
the view of normativity  or action-guidingness that they  discuss in connection 
with the open question argument.  They  note that unlike Moore, “Wittgenstein 
... could see that #no description that I can think of would do to describe what I 
mean by absolute value, [and] I would reject every  significant description 
anybody  could suggest.!”18   They also think that both Wittgenstein!s and 
Moore!s arguments against moral naturalism depend on the normativity  or the 
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17  Nicholas L. Sturgeon, “Ethical Naturalism,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 112.
18 “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics,” p. 119.
action-guidingness of moral terms and concepts.  According to them, both 
arguments trade on an insurmountable difference between saying that some-
thing has certain natural properties and saying that this thing is morally  good. 
This insurmountable difference depends on a semantic platitiude: whereas 
moral predicates have action-gudingness or normativity  logically  built into 
them natural ones do not.  Darwall, Gibbard and Railton!s assessment of both 
Moore!s and Wittgenstein!s arguments against moral naturalism may  have 
something to do with the continuing neglect that the argument against moral 
naturalism based on fallible omniscience has suffered.  But fallible omnis-
cience is not necessarily tied up with the normativity  of moral terms and con-
cepts.  The similarity  between someone who knows all natural facts but does 
not know whether something is morally  wrong with someone who knows all 
physical facts about color vision but does not know what it is like to see red 
implies this.  
" In some respects Wittgenstein!s argument against moral naturalism is 
similar to Jackson!s knowledge argument against physicalism.  The similarity 
between these two arguments and the fully informed characters in them will 
be explored to the antinaturalist!s advantage here through a discussion of a 
distinct type of moral disagreement.  A precursor of this type of disagreement 
is featured in Terence Horgan and Mark Timmon!s revival of Moore!s argu-
ment against moral naturalism.  The discussion of Moore!s argument in the 
next chapter will be focused on how an argument similar to Moore!s can work 
better if it relies on this type of moral disagreement rather than on questions 
of the sort that Moore posed.  
" Moral naturalism is the default position among moral realists, those 
who believe that (a) there are moral properties; (b) some moral beliefs are 
true; and (c) true moral beliefs are made true by  the instantiation of moral 
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properties.  Some moral realists support their position by  drawing an analogy 
between philosophy of mind and metaethics.  Roughly, the idea is to show 
that moral properties resemble conscious experience in important ways. 
Non-reductive physicalism about phenomenal properties associated with con-
scious experience combine many of the features that a moral realist needs to 
defend her claims about moral properties.  Jackson, McDowell and Shafer-
Landau make use of an analogy  between philosophy  of mind and metaethics 
in different ways.19  The metaethical position of these philosophers are by  no 
means similar but they all make use of a similar strategy.  Jackson appeals to 
the supervenience on the descriptive and makes use of strategies used in the 
philosophy  of mind to establish the supervenience of the mental on the physi-
cal to show that moral supervenience implies that moral properties are natural 
properties.20  McDowell draws an analogy  between perceiving moral proper-
ties and perceiving color to establish his own brand of moral realism.21 
Shafer-Landau makes use of the notion of intensional individuation to estab-
lish a non-naturalist moral metaphysics that nevertheless concedes that the 
moral supervenes on the descriptive.22  
! But the strategy  of drawing an analogy between philosophy  of mind 
and metaethics is neither simple nor straightforward.  There is at least one 
important dis-analogy  between phenomenal properties and moral properties: 
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19 William G. Lycan also talks about the possibility  of finding a way  to ar-
gue for an a posteriori reduction of moral properties into natural properties by 
appealing to some of the strategies that philosophers use in their work on the 
mind-body problem.
“Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 
(1986): 79-94.
20 From Metaphysics to Ethics, pp. 118-25.
21  John McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” Essays on Moral 
Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) pp.166-80.
22 Moral Realism, pp. 80-115.
the existence of the former is indubitable while the existence of the latter is 
not.  Because of this difference the knowledge argument and Wittgenstein!s 
argument against moral naturalism establish contrasting metaphysical con-
clusions.  Whereas the knowledge argument establishes the discrete meta-
physical existence of phenomenal properties, Wittgenstein!s argument estab-
lishes that moral properties are not natural in a way  that casts doubt on the 
existence of moral properties.  The significant difference between phenome-
nal properties and moral properties will be used to defend the crucial premise 
of Wittgenstein!s argument, which states that fallible omniscience implies that 
moral properties are not natural.  In this way  the new argument against moral 
naturalism would also prove to be effective against the different kinds of moral 
realism mentioned above.
" The structure of this dissertation is straightforward: Chapter 2 is de-
voted to a discussion of Moore!s argument against moral naturalism.  The 
new argument against moral naturalism is introduced in Chapter 3.  The first 
premise of this argument is discussed in Chapter 4 while the exposition and 
defense of the second premise are taken up in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 2
Moore!s Argument Against Moral Naturalism
" One of the most well-known arguments against moral naturalism is 
Moore's open question argument (OQA).  In this chapter an exposition of 
Moore's argument will be given in order to show that an argument similar to it 
could prove to be a formidable challenge to some contemporary forms of 
moral naturalism.  The open question argument is as well-known as it is 
problematic.  Numerous objections have been raised against this argument 
and it is generally  agreed that questions of the sort Moore posed to make a 
case against moral naturalism do not provide sufficient grounds for a decisive 
antinaturalist conclusion.1  But such a conclusion may  still be forthcoming if 
an argument similar to Moore!s focuses on a distinct type of moral 
disagreement and what such a disagreement implies for the moral knowledge 
of a person who knows all natural facts.  The discussion of this new argument 
12
1 Even Moore later admitted that all his supposed proofs that moral good-
ness is not natural #were certainly  fallacious.!  [Philosophical Papers (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1959), pp. 89-101.]   He also admitted that his attempt to 
explain what a natural property is in the Principia Ethica was #hopelessly  con-
fused.!  [“Reply  to My  Critics,” The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (La Salle: Open 
Court, 1968), p. 582.]
Today, philosophers who subscribe to diverse ethical theories say more or 
less the same thing about Moore!s argument against moral naturalism.  David 
O. Brink argues that Moore relies on an implausible #semantic test for proper-
ties,# according to which two terms that are not analytically  equivalent cannot 
refer to the same property.  Brink points out that this is clearly  a false assump-
tion because we make discoveries that flout this assumption all the time, e.g. 
Water = H2O, genes = DNA, etc.  Moral Realism and the Foundations of Eth-
ics (Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press, 1989), pp. 159-67.  Gilbert 
Harman argues that the open question argument is inconclusive for similar 
reasons; an argument analogous to Moore!s can be used to prove that water 
is not H2O.   The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics (New York: Ox-
ford University  Press, 1977), pp. 17-20.  Michael Smith points out that the 
force of the open question argument depends on the dubious assumption that 
analyses cannot be correct if they  are also unobvious and informative.  The 
Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 35-9.   
against moral naturalism will be taken up in the next chapter.    
Moore!s Open Question Argument
" There have been innumerable discussions of Moore's argument. 
Although various commentators offer different versions of the open question 
argument, the best account of the core of the argument is still the one in 
Principia Ethica:
If, for example, whatever is called 'good' seems to be pleasant, the 
proposition 'Pleasure is the good' does not assert a connection 
between two different notions, but involves only  one, that of pleasure, 
which is easily  recognised as a distinct entity.  But whoever will 
attentively  consider with himself what is actually  before his mind when 
he asks the question 'Is pleasure (or whatever it may  be) after all 
good?' can easily satisfy  himself that he is not merely wondering 
whether pleasure is pleasant.  And if he will try  this experiment with 
each suggested definition in succession, he may  become expert 
enough to recognise that in every  case he has before his mind a 
unique object, a distinct question may  be asked.  Everyone does in 
fact understand the question 'Is this good?'  When he thinks of it, his 
state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked 'Is this 
pleasant, or desired, or approved?'2
Moore puts an emphasis on the mental state of competent speakers when 
they ask questions like 'Is pleasure good?' because what propels the 
argument is the distinction between the concept of moral goodness and the 
concept of having some natural property.3  Moore thinks that this conceptual 
distinction is sufficient to establish the discrete metaphysical existence of 
moral properties and natural properties.  Since open questions demonstrate 
this distinction he thinks that it is a powerful polemic against the naturalist. 
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3 The concept of moral goodness is associated with prescriptions for ac-
tion or imperatives whereas the concept of having some natural property  is 
not.  The latter has more to do with the descriptive rather than the prescrip-
tive.  It is unclear whether Moore meant to highlight this distinction when he 
spoke of the difference between the mental state of competent speakers 
when they  ask #Is pleasure good?! and the mental state of the such speakers 
when they ask #Is pleasure pleasure?!
The argument can be stated thus: 
OQ1! For any  natural property, it is an open question whether 
! something which has this natural property is morally good.
! OQ2! If for any  natural property, it is an open question whether 
! ! something which has this natural property  is morally  good, then 
! ! moral naturalism must be false
! OQ3! So moral naturalism is false.
An open question is one that a competent speaker can ask without betraying 
any conceptual confusion.  The best way  to show what this definition amounts 
to is to give an example of a closed question: is a brother a male sibling? 
This question is closed because the answer to it should be obvious to anyone 
who understands the terms 'brother' and 'male sibling.'  The concepts 
involved in this question are synonymous; anyone who grasps them and is 
sufficiently  familiar with the language in which the question is posed knows 
that the only  conceivably  correct answer is “yes.”  No further investigation is 
necessary  in order to answer a closed question.  Stating the meaning of the 
terms involved in the question is enough to show anyone with sufficient 
understanding that the answer is right before her eyes.  In contrast, there are 
no quick and easy  answers to open questions.  Answering them may  require 
further investigation, even if we already  grasp all the concepts required to 
understand the question.  Not knowing the answer to an open question 
betrays an ordinary  lack of information, as opposed to linguistic incompetence 
or conceptual confusion. 
! Moore defends the first premise of his argument by showing that 
naturalistic definitions of moral goodness are prone to open questions.  Moore 
claims that “whatever definition be offered, it may  be always asked, with 
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significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good.”4   For 
instance, since hedonists claim that goodness is nothing other than pleasure, 
we can ask, 'But is pleasure good?'  This question is open because it is 
patently  different from 'But is pleasure pleasure?'  Knowing the meaning of 
both 'good' and 'pleasure' is not sufficient to answer the question 'But is 
pleasure good?'  Even someone who is inclined to agree with the hedonist 
might say  that further explanation and argument are needed to show that 
pleasure is indeed good.  Defining moral goodness as 'what we desire to 
desire' is open to the same objection.  'But is what we desire to desire good?' 
is clearly  not the same thing as 'But is what we desire to desire what we 
desire to desire?'  The first question is open, the second is not.  
! Moore thinks that questions of the sort he raises against naturalistic 
definitions of 'good' are open because each involves 'two distinct notions.'  He 
takes the openness of such questions to be a sufficient basis for the 
conclusion that having the property of moral goodness is distinct from having 
some purely  descriptive natural property.5  Moore's explanation can be taken 
to show that the first premise of his argument applies to a wider range of 
natural properties, even complex or sophisticatedly  constructed ones.  If 
someone proposes a complex naturalistic analysis of 'good' we can ask of the 
focal point of such an analysis whether it is good.  For instance, if someone 
says that 'good' can be defined in terms of a sociobiologically  determined 
altruism—character traits or behavioral dispositions that developed through 
natural selection which promote the flourishing of our species—we can still 
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5 This of course is one of the most contested moves in Moore"s argument, 
especially  in light of the more sophisticated forms of naturalism endorsed by 
philosophers today.  Open questions might demolish analytic naturalism but 
other forms of naturalism can accommodate questions of the sort Moore 
raises.
ask if this sort of altruism is good.
! A plausible story can be told about how 'good' and other ethical 
concepts are a byproduct of evolution.  Traits and dispositions like being 
predisposed to make friends and practices like distributing goods on the basis 
of both need and merit helped humans to survive, so the disposition to abide 
by  similar traits and practices were called 'good.'  When we ask questions like 
'But is such a sociobiologically  determined altruism good?' and 'Are the traits 
we acquired through natural selection good?' it becomes apparent that these 
questions are not closed.  They  make sense in a way  that 'Is a brother a male 
sibling?' does not.  When someone asks these questions she is not asking if 
the traits and dispositions in question do in fact make us fit for survival; she 
already  understands that they  do.  Perhaps she is asking if we, as a biological 
species, should evolve further.6   Whatever she may  have in mind, the 
important point is that a naturalistic description of things that we take to be 
morally  good still does not capture something important about morality.  So 
much so that an analytic equivalence between goodness and a complex 
natural property appears inadequate.  These considerations might seem like 
a good reason to eschew any  position that posits analytic equivalence 
between moral properties and natural ones.  In any case, Moore"s argument 
is directed against any  kind of naturalism that depends on analytic identity 
between moral properties and natural ones.
! Support for the second premise of the argument comes from Moore's 
discussion of what he calls the naturalistic fallacy.  This fallacy  consists in 
conflating having the property  of moral goodness with having some natural 
property, X.  Moore complains that “far too many  philosophers have thought 
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6  Asking this question points to the normativity  or action-guidingness of 
moral terms like #good."  But since Moore himself did not explicitly  gloss open 
questions in this way normativity will not be discussed at length here.
that when they named ... other properties they  were actually defining good.”7 
Since no natural property is 'absolutely  and entirely  the same as goodness' 
Moore concludes that it is wrong to identify  goodness with any natural 
property, even if there is an objective correlation between some complex 
natural property  and goodness.  Moore endorses moral non-naturalism, but 
what he says about the implausibility  of positing analytic identity  between 
natural properties and moral ones fits well with saying that moral properties 
are natural but irreducible to non-moral or descriptive properties.  But unlike 
the non-reductive naturalist Moore believes that when we ascribe goodness 
to something we are ascribing one simple property  to it.  As far as Moore is 
concerned, goodness is sui generis.  In any  case, Moore!s non-naturalism 
resembles non-reductive naturalism because it holds that it is not possible to 
replace an attribution of goodness with an attribution of any natural property. 
" To say  that something is good is different from saying that it is X, even 
if X were a complete description of something good in terms of its natural 
properties.  This implies that there is something going on in attributions of 
moral goodness that is missing from attributions of any purely  natural 
property.  Even a complete natural description of something Moore takes to 
be morally  good would not (he and the non-reductive naturalist think) capture 
what is going on when he attributes moral goodness to that something. 
Whether a naturalist can accommodate this discrepancy  between attributions 
of natural properties and attributions of moral goodness is a separate 
question.  Moore seems to think that only a negative answer to this question 
is plausible.  But a separate argument is needed for this position.
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Some standard objections and replies
! There are a number of well-known objections to Moore"s argument 
against moral naturalism.  I will discuss some of these objections and the 
ways in which they  could be met or circumvented.  The first premise of the 
argument is standardly  charged with question begging.  Those who pose this 
objection say  that it depends on the significance of open questions in a way 
that gives the game away  to the non-naturalist.8   They  say  that naturalists 
cannot grant that the natural property  with which they  propose to define 
goodness is open to the question 'But is it good?' in any philosophically 
significant way.  For instance, a hedonist might be able to admit that she has 
to explain what she means when she says that goodness is nothing other 
than pleasure and why  she thinks that this definition of moral goodness is 
right.  But she also believes that after she has given a suitable account of 
pleasure and a justification of it, questions like 'But is pleasure good?' are 
already substantially answered, if not altogether silenced. 
! Thomas Baldwin offers a reply  to the question begging objection on 
behalf of Moore.  Baldwin points out that open questions do not have to be 
objectionable to the naturalist because they  can claim that upon conceptual 
reflection competent speakers will stop asking question like 'But is pleasure 
18
8  Those who pose this objection say  that Moore supports OQ2 by 
implicitly  assuming that moral goodness does not coincide with any  natural 
property  whatsoever.  This is most evident in the discussion of the 
naturalistic fallacy.  Indeed, this fallacy  is the prime target of the charge 
Moore begs the question against his naturalist opponents.  Frankena 
contends that by  calling any  attempt to define goodness in terms of natural 
properties a naturalistic fallacy, Moore assumes what he is trying to prove. 
The so-called fallacy  that Moore coined can only  be wielded if some other 
argument is given to knock down moral naturalism, something which 
Moore has not done.  [W.K. Frankena, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind 48 
(1939): 464-77]
good?'9  If the hedonist is right then upon conceptual reflection most, if not all, 
competent speakers would see that 'Is pleasure good?' is closed in the way 
that 'Is a brother a male sibling?' is closed.  The proposed analysis of 
goodness “should come to seem to us entirely  appropriate to guide our 
thought and judgments in accordance with it, even if at first the analysis 
strikes us as unobvious.”10  For instance, after the hedonist gives an account 
of and an argument for her position most if not all of us ought to be satisfied 
already.  But  most of us aren!t.  And Moore claims that we do not find the 
naturalist's analysis of goodness acceptable, even upon conceptual reflection. 
The main insight behind Moore's open questions is that the more we think 
about it the more we see that 'good' and 'pleasure,' or any other proposed 
naturalistic definition, are two distinct concepts.  So upon conceptual 
reflection we realize that an analytic moral naturalism cannot be true.  The 
kind of questions that Moore raised shows that synonymy or identity  between 
goodness and some natural property is impossible to establish.  A different 
kind of naturalism might turn out to be true but the analytic kind is implausible. 
But a different form of naturalism will only  fare better compared to the analytic 
kind if it can give a satisfying explanation for the insufficiency  of natural 
analytic definitions for moral goodness.  
" Another standard objection to Moore!s argument is that it presupposes 
an outdated semantics.  This objection is related to the previous one in the 
following way: even if Baldwin!s reply on behalf of Moore is true, the notion of 
analysis presupposed by his argument is mistaken so that the openness of 
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9  Thomas Baldwin, “Editor's Introduction,” Principia Ethica, Revised 
Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. xix.
10  Ibid.
questions that he poses do not disprove the naturalist!s position.11   Those 
who pose the outdated semantics objection go one step further, they say  that 
if we rely  on the natural term semantics of Frege, Kripke, and Putnam, we will 
see the real reason why  questions of the sort Moore raises are open.  There 
is usually  more than one concept associated with a single referent.  And most 
of the time we only become apprised of the fact that two concepts have the 
same referent through scientific discovery.  Moreover, the more precise 
scientific concept to which one of our ordinary notions are equivalent is 
usually  the result of conceptual and terminological innovation.   For instance, 
before the discovery  of what atoms in which specific ratio chemically 
composed water, it was thought that the colorless, transparent, odorless, 
tasteless liquid in seas, lakes, rivers, rain and most living organisms on earth 
is basic and indivisible—an atom in the literal sense of the word.  Even after 
hydrogen and oxygen were discovered it was not obvious that the water 
molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom (H2O). 
Before 1826 'Is water H2O?' was not only  an open question, it was a live 
problem in scientific research.  But when a more precise chemical 
nomenclature was proposed and instruments that could measure elements 
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11 The paradox of analysis objection is related to the objection from new 
moral semantics.  According to C.H. Langford, Moore's open questions 
trade on a lexical accident which gives rise to the paradox that no 
conceptual analysis can be both correct and informative.  It just happens 
that in English there is no synonym for 'good' in the same way that 'male 
sibling' is a synonym for 'brother.'  But if an analysis of a concept is only 
correct in the way that "brother = male sibling" then no new information can 
come from conceptual analysis.  So as long as Moore does not allow for a 
more permissive kind of conceptual analysis questions like “Is pleasure 
good?” will persist.  But if we accept the kind of analysis of concepts that 
natural science affords then there is no reason to think at the outset (as 
Moore seems to do) that no naturalistic analysis of moral concepts is 
plausible.  
   C.H. Langford, “The Notion of Analysis in Moore!s Philosophy.”  The 
Philosophy of G.E. Moore. 2nd Ed.  New York: Tudor, 1952.
with greater accuracy were made it was discovered that the water molecule is 
composed of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen.  Now we take 
the correctness of 'water = H2O' for granted; not because conceptual 
reflection allowed to see that it is right but because empirical discovery 
established it.  
! Those who propose to apply  natural term semantics to moral terms 
think that 'Is pleasure good?' is open in the same sense that 'Is water H2O?' 
was open to all competent speakers before 1826 (or is open to some 
competent speakers today  who have yet to learn basic chemistry).  They also 
say  that unless we understand this new semantics properly we might be 
inclined to say  that water is not H2O, or that moral goodness is non-natural 
just because 'water = H20' is not an a priori truth.  But this is clearly  absurd, so 
Moore's argument must be wrong-headed.  And some kind of moral 
naturalism that eschew a priori equivalence between moral and natural 
properties could turn out to be right. 
! How can one reply to the objection from new moral semantics on 
behalf of Moore?  A proponent of the open question argument must show that 
the proposed analogy  between ethics and natural science is flawed.  After all, 
this objection undermines the argument only  if the semantics of natural kinds 
applies to moral predicates in the way  that the naturalist needs to vindicate 
her theory.  To show that there is an important difference between natural 
kinds and moral predicates it is necessary  to look a little more closely at the 
former.  'Water' is a good example of a natural kind term.  Hilary  Putnam 
argues that the meaning of such terms “are not in the head” by  presenting a 
twin earth thought experiment.12  Twin earth is exactly  like earth except that 
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12 Hilary  Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” The Journal of Philosophy 70 
(1973): 699-711.
the liquid they  call water there is not H2O but a complex chemical compound 
that we could briefly summarize as XYZ.  Just like on earth 'water' fills 
oceans, and lakes, falls to ground as rain, etc., in twin earth.  When an 
earthling visits twin earth she might discover that on twin earth 'water' means 
XYZ.  Likewise, when a twin earthling—a doppelgänger of the former—visits 
earth she could discover that on earth 'water' means H2O.  But before such 
an interplanetary  exchange, an earthling and a twin earthling would most 
likely  disagree about the meaning of 'water.'  One would say that water is H2O 
while the other would claim that water is XYZ.  Once they  closely  examine the 
chemical composition of the liquid they both call water this disagreement 
would vanish.  Putnam thinks that the twin earth thought experiment shows 
that natural kind terms like 'water' are rigid indexicals.  'Water' is a rigid 
designator in that its reference is fixed by  our actual experience of H2O in our 
world.  And it is an indexical in that the natural and socio-linguistic 
environment in which it is uttered determines its referent.  If the new moral 
semanticists are right then moral predicates like 'good,' 'right,' etc., should 
behave just like 'water' in Putnam's twin earth scenario.  
! Non-reductive naturalists who endorse new  moral semantics probably 
think that Putnam"s semantic externalism can help to establish the external or 
objective basis of our moral predicates.  If the meaning of our moral terms are 
independent of competent speakers" intrinsic states and our application of 
these terms co-vary  with the natural features of the things to which we apply 
them, then they must refer to natural properties.  These naturalists think that if 
they show  that moral predicates behave like natural kind terms they could 
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make headway  in proving that moral properties are objective and natural.13 
The resulting form of naturalism would be immune from the open question 
argument because it can give a plausible naturalistic reason for the openness 
of the question !But is it good?"  Such questions are open because naturalistic 
equivalence or correspondence between two terms can only  be established 
through empirical research and most of the time conceptual and 
terminological innovation is needed before we can even speak of such an 
equivalence, e.g. Water = H2O, temperature = mean molecular kinetic energy, 
etc.  So there could be a natural property  to which moral predicates refer 
even if we have not discovered it yet.  
# Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons offer a new version of Moore"s 
open question argument that could prove useful for replying to the objection 
posed by the new moral semanticists.14  They present a Putnam-style thought 
experiment that aims to show that moral terms do not rigidly  refer to natural 
properties, even if these properties causally  regulate our use of moral terms.15 
Horgan and Timmons ask us to conceive of a planet exactly  like ours in all 
natural respects.  But whereas on earth moral terms are causally  regulated by 
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13  If semantic internalism, the belief that what a speaker means by  the 
words that she speaks depends on her intrinsic features, is true for both natu-
ral kinds and moral predicates, then moral naturalists could still use this se-
mantic strategy  to justify  their position.  But this time they  have to forgo the 
objective or external component of their view.  A moral naturalism that en-
dorses semantic internalism about moral predicates would have something in 
common with moral subjectivism.
14  Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Troubles for New Wave Moral 
Semantics: The !Open Question Argument" Revived,” Philosophical Papers 21 
(1992): 153-75.
15 “Our central claim will be this: ...moral terms do not rigidly  refer to the 
natural properties that causally  regulate their use by  humans.  Although 
causal regulation may  well coincide with--or even constitute--reference for 
certain terms (e.g. Names and physical natural-kind terms), we claim that for 
moral terms anyway, causal regulation does not coincide with reference.  I.e., 
moral terms do not refer to the natural properties that (we are supposing) 
causally regulate their use by humans (Ibid. p.160).”
consequentialist properties, on moral twin earth moral terms are causally 
regulated by  nonconsequentialist properties.  The notion of causal regulation 
of a moral term by  some natural property  or properties comes from Richard 
Boyd!s account of moral naturalism.  According to Boyd, “a term t refers to a 
kind (property, relation, etc.) k just in case there exist causal mechanisms 
whose tendency  is to bring it about over time, that what is predicated of the 
term t will be approximately  true of k.”16  This theory  of reference allows us to 
say  that premodern thinkers who were ignorant of the chemical composition 
of water, gold, etc., were nevertheless referring to these natural kinds that we 
pick out with greater precision today.  Although Aristotle, for instance, would 
be unable to say  that water and heavy water are the same compound by  in-
vestigating physical properties of samples alone, his use of the term "water! 
(or more accurately, hud#r) is intended to be responsive to distinctions in na-
ture that he may  be mistaken about.  Since "water" is causally  regulated by  a 
specific chemical natural kind (H2O on earth) even at the time when what is 
true of H2O was unknown, the term "water" already  stands in the right relation 
with the natural kind that causally regulates its use.  A naturalist like Boyd has 
it that moral terms could turn out to be like "water! and other natural kind 
terms.
$ Horgan and Timmons!s moral twin earth scenario poses a challenge to 
Boyd!s position by  showing that our semantic intuitions about a disagreement 
between earthlings and twin earthlings about some moral matter is different 
from our semantic intuitions about an analogous disagreement that features 
natural kinds.  When a chemist and a twin chemist disagree about the chemi-
cal composition of water, the former saying that it is H2O  while the latter in-
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16 Richard Boyd, “How to be a Moral Realist,” Moral Discourse and Prac-
tice: Some Philosophical Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 1996) 
p. 116.
sists that it is XYZ, our semantic intuitions incline us to say  that their dis-
agreement is merely  spurious.  When they discover that the chemical compo-
sition of the liquid in rivers, oceans, clouds, etc., on earth is H2O  but XYZ on 
twin earth their disagreement would cease to exist.  If they  are philosophically 
inclined they  might event think that !water" is causally regulated by  some spe-
cific chemical kind at the planetary  or global level, but more generally  refers to 
a physical natural kind--a genus--of which H2O  and XYZ are member species. 
But when an earthling and a twin earthling disagree about a moral matter our 
semantic intuitions do not incline us to say that their disagreement is merely 
spurious.  Indeed, most of us are inclined to say  that theirs is a genuine moral 
disagreement.  Horgan and Timmons think that this marked difference be-
tween our semantic intuitions about moral terms and natural kind terms show 
that moral terms, unlike natural kind terms, are not referential and that syn-
thetic moral naturalism is false.17
# Naturalists reply  to Horgan and Timmons"s argument against moral 
naturalism by  pointing out that our semantic intuitions about moral twin earth 
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17  Roughly, Horgan and Timmons"s argument against moral naturalism 
can be summed up as follows:
P1# If metaphysical moral naturalism is true then either it is analytic 
# # or it is synthetic
P2# If analytic moral naturalism is true, then questions of the sort 
# that Moore raised must be closed.
P3# If synthetic moral naturalism is true, then the moral twin earth 
# scenario must be interpreted (with the help of our semantic in-
# tuitions) in the same way that we interpret Putnam"s original 
# twin earth thought experiments.
P4# But questions of the sort Moore raised are open.
P5# Our semantic intuitions incline us to interpret the moral twin 
# earth scenario differently.
P6# So metaphysical moral naturalism must be false.  
are underwritten by  the normativity  of moral terms.  They  say  that the reason 
a disagreement between earthlings and twin earthlings about some moral 
matter is genuine despite the marked difference between the natural proper-
ties that causally  regulate their use of terms like !good" and !right" is that these 
terms are action-guiding.18   Regardless of which set of natural properties 
speakers associate with moral terms, they  take these terms to give them rea-
son to act in accordance with what they  take to be !good" or !right."  So even if 
speakers do not use these terms to refer to the same set of natural proper-
ties, they  could set this difference aside and have a meaningful argument 
about what ought to be done.  The possibility  of having such an argument 
hardly shows that moral terms do not function referentially; it merely  shows 
that moral terms are not only  referential in function.  Since naturalists who 
subscribe to new moral semantics think that Moore"s argument trades on the 
normativity  of moral terms and concepts so all that it really  shows is that there 
is a difference between the descriptive and the normative.19  Since some of 
these naturalists account for moral normativity  by  endorsing motivational 
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18 David Copp, “Milk, Honey  and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Syn-
these 124 (2000): 113-37.
19  This difference can be taken as good reason to eschew reductive 
analysis of moral terms and concepts.  But it does not necessarily  show that 
moral properties are not natural.
judgment externalism,20 rather than talking about moral semantics, their posi-
tion is immune from both Moore!s and Horgan and Timmons!s antinaturalist 
arguments.
Towards a new argument against moral naturalism
" If there is a type of moral disagreement that casts doubt on the useful-
ness of the notion of causal regulation for explaining away  questions of the 
sort posed in the open question argument, then new moral semantics and a 
sophisticated moral psychology  may not be enough to prevent an antinatural-
ist to set up a new argument similar to Moore!s.  The naturalist has it that like 
natural kind terms, moral terms refer to some unique set of natural properties 
even though we do not yet have a very clear idea of what these natural prop-
erties are.  Even though we use terms like #good! and #right! in the same way 
that Aristotle used the term #water!--that is, crudely and without much empiri-
cal precision--at some point in time a full-fledged naturalistic moral theory 
would allow us to use moral terms with greater sophistication and accuracy. 
But if a certain type of moral disagreement stands in the way  of discovering 
which set of natural properties moral terms really  refer to, then the moral 
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20 Motivational judgment externalism is the belief that the connection be-
tween making a moral judgment and being motivated to act according to that 
judgment is contingent rather than necessary.  Most externalists qualify  this 
statement by  saying that such a contingent connection could turn out to de-
pend on human beings! deep or widely  shared (natural, i.e. psychological) 
features.  Naturalists who endorse externalism typically  say  that on their view 
being motivated to act according to a normative moral judgment can be wide-
spread and predictable “even if it is neither necessary, nor universal, nor over-
riding (Brink 1989, p. 49).”  Hence a moral naturalist can explain away  the 
disagreement between earthlings and twin earthlings by  saying that the dif-
ference between their usage of moral terms and concepts must be correlated 
with a difference in their psychological features.  In the same way that in Put-
nam!s twin earth the twin earthlings! bodies are made up mostly  of XYZ rather 
than H2O, people!s psychological features on moral twin earth are constituted 
differently  compared to earth!s.  But this hardly  shows that moral naturalism is 
in trouble in the way that Horgan and Timmons say that it is.  
naturalist!s hope of vindicating their position cannot be fulfilled, and a new 
antinaturalist argument might work.
" The type of moral disagreement relevant here is similar to the one 
found in Horgan and Timmons!s response to the objection from new moral 
semantics.  When an earthling and a twin earthling disagree about some spe-
cific moral matter, say capital punishment, their disagreement could persist 
even when they  discover that their use of moral terms are causally  regulated 
by  different sets of descriptive properties, or even when they  discover that 
different psychological features stand behind their use of moral terms.  And as 
Horgan and Timmons pointed out, most people who contemplate such a 
situation would agree with the earthling!s and twin earthling!s assessment of 
their situation.  Let!s assume that the earthling Oscar, whose usage of moral 
terms is causally  regulated by  consequentialist properties, thinks that capital 
punishment is morally  justifiable under certain circumstances.  Assume also 
that twin Oscar, whose use of moral terms is causally  regulated by  nonconse-
quentialist properties, thinks that there are no circumstances under which 
capital punishment is morally justifiable.21  When Oscar and twin Oscar argue 
about their conflicting moral beliefs about capital punishment it is difficult to 
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21 In their article Horgan and Timmons stipulate that use of moral terms on 
twin earth are causally  regulated by  some nonconsequentialist property 
whose functional essence is captured by  some specific deontological theory 
(p. 164).  In the account of the disagreement between earthlings and twin 
earthlings given here I am merely relying on the coherence of saying that 
some specific form of deontological theory  is compatible with the statement 
#There are no circumstances under which capital punishment is morally  justi-
fiable! and that some specific form of consequentialism is compatible with the 
statement #There are some circumstances, namely  those that maximize utility, 
in which capital punishment is morally  justifiable.!  Of course it is possible to 
use consequentialist considerations to argue against capital punishment just 
as it is possible to argue for capital punishment on deontological grounds. 
What matters for the discussion here is that absent an assumption that some 
specific form of a normative theory, either consequentialist or nonconsequen-
tialist, is correct, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say which of two moral theo-
ries that are internally  consistent and at the same time congruent with de-
scriptive facts is correct.  
know which of them is right.  Because they  won!t only  be arguing about what 
ought to be done in this or that particular case that falls within the purview of 
their debate, but also about whose usage of moral terms is better, it is difficult 
to see how the debate can be settled.  Like the hypothetical moral agent cited 
above who wants to know  whether a sociobiologically  determined altruism is 
good, the two Oscars want to know which, if any, of them is right.  The intrac-
tability  of their disagreement does not imply  that moral naturalism is false, but 
such a disagreement could be used as a basis for saying that someone who 
knows all natural facts could be morally ignorant.
" The two Oscars are liable to cite descriptive or natural facts which are 
true on both earth and twin earth to support their position.  It is also likely  that 
each would give a good argument for the internal consistency of their respec-
tive positions.  Since the world which they  inhabit have virtually  the same de-
scriptive features, their disagreement would not hinge on the correctness of 
factual reports but on the relation of these facts to the moral principle to which 
they subscribe and to their established use of moral terms.  Oscar and twin 
Oscar might appeal to the internal consistency  of their use of moral terms and 
the coherence of that usage with natural facts.  But absent some way  of arbi-
trating between two equally  coherent naturalistic positions it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to settle the disagreement between them.  Someone fully  in-
formed about the debate between the two Oscars might think that the moral 
norms to which the disputants subscribe and the semantic norms that govern 
their use of moral terms are irreconcilable.  So much so that even access to 
more descriptive facts may  not be enough to determine which moral norms 
and which semantic norms about moral terms, if any, are justified.  
" It is noteworthy that the hypothetical disagreement described above is 
already  implicit in the contemporary  debate on capital punishment.  Pro-
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tracted and impassioned discussion of the pros and cons of capital punish-
ment has not yielded any  clear indication of which side is right.22  Neither has 
it become any clearer how the dispute can be settled.  It seems that nothing 
short of a sudden change in the evaluative priorities23 of one side could gen-
erate a consensus between the parties involved.  It also seems that the best 
way  to understand the persistent disagreement about capital punishment is to 
treat it not only  as a dispute about what ought to be done but also as a differ-
ence of opinion about what counts as good.  In other words, those who dis-
agree about capital punishment may not only accept different morally relevant 
rules or principles for action, they may  also be using !good! in different ways 
as a consequence of the difference between the moral norms that they 
accept.24  One side"s usage of !good! is probably  causally tracked by  a set of 
natural properties, which is constituted such that it excludes actions or states 
of affairs in which punishment that result in death is imposed.  In contrast, the 
set of natural properties that causally  track the opposing side"s usage of 
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22 Except of course that the staunch supporters of the opposing sides are 
certain that they  are right, and that most people have deep convictions about 
the matter one way  or the other.  But not one participant or group involved in 
the debate can provide evidence similar to those that scientists offer for their 
theories that could vindicate their moral position.
23 In a debate like the one on capital punishment, the matter hinges not on 
which action or state of affairs is good but on which one is to be given greater 
evaluative weight.  Participants in the debate are likely to share beliefs about 
the immeasurable value of a life, the irrevocability  of meting out a death pen-
alty, the merits of the existing judicial system, the fact that some crimes are 
worse than others, and so on.  What they  disagree about is comparative 
moral worth of something they both take to be morally valuable.
24 This is another way  of saying that their use of moral terms is governed 
by  different sets semantic norms.  However, each set of semantic norms 
seems to include the rule that even in the event that moral terms and con-
cepts are used differently a genuine disagreement can occur between speak-
ers.  It also seems that there is a more permissive threshold for disagreement 
about moral matters; despite a considerable difference in the semantic norms 
that govern speakers" use of moral terms and substantive variance in moral 
principles disputants may still have a genuine moral disagreement.  
!good! must be constituted such that it includes certain instantiations of the 
death penalty.  It is possible to imagine the participants in this debate saying 
thus:
A: Imposing capital punishment violates my conception of what is morally 
right, which involves a duty  to recognize the immeasurable value of human 
life that we can neither give nor take away  from any individual.  It is never 
right to impose capital punishment.
B: But I don"t see things the way you do.  I think that under certain conditions 
imposing capital punishment can be morally  right.  My concept of morality  en-
tails that an act is right if it promotes the welfare of the greatest number and 
recognizes the demands of justice.  Imposing capital punishment on those 
who commit heinous crimes clearly  falls under this concept because it is the 
only  acceptable form of redress in the circumstances and it deters further 
commission of such crimes.25
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25  In order to show that there are problems with Frank Jackson"s moral 
naturalism, Denis Robinson discusses a similar type of moral disagreement:
“Argle:# Assisted voluntary euthanasia violates my entire concept of 
what"s right, which holds human life sacrosanct.  It is always wrong.
Bargle:# Au contraire, it"s often right.  According to my  concept, what"s 
right is what maximizes well-being and minimizes suffering, so long as core 
moral values are respected.  Autonomy  is one of them.  Coupled with the im-
perative to minimize suffering, it trumps the so-called sanctity  of human life 
[“Moral Functionalism, Ethical Quasi-Relativism, and the Canberra Plan,” 
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2009), p. 318).”
Robinson thinks that there are some disagreements in which it is idle to 
ask which party  is right from a neutral standpoint because no such standpoint 
exists.  Any attempt to arrive at such a standpoint imports neutrality  into one 
of the competing positions, thereby  amounting to a petitio.  But whereas Rob-
inson thinks that this type of moral disagreement shows that moral functional-
ism implies quasi-relativism.  Robinson rightly  points out that this position is 
still a naturalistic form of moral realism.  But what matters for present pur-
poses is that the type of disagreement being discussed supports a new and 
interesting argument for antinaturalism.   More on this in Chapter 4.
! In a case like this, even someone who knows all descriptive facts 
about capital punishment may  not know whether it is morally  justifiable.  The 
kind of convergence of moral opinion that could end the debate does not 
seem to be forthcoming.  The difference between those who advocate and 
those who oppose capital punishment does not seem to depend on a differ-
ence in how they  enumerate facts about matter under discussion.  Rather, it 
rests on a difference in what they  believe ought to be done given the facts. 
So much so that even someone who knows all natural facts may not be able 
to infer from what he knows something that could tell us which of the dispu-
tants got things right.
! When we ask which analysis of goodness or sets of natural properties 
that causally  track moral terms is correct we are asking in effect whether it is 
A or B who got things right.  It is not only  that we want to know if all things 
considered we ought to bring it about that the natural properties or analyses 
ought to be pursued, we want to know who is mistaken and who is right in 
using moral terms in the way  that they  do.   Naturalists, like common folk, 
would say  that A and B can"t both be right.  But naturalists, unlike common 
folk, owe us an account of how we can determine which position is the right 
one.  If such an explanation is not forthcoming, then moral naturalism is in 
trouble.  
! To mount a new argument against naturalism, a hypothetical moral 
agent who knows all the natural properties that constitute something but is 
still uncertain whether this something is good can be used to replace the 
tendency  of competent speakers to ask the sort of questions that Moore 
raises.  Being confronted with persistent disagreement between well-meaning 
and well-informed moral agents, who are also competent users of moral 
terms, could give someone who knows all natural facts a reason to think that 
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the wrongness of what moral agents disagree about may  not be a natural, or 
even a factual matter.26  What matters for this new antinaturalist argument is 
the shift from talk of competent speakers asking open questions to talk about 
fully  informed moral agents who are uncertain whether something is good. 
There seems to be no straightforward contradiction involved in knowing about 
all the natural features of something and not being sure whether this thing is 
morally good.  
! A fully  informed moral agent could remain uncertain whether 
something is good because he knows that competent speakers who are well-
informed about moral matters still disagree not only  about what ought to be 
done but also about which use of moral terms is right.  Since knowledge of all 
the natural features of something and competence with moral terms do not 
guarantee agreement about the moral goodness of that thing among moral 
agents, the moral goodness things may  not be a natural matter at all.27 
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26  Although persistent moral disagreement is not ubiquitous the applica-
tion of complex moral notions like "just punishment# to different sets of natural 
facts ensure that the disagreement that can be gleaned from the moral twin 
earth scenario is widespread.  There are some moral matters about which 
there seems to be a consensus, e.g. murder, slavery, torture for fun, etc. 
Whether such a consensus is sufficient for establishing that a specific set of 
natural properties causally  regulate our use of moral terms as a matter of ob-
jective necessity  is a separate question, especially  since even well-informed 
moral agents do not agree about what counts as murder, slavery  or torture for 
fun.  It is possible that lack of agreement about the right use of moral terms 
could undermine the apparent certitude brought about by  our agreement on 
murder, slavery, torture for fun, etc.  Answering these questions could turn out 
to be dependent on yet to be discovered empirical facts about what compe-
tent and well-meaning moral agents are disposed to desire and what it takes 
for a moral disagreement like the one described to be resolved.
27  It still remains possible that moral goodness is natural, but then the 
naturalist would also have to say that it is inaccessible to well-informed and 
well-meaning moral agents, whom we nevertheless take to be competent with 
moral terms, just which natural properties are objectively correlated with 
moral terms.  But of course it is absurd to say  that the objectively correct use 
of moral terms is inaccessible to competent speakers who are well-informed 
about that natural features of a moral matter.  So if it can be shown that this is 
the only  option that remains for the naturalist, then that would serve as a re-
ductio of their position.  
Unlike Moore!s open question argument this new antinaturalist argument 
does not derive a metaphysical conclusion from a semantic premise.  Instead, 
it derives a metaphysical conclusion from an epistemological premise.  In the 
next four chapters this new "knowledge argument! against moral naturalism 
will be discussed further.  Here it was merely  shown that since some moral 
disputes cast doubt on the possibility  that our moral judgments are 
naturalistically  justified, knowledge of natural facts are not sufficient for 
knowing whether something is morally  good.  As we shall see, this conclusion 




someone who knows all natural facts 
but does not know whether something is morally good
! When he returned to Cambridge and to philosophy  in 1929 after many 
years of self-imposed exile, Wittgenstein delivered a lecture on ethics.1  In 
this lecture he explicitly  adopts some of Moore's ideas.  “My  subject, as you 
know is Ethics, and I will adopt the explanation of that term which Professor 
Moore has given in his book Principia Ethica.”2  Despite this reference and 
Darwall, Gibbard and Railton"s discussion of the similarity  between 
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1  Ludwig Wittgenstein, “A Lecture on Ethics,” Philosophical Review 74 
(1965), 3-12.  Also in Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, Ed. James C. 
Klagge and Alfred Norman (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993) 37-44.  Hereafter this 
work will be referred to as LE.
According to Klagge and Norman, LE was delivered to a society  called 
'The Heretics' on 17 November at the invitation of C.K. Ogden (p. 36).  1929 
is the beginning of Wittgenstein's so-called middle-period (1929-1936), that 
time he was already  inclined to repudiate what he wrote in the Tractatus but 
he had yet to write the views that were later published as the Philosophical 
Investigations.  The editors of The Philosophical Review wrote in a note that 
the text of the lecture published in their journal “is a transcript of shorthand 
notes made by... Friedrich Waismann during and after conversations with 
Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick in 1929 and 1930 (p. 3).” Wittgenstein re-
peated the main lines of his lecture to Waisman and Schlick between Decem-
ber 1929 and January 1930 [Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty of 
Genius (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), p. 282].  G.H. von Wright's catalogue 
of Wittgenstein's papers lists two existing version of LE: a 22-page handwrit-
ten manuscript (MS 139a) and a 10-page typescript (TS 207). Von Wright 
claims that “139a differs in some interesting respects from the typescript (207) 
from which the lecture was posthumously printed in the Philosophical Review. 
[Georg Henrik von Wright, “The Wittgenstein Papers,” Philosophical Occas-
sions 1912-1951, pp. 496-7]
Brian McGuinness speculates that LE is probably based on a German text 
which is now  lost.  [Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Re-
corded by Friedrich Waismann (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), p. 92 n. 
60.]
2 LE p. 4
Wittgenstein!s and Moore's views on ethics,3 the parallel between their views 
have neither been explored nor appreciated much.   Some even go so far as 
to say that Wittgenstein!s lecture is of no significance whatsoever.4  But apart 
from explicitly  referring to Moore in his lecture, Wittgenstein also presents an 
argument against moral naturalism reminiscent of the open question 
argument.5   Wittgenstein's argument, which is based on the possible moral 
ignorance of someone who knows all natural facts, bears a striking similarity 
to Moore!s, which relies on competent speakers who persist in asking certain 
questions.  
" This new antinaturalist argument rests on the idea that if someone 
who knows all natural facts would not know whether something is morally 
good, then moral goodness must not be a natural matter.  I will call this 
argument the world book argument (WBA) and the omniscient person in it 
Jeeves, after the knowledgeable butler in P.G. Wodehouse!s writings.6  In this 
chapter it will be shown that the world book argument presents a formidable 
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3 Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, “Toward Fin De Siècle Ethics,” pp.117-9.
4 E.D. Klemke, “Wittgenstein!s Lecture on Ethics,” Journal of Value Inquiry 
9 (1975): 118-27.
“Wittgenstein!s Lecture on Ethics is undoubtedly  one of the shoddiest 
things ever written on the subject (p. 118).”
“Wittgenstein!s #Lecture on Ethics! is of no worth whatever for ethical in-
quiry, and ... the manner of philosophizing which it exhibits is despicable (p. 
127).”
5 This is something that Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, or even David Wig-
gins who pointed out the Wittgenstein reference to them, seem to have 
missed.
6 Jeeves has long been associated with being a helpful know-it-all, as evi-
denced by the internet search engine named after him (askjeeeves.com), one 
of the precursors of the now ubiquitous google.  Jeeves, like Wittgenstein!s 
omniscient person and the ideal advisor or observer in some ethical theories, 
is someone we typically defer to regarding correct moral judgment.  But at the 
same time, Jeeves and other similar characters are constructed as an aid to 
limited and fallible moral agents.  Archangels, omniscient persons, ideal ob-
servers and fully  rational versions of ourselves are all aides to whom we de-
fer, so naming such a character Jeeves is fitting.  
challenge to moral naturalism because it is immune from some of the 
standard objections to Moore!s argument and because it shares some of the 
advantages of another well-known argument: Jackson!s knowledge argument 
against physicalism.  The world book argument embodies the new and more 
promising argument against moral naturalism that began to emerge at the 
end of the previous chapter.
Wittgenstein!s Argument Against Moral Naturalism      
" It is unclear whether Wittgenstein intended his discussion of an 
omniscient person!s ignorance about ethics to be a basis for a new 
antinaturalist argument similar to Moore!s.  There is insufficient evidence in 
the published writings of both philosophers to indicate anything definite on 
this point.  Nevertheless, it is obvious that in the following passage 
Wittgenstein expresses some interesting ideas that bolster the new argument 
against moral naturalism that emerged at the end of Chapter 2.
Now what I wish to contend is that, although all judgments of relative 
value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of 
fact can ever be or imply, a judgment of absolute value.  Suppose one 
of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew  all the 
movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also 
knew all the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived, and 
suppose this man wrote all he knew in a big book, then this book 
would contain the whole description of the world; and what I want to 
say  is that this book would contain nothing that would be called an 
ethical judgment or anything that would logically  imply  such a 
judgment.  It would of course contain all relative judgments of value 
and all true scientific propositions and in fact all true propositions that 
can be made.  But all facts described would, as it were, stand on the 
same level and in the same way  all propositions stand on the same 
level.7 
Wittgenstein thinks that someone fully  informed about the physical and men-
tal features of the world will not know whether something is good.  This im-
plies that someone who remains unsure whether killing another human being 
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7 LE p. 6
is good does not necessarily  remain uncertain because of ordinary  ignorance, 
i.e. lack of information about the natural features of such an act.  Wittgen-
stein!s omniscient person scenario is supported by  the traditional distinction 
between instrumental and intrinsic value; Wittgenstein calls the former relative 
or trivial and the latter absolute.  He rightly  points out that statements that ex-
press the instrumental value of something can always be reformulated as a 
statement of fact.  For example, when we say  that someone is a good police 
officer we mean that she enforces the law according to established procedure 
with a certain degree of efficiency.  Here enforcement of the law is the pur-
pose relative to which a police officer is evaluated.  The value involved in the 
relative or instrumental sense of "good! is a function of a means-ends relation 
between a predetermined purpose and something that brings it about.  In con-
trast, ethics is concerned with what is good "in itself;! like Moore, Wittgenstein 
thinks that this is the kind of value that ethical expressions convey.  Intrinsic 
value is usually described as something that is pursued for its own sake.  
# For instance, we think that the enforcement of the law is good be-
cause it allows a large number of people to live happy  and productive lives; 
the latter is a good candidate for something intrinsically  valuable.  We think 
that the collective happiness of a great number of people is worth pursuing for 
its own sake; it is not worthwhile merely  because it serves another purpose. 
If someone asks us why we think that the collective happiness of a great 
number of people is good we might describe the situation in more detail and 
say  that it is a situation in which many  people are pleased.  We might then 
ask our interlocutor to imagine herself happy  or pleased and ask her if she 
thinks that some things are good because it contributes to bringing about 
such a state.  If she gives an affirmative answer then we might add that the 
happiness of a great number of people is that from which many other things 
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derive their goodness.  So it is the collective happiness of a great number of 
people from which the goodness of other things derive; such a situation is 
non-derivatively  good.  If our interlocutor persists in asking how we are sure 
about the goodness of the happiness of a great number of people we might 
wonder what we could do to convince her that we are right.  She might persist 
in asking questions because she does not see that valuing her own happi-
ness automatically  gives her a reason to value the happiness of a great num-
ber of people, whether it includes her or not.  This development merely shows 
that valuing something because of its intrinsic moral worth is different from 
valuing something for prudential reasons.  In any case, we think that we are 
right about the non-derivative moral worth of the happiness of a great number 
of people, but how do we know this?8  Does our interlocutor persist in asking 
questions because there is some piece of information about the natural world 
that she lacks?  
! Wittgenstein favors a negative answer to this question.  The quote 
from his lecture above implies that the following two propositions "stand on 
the same level:# (1) A great number of people are happy; and (2) A great 
number of people are suffering.  He thinks that a person omniscient about all 
the natural facts could be ignorant about the important ethical difference be-
tween (1) and (2).  In writing a world book a person omniscient about all the 
natural facts will describe the world neutrally, his book would contain either (1) 
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8 There is a certain sense in which evaluative statements like "A situation 
in which a great number of people are happy  is intrinsically  good#  cannot be 
proved.  In this way, even those evaluative statements about which virtually 
everyone agrees have the same status as the existence of the external world, 
the existence of other minds and other common sense propositions.  They 
are not indubitable.  However, once it is granted that knowledge of natural 
facts is possible, even if not all natural facts are cognitively  accessible, doubt 
about non-evaluative common sense propositions disappear.  Wittgenstein#s 
point about ethical judgments is that even if we grant that someone knows all 
natural facts, it is still possible to doubt whether such a person knows that the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number is intrinsically good.  
or (2) but it would not contain the judgment that (1) is good and (2) is bad, 
and the writer of the world book might not think that he must do something to 
bring about (1) and prevent (2) from happening or continuing to happen. 
Wittgenstein goes so far as to say that in this world book murder “will be on 
exactly  the same level as any  other event, for instance the falling of a stone.”9 
This is a provocative way of putting the point about the complete absence of 
evaluative statements in the omniscient person!s description of the world.  It is 
certainly possible to describe the world in value-neutral terms.  But Wittgen-
stein makes a stronger claim: a complete value-neutral description of the 
world, i.e. a world book, would not contain anything that implies a moral 
judgment.  So when someone omniscient about all the natural facts writes a 
world book, this book would include the fact that some moral judgments are 
accepted by  virtually  everyone, but it would not include any statement that 
would count as a moral fact. 
" Since the omniscient person!s world book does not contain any  moral 
facts, it follows that the omniscient person is morally  ignorant.  After all, such 
a person cannot refrain from making other judgments because of what he 
knows, e.g. naturalistic judgments that are necessary  for knowing exactly how 
the human brain works or socioeconomic judgments that are necessary for 
fully  understanding what events created the recent economic recession.  If 
someone omniscient about all natural facts does not make moral judgments, 
then this must mean that judgments made in the moral domain do not stand 
on the same level as naturalistic, socioeconomic, and other similar conclu-
sions that can be drawn from natural facts.  Moral judgments then must be 
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9 LE p. 6
different from other types of judgments.10   Wittgenstein thinks that the ab-
sence of any  ethical statements in the omniscient person!s world book is a 
sufficient basis for saying that the goodness must either be ineffable or non-
existent.  
" It is noteworthy  that in his lecture Wittgenstein ends with a disjunctive 
conclusion: ethics is either supernatural or nonexistent.11   He even goes so 
far as to say that he is inclined to believe that ethics falls within the domain of 
the mystical.12  Since Wittgenstein does not say more about what he clearly 
takes to be ineffable it is difficult to say  what the claim that ethics is super-
natural amounts to.  It is worth noting, however, that even the claim that ethi-
cal properties are supernatural or nonnatural is prone to the objection posed 
by  the type of question raised by Moore in his open question argument.13 
Even if good means #is approved by  God,# it is possible to ask of something, 
which is approved by God, whether it is good.  Although Wittgenstein and the 
Ancient Greeks may  not have had the same deity  in mind, Plato!s Euthyphro 
demonstrates very  well that defining piety  or goodness in terms of what is 
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10 It is possible that not only moral judgments but also all evaluative judg-
ments differ from natural or descriptive ones.
11 “Ethics, if it is anything at all, is supernatural (LE p. 7).”  
12  “My whole tendency  and I believe the tendency of all men who ever 
tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of 
language.  This running against the boundaries of our cage is perfectly, abso-
lutely  hopeless.  Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say  something 
about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, 
can be no science.  What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. 
But it is a document of tendency  in the human mind which I personally  cannot 
help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it (LE pp. 11-12).”
13 Moore himself did not see that the strategy  he used to undermine that 
moral naturalist!s position can be used against moral nonnaturalism.  This is 
probaby why  some philosophers call Moore!s deployment of the open ques-
tion argument accident-prone (Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, p. 115).  
loved by  the gods gives rise to a formidable problem.14  If something is good 
because it is loved by  the gods then this would make goodness arbitrary  but if 
the gods love something because it is good then we still do not know what 
makes things good.  Perhaps it is because of the latter possibility  that we 
could still ask whether something approved by  the gods is good.  Whatever 
the reason, it is ineffectual to define goodness in terms of of what is loved or 
approved by  the gods.  That is why  notwithstanding Wittgenstein!s predilec-
tion for mysticism, an antinaturalist conclusion with antirealist affinities fits well 
with the argument that he gives in his lecture.  The world book argument can 
be stated thus:
WB1" " Someone who knows all natural facts would fail to know whether 
" " some"thing "is morally good.
WB2" If someone who knows all natural facts does not know whether 
" something is morally good, then moral naturalism must be false.
WB3" So moral naturalism is false.
Stated in this way  the world book argument has obvious parallels with 
Moore!s argument against moral naturalism.  But instead of deriving a meta-
physical conclusion from semantic premises, this new  antinaturalist argument 
uses an epistemological premise to arrive at a metaphysical conclusion.  If a 
person omniscient about all the natural facts does not know whether some-
thing is morally  good, then knowing whether something is morally  good must 
not be a natural matter.  In the previous chapter we have already begun to 
see that stating the antinaturalist position in this way  has significant advan-
tages, here we will see the advantages of the world book argument in greater 
detail.
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14 Plato, Euthyphro, Trans. G.M.A. Grube.  Plato: Complete Works.  Ed. 
John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
The world book argument and the open question argument
! Stipulating omniscience about natural facts alone cannot propel an 
argument against moral naturalism; in itself it merely  clarifies what is at stake 
in a debate in which one side claims that certain things exist while the other 
denies their very  existence.15  This is why it is necessary  to explain what it 
means for Jeeves to be omniscient about all the natural facts but ignorant 
about moral goodness and why  he is the way  that he is.  In the previous 
section it was shown that an omniscient person would not necessarily  make 
ethical judgments, i.e. Jeeves can write a complete description of the world 
without making any  moral judgments.  In this section we will begin to see why 
such a possibility  implies that naturalistic forms of moral realism are in 
trouble.  
! The reason Jeeves"s failure to make moral judgments implies that 
moral properties are not natural has something to do with the type of moral 
disagreement discussed in the last section of the previous chapter.16   In this 
 43
15 The idea of omniscience alone is neutral.  Using the idea of knowing all 
natural facts alone can only go so far, it is a tool that both realists and antire-
alists about a certain domain could use to clarify their position.
“The idea of an omniscient God is often appealed to by  philosophers who 
have no belief, or even interest, in the existence of such a being.  An omnis-
cient God is a useful expository device for realists who believe that there are 
true propositions which we human beings may never be in a position to assert 
with good warrant.   They  may be truths about the remote past, about remote 
corners of the universe, about Schrödinger"s cat, or about the secrets of the 
human heart; the idea is that, while such matters may  be impenetrable to us, 
we can think of God as knowing the truth of the matter.
Anti-realists, by  contrast, may invoke the idea of an omniscient God in al-
most the opposite way.  Consider, for example, the question #If John Kennedy 
hadn"t been assassinated, would George Bush still have been elected presi-
dent of the United States in 1988?".  A philosopher is anti-realist about coun-
terfactuals might say  that there is here no truth of the matter, nothing that 
even an omniscient God could know.”  [Murray  MacBeath and Paul Helm. 
“Omniscience and Eternity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supple-
mentary Volumes 63 (1989): p. 55.]
16 See pp. 28-31.
type of moral disagreement the disputants agree about the natural features of 
the matter under discussion, but disagree about what moral conclusions to 
draw from these natural features.  It was previously  shown that if Moore!s 
argument against moral naturalism had relied on this type of disagreement 
rather than on the questions of the sort he posed about naturalistic analyses 
of moral goodness, his argument would have fared better.  Here it will be 
shown that the world book argument is better than the open question 
argument precisely  because it makes use of the relevant type of moral 
disagreement to make a case against moral naturalism.  
" Ordinary  use of moral terms and concepts has the appearance of 
being descriptive; statements that feature moral predicates resemble 
statements that feature natural property  attributions.  Moreover, the moral 
goodness of something co-varies with the natural features of that thing. 
These considerations partly  support the moral naturalist!s claim that correct 
usage of moral terms and concepts are causally  tracked by  a set of natural 
properties.  But since moral agents who have access to the same natural 
facts about the moral matter under discussion can arrive at different moral 
conclusions about it, doubts about the usefulness of the notion of #causal 
tracking#  for establishing the claim that moral properties are natural arise. 
Each participant in the relevant moral dispute would support her conclusion 
by  citing natural facts and appealing to the normative moral principles to 
which she subscribes, which each could in turn show to be congruent with 
natural facts.  But since more than one set of normative moral principles are 
congruent with natural facts we have to ask how, if at all, we can know for 
sure that this or that set of normative moral principles is justified.  Without 
finding some neutral standpoint from which to arbitrate such a disagreement 
by  showing just which moral principles are correct, the whole notion of #causal 
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tracking!  begins to look dubious.  That there are at least two different ways of 
drawing moral conclusions from the same set of natural facts implies that 
drawing moral conclusions from natural facts is not a matter of making an 
objective inference.
" If moral naturalists are right, i.e., if it is true that moral properties are 
natural properties, then surely  sincere and well-informed moral agents must 
arrive at similar moral conclusions given that they  agree about the natural 
features of some moral matter.  And someone who knows all the natural 
features of some moral matter must know all about its moral properties also, 
as a matter of necessity.  But as we have seen previously  sincere and well-
informed moral agents do not arrive at similar moral conclusions about say, 
capital punishment, despite agreement about the natural features of the moral 
matter under discussion.  Such an impasse makes it unclear whether moral 
principles can be justified.  Jeeves can only  know whether something is 
morally  good if he is able to derive the evaluative from the descriptive in the 
same way that he derives higher order physical laws from complete natural 
information about moving bodies.  That is, uncontroversially  and 
demonstrable to the well-meaning and well-informed.  The problem isn!t so 
much that it is impossible to derive the evaluative from the descriptive.  After 
all, the disputants in the relevant type of moral disagreement were able to do 
it.  The problem is that it is difficult to say  which, if any  of them, is right.  Each 
side is justified by their own lights.  That is why  Jeeves is unable to say which 
of them is right, which is ultimately why he does not know whether something 
is morally good.
" If it is possible to find justified moral principles, then bringing them to 
bear on the descriptive would yield the right moral judgment.  But since there 
is no uncontroversial way  to establish that some specific set of normative 
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moral principles are justified it is plausible to assume that Jeeves could know 
what he does and still fail to know whether something is morally  good 
because he does not know which moral principles, if any, are justified.  
! A dispute between moral agents similar to A and B"s disagreement 
about capital punishment described previously  poses a problem for Jeeves.17 
He knows about all such disagreements.  And it is possible that he is not sure 
whether he can successfully  arbitrate these disagreements by  solely  appeal-
ing to the natural facts that he knows.  Since statements that feature an attri-
bution of a natural property  do not provide a reason to do something while 
statements that feature attributions of moral goodness do, it is not clear how 
descriptive premises can yield a normative conclusion without some illicit at-
tempt to import evaluative concepts onto natural facts.  Here we see the core 
of the problem that the relevant type of moral disagreement poses.  Each dis-
putant in such a disagreement brings the moral principles to which she sub-
scribes to bear on the natural features of the matter under discussion.  So the 
moral conclusion that each participant in the debate reaches is determined by 
which natural facts are given greater moral weight by the moral principles to 
which she subscribes.  In the disagreement between A and B, the latter will 
look at the effects of imposing capital punishment on the welfare of the great-
est number while the former will look at what type of action the imposition of 
capital punishment is and the reasons why such actions must be forbidden. 
Because of the difference in their evaluative priorities, A and B arrive at differ-
ent conclusions about the moral worth of capital punishment.  
! Jeeves"s knowledge of the different moral valuations of the same 
moral matter puts him in a predicament.  Those who argue for and against 
capital punishment support their position by  appealing to the natural features 
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of the moral matter in question and they  talk and think like their judgment 
automatically  follow from the natural features of capital punishment.  There 
would be no problem if these putative judgments are all of a piece.  But the 
fact that these judgments are opposed lead Jeeves to think that uncertain 
whether the mere fact that capital punishment has the natural features that it 
does not give him a reason to make some moral judgment about it, much less 
that some judgment on the matter is justified.
! The first premise of the world book argument is more effective than 
the analogous premise of Moore"s argument.  Wittgenstein"s omniscient per-
son scenario  presents a challenge not only  to those naturalists who propose 
an analytic or a priori equivalence between natural properties and moral ones. 
Even naturalists who favor synthetic or a posteriori analyses of moral good-
ness need to address the challenge presented by  Jeeves.  His knowledge of 
all natural facts entails that if he is morally  ignorant, then knowledge of moral 
goodness must be distinct from knowledge of all the natural features of all 
morally  good things in a way  that is detrimental to moral naturalism.  If knowl-
edge of all natural facts does not entail moral knowledge then the latter might 
not turn out to be knowledge at all.  Since Jeeves, as he has been described, 
presents a coherent idea, this idea could potentially  establish very  clearly  that 
moral properties are not natural properties.  At the same time, the first prem-
ise of the world book argument is more controversial than the first premise of 
the open question argument.18  So a lot more needs to be said about why fal-
lible omniscience implies antinaturalism.  
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18  So much so that some naturalists might be inclined to say  that like 
OQ1, WB1 merely  amounts to a petitio.  This issue will be taken up in the 
next chapter.  It is worth noting here though that the version of a premise or 
an argument that is more controversial is also more effective.
! Unlike its analogue in the open question argument,19  the second 
premise of the world book argument is not prone to those objections posed 
against Moore"s argument.  The first premise of the world book argument is 
effective against non-analytic forms of moral naturalism.  Jeeves"s omnis-
cience entails that he knows about all synthetic natural identity  claims.  His 
possible moral ignorance cannot be explained away by  making an appeal to 
new moral semantics.  Because knowing whether something is morally  good 
comes apart from knowing the complete natural description of all morally 
good things, there must be an insurmountable distinction between moral 
properties and natural ones.  And because the world book argument does not 
depend on a dubious assumption about the philosophical significance of the 
question #But is it good?# it cannot be dismissed as easily  as Moore"s argu-
ment.  It remains to be seen whether the second premise of the new argu-
ment also fares better than its analogue in the open question argument.  It is 
to this issue that we must now turn.  
The world book argument and the knowledge argument (KA)20
! There are some striking similarities between the world book argument 
and Jackson"s knowledge argument.21  Both arguments are propelled by  the 
same strategy: presenting a vivid description of someone who knows all the 
facts relevant to some domain but still ignorant about it in an important way. 
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19 OQ2: If for any natural property  it is an open question whether some-
thing which has this property  is morally  good, then moral naturalism must be 
false.
20  Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” The Philosophical Quarterly 
32 (1982): 127-36.
21 For a discussion of the parallels between Moore"s OQA and Jackson"s 
KA see Michael Pelczar, “The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Ar-
gument, and the Moral Problem,” Synthese 171 (2009): 25-45.  My discussion 
of the parallels between WBA and KA here was set off by ideas in this paper.
Whereas the world book argument has Jeeves, the knowledge argument has 
Mary:
! Mary  is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced 
to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and 
white television monitor. " She specialises in the neurophysiology of 
vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there 
is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes or the sky, 
and use terms like 'red,' 'blue,' and so on. "She discovers, for example 
just which wavelength combinations from the sky  stimulate the retina, 
and exactly  how this produces via the central nervous system the con-
traction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that 
result in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky  is blue.#  (It can hardly 
be denied that it is in principle possible to obtain all this physical in-
formation from black and white television, otherwise the Open Univer-
sity would of necessity need to use colour television)
! What will happen when Mary  is released from her black and 
white room or is given a colour television monitor?  Will she learn any-
thing or not?  It seems just obvious that she will learn something about 
the world and our visual experience of it.22
Of course Wittgenstein#s lecture on ethics was written many  years before 
Jackson#s argument was published.  And there seems to be no reason to 
think that Jackson developed the knowledge argument by  taking some of 
Wittgenstein#s ideas.  But it is noteworthy that a precursor of the knowledge 
argument can be found in the writings of one of Wittgenstein#s contemporar-
ies.  C.D. Broad presents a character similar to Jeeves in order to show that 
knowledge of natural facts excludes direct acquaintance with properties that 
are emergent from these facts.  In The Mind and Its Place in Nature there is a 
discussion of a mathematical archangel who knows all the microphysical 
properties of nitrogen, hydrogen and the gaseous compound which these can 
form but does not know  the smell of ammonia.23  A variation on the same ar-
gumentative strategy  is expressed in the following question: “Could a Martian, 
entirely  without sentiments of compassion or piety, know about what is going 
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22 Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” p. 130
23 C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London, K. Paul, Trench 
Trüber & Co., 1925), pp. 70-1.
on during a commemoration of an armistice?”24  Jackson improves on the 
scenario described by Broad, Feigl and others by providing more details 
about the situation of the well-informed subject before and after she gets di-
rectly  acquainted with those properties that she is putatively  ignorant about. 
Mary  and her black in her white room presents a vivid picture of how some-
one can be fully  informed about something and yet still ignorant about some 
aspect of it.  Jeeves is much like Mary, the archangel and the Martian; they 
are all ideal and fully informed yet deficient in some way.  
! To compare the knowledge argument with the world book argument in 
a straightforward way  the following version of Jackson"s argument will be 
used here:
K1! Someone who knows all physical facts about color vision would not 
! know what it"s like to see red.
K2! If someone who knows all physical facts about color vision does not 
! know what it"s like to see red, then physicalism about conscious expe-
! rience must be false.
K3! So physicalism about conscious experience is false.
The most crucial part of the knowledge argument is its second premise.  It 
presents the problem that Mary  poses for physicalists in a clear and intuitive 
way.  Because of the coherence of the Mary  scenario a clear cut division is 
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24 Herbert Feigl asks this question in an article on the mind-body problem.
“For the sake of the argument, we assume complete physical ... predict-
ability  and explainability  of the behavior of humans equipped with vision, a 
sense of humour and sentiments of piety.  The Martian could then predict all 
responses, including the linguistic utterances of the earthlings in the situations 
which involve their visual perceptions, their laughter about jokes, or their (sol-
emn) behavior at the commemoration.  But ex hypothesi, the Martian would 
be lacking completely  in the sore of imagery  and empathy which depends on 
familiarity  (direct acquaintance) with the kinds of qualia to be imaged or em-
pathized.”  [“The #Mental" and the #Physical,” Minnesota Studies in the Phi-
losophy of Science 2 (1958): 431.]
established between knowledge about color vision and the experience of 
what it is like to see red.  Since it is apparent that bridging such a division 
presents formidable problems there is reason to think that knowing what it!s 
like to see red cannot be reduced to knowing all the facts about seeing red. 
Stuart Brock and Edwin Mares take the knowledge argument to be a para-
digm example of a strategy that they  call an argument from an attitude 
problem.25    The argument relies on our conflicting attitudes towards physical 
information about color vision and what it is like to see red.  Furthermore, this 
discrepancy  in our attitudes towards two closely  related domains is taken as a 
basis for saying that what it is like to see red cannot be reduced to physical 
information about color vision.  In other words, the incongruity  of our attitudes 
towards the reduced properties and the proposed reductive base proves that 
the attempt at reduction has failed.26   Other standard features of an attitude 
problem include citing special reasons why  one domain is not reducible to 
another and stipulating that the subject involved is not suffering from some 
kind of debilitating ignorance or cognitive malfunction.  
" In the knowledge argument it is implied that whereas the chemistry  
and the biology of color vision can be reduced to physical facts, the phe-
nomenology of it cannot.  Like the knowledge argument, the world book ar-
gument features a fully  informed subject who is not suffering from debilitating 
ignorance or cognitive malfunction.  Likewise, Wittgenstein!s antinaturalist 
argument is built around conflicting attitudes towards two related domains: 
knowledge about the natural features of something and knowledge of that 
thing!s moral worth.  But unlike the knowledge argument, which establishes 
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25 Stuart Brock and Edwin Mares, Realism and Anti-Realism (Stocksfield: 
Acumen, 2007) 24-7.
26 Ibid.
the distinct metaphysical existence of what it is like to see red, the world book 
argument arrives at the conclusion that there are no moral facts.  This differ-
ence between the conclusions of the two arguments might have something to 
do with the distinct features of the subject matter of each.  Whereas in phi-
losophy of mind the mind itself cannot be coherently doubted,27 in metaethics 
one of the central concerns is whether there really  are such things as moral 
properties in the same way that there are natural ones. 
! The second premise of the world book argument can be supported by  
drawing a parallel with the knowledge argument.  Naturalists think that moral 
facts, or at least moral properties, are already  covered when we talk of all 
physical and mental facts that constitute the world.  But naturalists are usually 
silent about whether these moral properties would appear to us or to Jeeves 
in the same guise as the natural ones do, especially  if he does not participate 
in our moral practices like Heigl"s Martian.  Since there is a problem involved 
in drawing moral conclusions from purely  descriptive premises it is reason-
able to suppose that even if descriptivist naturalism were true moral proper-
ties could only  become manifest in a distinctive guise which is not easy  to 
square with a mere enumeration of all the relevant natural features of some-
thing.  That is, moral properties which are fully  captured by a natural descrip-
tion of something that has them may  still turn out to be recognizable as such 
only  under a certain distinctive guise.  If this is the case the naturalists must 
explain why moral properties have this distinctive guise at all.28   But before 
the plausibility  of such an explanation can be settled it remains a distinct pos-
 52
27 Renè Descartes famously discovered this when he tried to doubt every-
thing.
Meditations on First Philosophy (New  York: Cambridge University  Press, 
1996), 16-23.
28 This old fact-new guise strategy  against the world book argument will 
be the main topic of Chapter 6.
sibility that moral properties are not natural.  Of course it remains to be speci-
fied further what exactly  it means for a property  to be natural or otherwise. 
But since some descriptive properties that are ordinarily taken to be natural, 
e.g. psychological and economic ones, do not generate as much difficulty  and 
disagreement as moral properties, it is probable that there is something about 
moral properties that sets them apart.
! There are some other domains in which conceiving of someone like 
Jeeves or Mary  implies that the properties associated with the domain in 
question are not natural in the same sense that economic and psychological 
ones are.   The second premise of the world book argument can also be sup-
ported by  drawing an analogy  between ethics on the one hand, and comedy 
and language on the other.  We can conceive of someone who knows all co-
medic facts, including the biological, sociological, and even literary  aspects of 
what human beings find funny, but still does not know whether some new 
sketch is funny.  Call this comedically challenged hypothetical being, Jean. 
Like Jeeves, Jean can write a complete natural description of all comedic 
facts.  But in the same way that Jeeves"s world book would not include any 
moral judgment, Jean"s book of comedy  would not include any comedic ap-
praisal.  
! Crispin Wright offers an account of the independence of what is funny  
from our reaction to it that could be relevant to understanding why  someone 
like Jean is conceivable:
When I claim that something is funny, I"m not simply  reporting my own re-
action to it; for I can readily  conceive that my  reaction might be wrong--
insensitive or misplaced.  Nor am I reporting a majority  reaction to it, or 
conjecturing the direction it might take; for the same applies--the comic 
sensibilities of the majority  may  be blunted, “off the wall” or debased.  Re-
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garding something as funny  incorporates a judgment about the fittingness 
of the comic response.29
Jean!s uncertainty  can be explained by  a worry  about distorting factors that 
could affect her reaction to something.  Our comedic response is affected by 
our biases, among other things, and she knows this.  The comedic properties 
of something is not up to us; just because we laugh at something or think that 
it is funny  does not mean that it is appropriate to laugh at it.  Some corrective 
measures are even adopted when we think it is possible that what we find 
funny could turn out to be offensive or mean.  Perhaps Jean is a logical pos-
sibility because someone fully  informed about the comedic can have a de-
based sense of humor.  Knowing all comedic facts is certainly  compatible with 
being bigoted about what counts as funny.  Knowing all comedic facts is also 
compatible with not knowing what we ought to find funny.    
" But these considerations are not the only  possible explanations for the 
conceivability  of someone like Jean.  It is possible that what such a person 
knows is not sufficient to determine whether that thing is funny.  That is, what 
Jean knows does not determine the comedic properties of something one 
way  or another.  This implies that knowledge whether the new sketch is funny 
cannot be inferred from knowing all the relevant facts, or even relying on an 
individual!s or a population!s instinct or gut reaction to that thing.  But since 
there is no independent access to the appropriateness of a comedic response 
apart from reliance on people!s responses and engaging upon discussion and 
reflection on what we find funny, it seems reasonable to take an antirealist 
line on comedic properties. Knowing whether something is funny  is different 
from knowing whether something is red because there is no independent ac-
cess to the former.  This difference might be part of the reason an antirealist 
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29  Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), p. 8.
construal of comedic properties seems to be warranted while an antirealist 
construal of surface reflectance properties associated with color vision is not. 
Moral properties are like comedic properties in that there is no independent 
access to them apart from reliance on our intuition about cases and a similar, 
albeit more systematic, discussion and reflection upon these.  So it is also 
possible to construe moral properties in an antirealist way.  What this analogy 
between ethics and comedy shows is that a purely  descriptive account of the 
world may  not be able to generate an account of what we ought to find funny 
or what we ought to take to be morally  good or bad because, as it has been 
shown in the previous section, it is difficult if not impossible to settle disputes 
about judgments like these by showing which of them is justified.  
! In the same way that we can conceive of Jeeves and Jean we can 
conceive of someone who knows all linguistic facts, including all psychologi-
cal, neurological and evolutionary facts about language, but does not know 
how to speak good conversational English.  Call this hypothetical being Jane. 
Jane knows all the rules of English grammar; she is also familiar with a wide 
variety  of words.  Perhaps we can even say  that she knows everything written 
in the Unabridged Oxford English Dictionary.  Besides this, she knows every-
thing about both the literary  and scientific aspects of every  language, includ-
ing English.  Jean can write all that she knows in a book and in this book will 
contain all linguistic facts.  But Jean"s book on language will not help anyone 
who, like her, needs help with conversational English.   Despite knowing all 
that she does Jane can be stumped when she finds herself chatting with ordi-
nary  English speakers.  Jane may  not know what would be appropriate to say 
in particular conversational situations such that talking to her could turn out to 
be like trying to communicate with a Martian.  Jane does not know what she 
ought to say in particular conversational situations in the same way  that Jean 
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does not know whether she ought to find a new sketch funny.  What one 
ought to say  when conversing with others and what one ought to find funny 
are not merely a function of our reactions to it.  Making some particular re-
mark may be appropriate but it may  also be rude or mean, so that one ought 
not to say  it.  Jane could fail to know what to say in ordinary  conversational 
situations because she cannot understand how, if at all, what one ought to 
say follows from what she already knows.
! Like the capacity  for moral judgments, the capacity  for language is 
shared by  virtually  all humans.  But having this shared capacity  and an estab-
lished body of shared judgments do not necessarily  imply  that there are natu-
ral facts objectively  correlated with moral goodness.30  This may  be because 
our tendency to think of some things as morally  good or bad is underdeter-
mined by  natural facts, including facts about our natural dispositions.  What-
ever the reason, the second premise of the world book argument shows us 
that there are important aspects of the ethical that the descriptive cannot ac-
commodate and that the reason for this could very  well be that moral natural-
ism is false.
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30  For a scientific hypothesis that fits well with this possibility  see Frans 
De Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 166-7.  
De Waal"s hypothesis is not being endorsed here.  Indeed, it is difficult to 
say  what an endorsement of an empirical hypothesis from philosophical con-
siderations amount to. De Waal"s hypothesis is merely being presented as 
one among many  possibilities that would flout the moral naturalist"s expecta-
tions.  More on this on p. 59 and following.
Chapter 4
Taking Jeeves Seriously: 
would someone who knows all natural facts 
really fail to know whether something is good?
! When juxtaposed with Moore"s argument against moral naturalism 
and Jackson"s argument against physicalism, it is surprising that the world 
book argument is not more well-known or widely  discussed.  Coupled with the 
proliferation of full information accounts of moral goodness, the relative 
obscurity  of Wittgenstein"s argument against moral naturalism seems even 
more astounding.  It is possible that the world book argument is not more 
well-known or widely  discussed because philosophers find it difficult to take 
the notion of fallible omniscience seriously.  What lies behind this difficulty  is 
not clear because people don"t usually  give reasons for not talking about what 
they don"t discuss.  In this chapter, the first premise of the new antinaturalist 
argument will be explained and defended in order to facilitate a discussion of 
the world book argument.
The Notion of Fallible Omniscience
! The first premise of the argument against moral naturalism from 
Wittgenstein"s lecture on ethics expresses the logical possibility of knowing all 
natural facts without knowing whether something is morally  good.  Jeeves as 
he has been described in the previous chapter embodies this logical 
possibility.  Such a possibility  does not depend on arcane ideas.  Even 
common folk can recognize that there is a difference between knowing 
whether something is morally good and knowing all the natural features of 
that thing.  We ordinarily  think that someone well-informed about natural facts 
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is different from someone who knows the difference between right and wrong. 
It is neither contradictory  nor incoherent to say of someone that she is 
intelligent and well-informed but muddled about the difference between good 
and bad; characters like this abound in fiction and in real life.  Jeeves could 
merely  be an extreme version of such a character.  He could be a natural 
byproduct of our ordinary  understanding of knowing whether something is 
morally  good, knowledge that can come apart from knowledge of the natural 
features of that thing.
! Attributing knowledge of all natural facts to someone is not the same 
thing as attributing moral infallibility  to that person.  We see this best when 
philosophers talk about God.  When St. Anselm describes God as "that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived,# he is in effect saying many  things 
about God.  As the most perfect existent, much is attributed to God: he is all-
knowing, all-powerful, eternally  happy and supremely  good.  But not only  that. 
The most singular attribute of God is his self-sufficient existence; only  God 
exists of and by  reason of Himself.  It is from this last attribute that 
philosophers argue for the perfection of God.  In contrast, Jeeves  merely 
knows all natural facts.  He is perfect only in terms of knowledge of the 
natural world.  Jeeve#s knowledge of all natural facts is certainly  compatible 
with moral infallibility.  But his omniscience is also compatible with moral 
perversion, and with neutrality  on moral matters.  This is because after 
omniscience about natural facts is attributed to Jeeves more has to be said 
about him before we can say anything about his moral knowledge or lack 
thereof.  To say  that Jeeves knows all natural facts is not the same thing as 
saying that he knows all moral facts.  Because of this difference it is possible 
for him to possess the former without possessing the latter.
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! Wittgenstein has it that a person who knows all natural facts could 
give a comprehensive description of the world without making any  moral 
judgments.  The world book would contain reports about all moral judgments 
that were ever made, including an account of how these were made.  But to 
all this Jeeves would not add anything that might be construed as his own 
moral judgment; he would only list all facts, including facts about our moral 
practices.  We could add that the world book is written in the way that 
Wittgenstein suggests because Jeeves is a dispassionate alien who wants to 
write an accurate account of what our planet is like.  The material point is that 
a complete description of the natural world can be written without any  morally 
evaluative statements.
! Jeeves could even note that virtually  everyone on our planet thinks 
that slavery  and torture for fun, among other things, are morally  wrong. 
Perhaps he would even add that these and other widely  held moral 
judgments are made through the proper functioning of highly  evolved neural 
mechanisms and that such judgments and their accompaniments aid in the 
survival and flourishing of our species.  He would also note that more 
sophisticated moral distinctions, which are learned by  moral agents as they 
mature, contribute to the highly  complex social structures and institutions that 
preserve and enforce a code of behavior that human beings need to subsist 
for as long as possible.  But Jeeves stops at this.  He neither agrees nor 
disagrees with the moral judgments that we make; he neither subscribes to 
nor rejects our morals.  This description of Jeeves does not involve any 
obvious contradiction; conceiving of someone omniscient about natural facts 
yet morally  fallible does not amount to imagining a female brother or a 
married bachelor.
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! What then makes it difficult for philosophers to take Jeeves seriously?  
Perhaps it is simply the obviousness of the fact that morality  is part of the 
natural world.  So much so that someone who knows everything there is to 
know about the natural world ought to know about morality  also.  After all, it 
cannot be denied that all humans engage in the practice of making moral 
judgments.  Such a practice has created a variety  of moral codes, which are 
articulated in moral language.  Hence moral judgments, moral rules, and 
moral predicates, etc., are just some of the natural phenomena studied by 
psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists, ethnographers, linguists, and 
so on.  But it is one thing to know all that these specialists know about moral 
phenomena and quite another to know whether something is morally good. 
Fallible omniscience is not presented as a denial of the fact that moral 
phenomena are one of the things that exist in the natural world.  Rather, it is 
an expression of the possibility  that a certain type of explanation for moral 
phenomena may  not exist.   Just as a moral naturalist is not merely  saying 
that these moral phenomena exist, the scenario presented in the first premise 
of the world book argument does not merely  amount to saying that such 
phenomena are nonexistent.  What the new antinaturalist argument amounts 
to saying is that contrary  to what the naturalist expects, there could be 
nothing that we can derive from natural facts regarding morality  apart from a 
genealogical explanation for the practice of making moral judgments, a 
detailed comparative analysis of different moral systems, and a functional-
evolutionary  account of the neural mechanisms that are implicated in moral 
judgment.
! That it is possible to imagine someone like Jeeves presents a problem 
for moral naturalists because a reasonable concomitant of the view that moral 
properties are natural is the expectation that someone who knows everything 
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there is to know about natural properties would be as fully informed about 
moral properties also.  The first premise of the world book argument is not a 
denial of the coherence of this expectation.  If moral naturalism is true, then it 
is reasonable to expect that someone who knows all natural facts would be 
morally  infallible.  Fallible omniscience is an articulation of an imaginative 
possibility  that flouts the naturalist!s expectation.  If substantial philosophical 
reasons can be given for taking the possibility  that Jeeves presents seriously, 
then it will begin to seem that moral naturalism cannot be true.  The world 
book argument is built around the idea that if the naturalist!s expectations 
prove to be ill-founded then we have at least one good reason to believe that 
moral properties are not natural.  The plausibility  and coherence of fallible 
omniscience is a counterexample to moral naturalism, much like a zombie is 
a counterexample to physicalism about conscious experience.1
A Naturalist!s Account of Omniscience
" A proponent of the world book argument has it that someone who 
knows all natural facts but does not know whether something is morally  good 
is a counterexample to moral naturalism.  But moral naturalists think that 
someone who knows all natural facts would always know whether something 
is morally  good.  When naturalists conceive of someone like Jeeves they 
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1  Jeeves is like phenomenal zombies in philosophy  of mind, beings 
exactly  like us in all physical respects but lacking conscious experience. 
Briefly, there is nothing it is like to be a zombie.  Zombies are important 
because as a logical possibility  they  count as a counterexample to 
physicalism.  Roughly, the argument is as follows, if zombies are conceivable, 
then physicalism must be false.
Robert Kirk, “Sentience and Behavior,” Mind 83 (1974): 43-60.
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental 
Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 94-9.
automatically  think of someone morally  omniscient.  For instance, Brink gives 
the following account of a person omniscient about all natural facts:
He could presumably  list all the obligations people would have in different 
sorts of circumstances and could then formulate extremely  complicated 
moral rules specifying all of these obligations.  Then one set of moral 
rules would apply  to everyone, although, of course, they would tell people 
in different circumstances to do quite different things.  This set of rules 
would state (at least a large part of) the one single true morality.  We can 
even say that these realist claims amount to a form of moral absolutism; 
but this form of absolutism is no embarrassment to the moral realist.2
A naturalist like Brink thinks that complete physical and mental information 
about the world already  includes moral information.  This is why  he thinks that 
if someone like Jeeves had enough time he could write not only  a complete 
physical and psychological description of the world but also an account of the 
one single true morality.  Brink and other like minded naturalists think that 
Jeeves cannot fail to know whether something is good.  They also think that 
Jeeves!s knowledge of all natural facts entails not only  that he will make 
moral judgments but also that these judgments would be justified and true by 
virtue of what he knows about the natural world.  As they  see it, Jeeves!s 
comprehensive knowledge of natural facts would enable him to see which 
natural properties moral terms and concepts pick out.  Since Jeeves also 
knows all the natural features of every practical and substantive moral matter 
he will also know whether each of these is morally good or bad.
" So it seems that in the face of the moral naturalist!s account of a 
person who knows all natural facts the first premise of the world book 
argument merely  amounts to question begging.  It does not help the 
antinaturalist!s case that she could launch a begging the question charge of 
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2 David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, pp. 91-2.
Brink says that “if the moral realist were omniscient and had sufficient 
time [ibid.]” he would also be morally  omniscient.  But perhaps a more 
accurate statement of the case is as follows: if moral naturalism of the sort 
that Brink endorses is true, then a person who knows all natural facts would 
always know whether something is morally good.  
her own against someone like Brink.  In the same way  that the naturalist 
could say  that the proponent of the world book argument would only  be able 
to say  that fallible omniscience flouts the naturalist!s expectations because 
such a scenario already implicitly  assumes that moral naturalism is false, the 
antinaturalist could say  that the only way that someone like Brink could say 
that someone who knows all natural facts would know the one single true 
morality  is that he assumes that there is such a thing as the one single true 
morality.  Charges of begging the question from both sides merely  brings the 
discussion between the naturalist and the antinaturalist to a standstill.  Unless 
one of the participants in the debate thinks of a better argument to prove their 
position or demolish their opponent!s, the discussion cannot move forward. 
But perhaps it is possible to find something about which both the naturalist 
and the antinaturalist can agree so that an interesting discussion about the 
world book argument can proceed.  
" The naturalist and the antinaturalist can agree that moral theorists 
seek to account for for moral phenomena by making use of the information 
about moral phenomena afforded by  the natural and social sciences.  From 
here they  can go on to say that if moral naturalism is true then a certain sort 
of explanation for moral phenomena would emerge, or is already  beginning to 
emerge.  What sort of explanation for moral phenomena could confirm the 
moral naturalist!s claim?  We could begin by  saying what type of explanation 
would not do.  Natural science!s explanation for laughter in particular and 
comedy  in general do not incline us to say  that there are objective comedic 
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properties and that comedic properties are natural.3   That we respond to 
certain states of affairs or verbal signals with spontaneous and instinctive 
expressions of amusement do not imply  that there is a set of natural 
properties in the world that elicit amusement.      
! While it is true that human beings laugh as a matter of course and that 
a full natural description of human and other animal life would be incomplete 
without an account of laughter, what is funny  is not a factual matter.  This is 
not because there is no such thing as funny  or knowing what is funny, but 
because knowing whether something is funny does not depend only  on 
knowing the existing dispositions of the relevant population and inferring 
statistical norms from these.  Knowing that something is funny  implies having 
the right sort of properly  functioning neural mechanisms.  Although we 
ordinarily  discuss and critically  examine our comedic responses to things, 
when we do this we are not performing an exercise in self-discovery or even 
engaging in an inquiry  into objectively  occurring comedic properties.  Rather, 
we engage in a critical reflection aimed at helping us to make certain 
decisions about which dispositions to keep and which ones to abandon. 
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3 Robert P. Provine, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation (New York: Viking, 
2000).
By making systematic and long-term “observations of naturally  occurring 
laughter,” Provine and his research associates are able to describe the 
acoustics of laughter, where and when we laugh, how we laugh and so on. 
Their data consists in a number of laugh-logs in which people take note of all 
the times in which they  laugh throughout a given period and compiled 
observations from many  hours of eavesdropping on the conversations of 
laughing people in public places.  And it shows that laughter plays an 
important role in social bonding, solidifying friendships and pulling people into 
the fold, together with its converse: ostracizing outsiders or enemies.  Here 
are some of Provine"s more specific findings: (a) females in general are 
laughers while males are laugh-getters; (b) most laughter is not a response to 
jokes or other formal attempts at humor (e.g. one of the most typical prelaugh 
comments is #I"ll see you guys later").  These findings and scientists" attempt 
to make sense of them do not incline us to believe that there are comedic 
properties in the same way  that there are properties like brittleness or 
malleability.  
After considerable debate and deliberation we may  decide as individuals or 
as a community  to alter our dispositions to laugh at something in this or that 
way.  But we may not find a way  to justify  this decision definitively.  Being 
funny is a natural property  in some sense, but not the sense which the 
naturalist needs to defend her position.4  So a functionalist-natural account of 
what!s funny does not imply  that the property  of being funny is objective in a 
philosophically  interesting way.  If being morally  good is like being funny, then 
moral properties must not be like uncontroversially  objective properties like 
redness and brittleness.
" To see this more clearly, compare our tendency  to find things funny  to 
our tendency to express ourselves using certain idioms or to think that certain 
turns of phrase are better than others.  The capacity  for language is 
something that virtually  all humans share.  We all have a knack for using 
certain sounds, written symbols, or even bodily  movements to refer to things 
and to express ideas.  Experts from different fields tell us that deep structures 
in the human brain are implicated in this ability to use language.  Steven 
Pinker expresses the now well-known idea as follows:
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell 
time or how the federal government works.  Instead, it is a distinct piece of 
the biological makeup of our brains.  Language is a complex, specialized 
skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort 
or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying 
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4 The strategy being used here is not a reductio of natural properties to 
comedic ones, or some other dispositional property  whose distinct 
metaphysical existence is questionable, e.g. gastronomic properties.  For an 
interesting discussion of the failure of an antirealist attempt at a reductio ad 
absurdum of moral properties by  pointing out parallels between it and 
gastronomic value properties, see D. Loeb, “Gastronomic Realism--A 
Cautionary  Tale,” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 
(2003): 30-49.  The material point for my  discussion is that it is possible to 
find a naturalistic dispositional explanation for comedic properties and moral 
properties that defines the fittingness of some comedic or moral response 
that is neutral between value and disvalue.  If this is the case, then moral 
naturalism cannot locate the kind of morally  normative distinction that any 
moral theory needs in the descriptive.  
logic, is qualitatively  the same in every individual, and is distinct from 
more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently.  For 
these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a 
psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a 
computational module.  But I prefer the admittedly quaint term “instinct.”  It 
conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense 
that spiders know how  to spin webs.  Web-spinning was not invented by 
some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right 
education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction 
trades.  Rather, spiders spin webs because they  have spider brains, 
which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed.5  
The language we speak then is a byproduct of a universal aptitude that past 
speakers in our native community  have shaped and which present linguistic 
practices develop further.  In his later writings, Wittgenstein expresses a 
similar idea as follows: “Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a 
maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with 
additions from various periods.”6   It may  be true then that some idioms are 
more apt for expressing this or that idea and that using certain phrases for 
certain purposes makes for better prose.  But the explanation for the 
rightness of using such idioms and such turns of phrase is not the sort that 
the naturalist needs to support her position.  It is only  right to use such and 
such a word in the same way  that it is right for some spider to spin its web a 
certain way  because it is a member of a certain species and it exists at such 
and such an environment at such and such a time.  Spiders evolve over time 
so that they  begin to spin differently.  The way  people speak a language 
similarly  changes over time through a combination of deliberate effort and 
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5 Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), p. 18
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd Ed., trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), §18.
The similarities between the idea expressed in the quote from Pinker and 
Wittgenstein!s striking comparison between language and an ancient city  may 
be incidental.  It is merely  being pointed out here that an idea that resonates 
with some remarks from Wittgenstein!s later writings fits well with the defense 
of WB1 being discussed in this chapter.  
accidental alteration.  And it may not be possible to find a way  to 
systematically  integrate the different ways that language is used and to find a 
single homogenous account of what counts as right usage.
! The analogous explanation for morality that flouts the naturalist"s 
expectation is best expressed in the following suggestion:
Even if the human moral capacity  evolved out of primate group life, this 
should not be taken to mean that our genes prescribe specific moral 
solutions.  Moral rules are not etched in the genome.  ...
! We are not born with any  specific moral norms in mind, but 
with a learning agenda that tells us which information to imbibe.  This 
allows us to figure out, understand, and eventually  internalize the moral 
fabric of our native society.  Because a similar learning agenda underlies 
language acquisition, I see parallels between the biological foundation of 
morality  and language.  In the same way  that a child is not born with any 
particular language, but with the ability  to learn any language, we are born 
to absorb moral rules and weigh moral options, making for a thoroughly 
flexible system that nevertheless revolves around the same two H"s 
[Helping and (not) Hurting] and the same basic loyalties it always has.7
What de Waal says about morality  bears a striking resemblance to what 
Pinker says about language.  A shared psychological capacity  or neural 
mechanism allows us to learn how to make moral judgments in the same way 
that a shared instinct allows us to acquire a language.8  In the same way  that 
we can barely  subsist without knowing some form of language, we barely 
survive without making moral judgments or subscribing to some form of moral 
code.  But this does not necessarily  imply  that there is some moral code or 
set of moral judgments that is right for everyone.  There may  be too much 
variety  in the kind of moral judgments that we make, in what counts as a 
fitting judgment of this sort and in what contingencies alter the fittingness of 
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7 De Waal, Primates and Philosophers p. 166-7.
8  There is a wide range of languages to learn.  And language must be 
understood in its most capacious sense, e.g. including sign language.  Also, 
what language or languages are learnt inevitably  exerts an influence over 
how an individual sees the world.  For a striking example see Oliver Sacks, 
Seeing Voices (New York: Vintage, 1989).  These considerations make it 
even more difficult to find a single coherent account of what counts as the 
right way to use a word or a phrase.  
making such and such moral judgments.  So much so that it is not possible to 
find a synthesis of our moral practices that the moral naturalist is hoping to 
find.  
! De Waal"s hypothesis about morality  is by no means an established 
empirical fact.  Much is still needed to be done before we can even begin to 
see that it is true.  But it is certainly  possible that de Waal is on to something. 
The relevant point here is that both the naturalist and the antinaturalist can 
agree that if de Waal"s hypothesis about morality  is right, then moral 
naturalism is in trouble.  Here is the common ground that is needed for 
preventing the stalemate mentioned above.    
! The scientific explanation for seeing color implies that there is such a 
thing as a property possessed by some objects to produce certain sensations 
in the visual apparatus of certain animals, and that there is an objective 
property, namely  the surface reflectance properties of objects, that explains 
color vision.  That virtually  all of us respond in a certain way  to certain objects 
that produce certain sensations in our optical faculties demonstrates that 
color is indeed an objective property.  Full information about how we talk 
about color and how we judge whether an object is this or that color would 
yield a single coherent account of color vision that could allow someone who 
has cognitive access to such information to know whether some object, say  a 
ripe tomato, is this or that color.  Such a fully  informed individual may not 
know what it is like to see red because she has not actually  seen a red object, 
but she would know that a ripe tomato is red.  This is the type of scientific 
explanation for morality  that the naturalist needs to vindicate her theory.  If an 
empirically verifiable theory  about morality  turns out to be vindicated then 
fallible omniscience would turn out to be a kind of fantasy.  Jeeves would be 
like flying pigs or a moon made of cheese, logically  conceivable and 
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interesting but irrelevant.  But until the relevant kind of empirical evidence 
becomes available, the competing naturalist and antinaturalist accounts of the 
same moral phenomena stand on the same level as plausible hypotheses.
! Now that a common ground between the naturalist and the 
antinaturalist has been established, it is possible to discuss the world book 
argument.  In the next section an explanation for Jeeve"s moral ignorance 
that comes from the relevant type moral disagreement will be explored 
further.
Moral Disagreement and Knowledge of all Natural Facts
! Many philosophers argue for moral non-cognitivism or moral 
antirealism, positions which are incompatible with naturalism, from moral 
disagreement.9  Some argue that the lack of convergence of opinion on moral 
matters implies that moral beliefs are not formed in the way that beliefs 
associated with sense perception are formed.10   Others say  that widely 
diverging beliefs about many  moral issues is a good basis for saying that 
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9 The list of philosophers include C.L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare, J.L. Mackie, 
and Crispin Wright. 
10 Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, pp. 36-8.  Mackie famously 
takes the wide variety  of moral beliefs, and its implication that disagreements 
that feature these would be irresolvable, as a basis for saying that moral 
beliefs reflect a way of life rather than a perception of some part of the world. 
Mackie takes what he calls the relativity of moral beliefs as a basis for saying 
that moral terms are not referential in function.  
moral terms have a non-referential function.11   Still others think that the 
rational intractability  of disagreement on moral matters demonstrate that no 
moral belief is justified and that moral knowledge is therefore epistemically 
inaccessible.12  These different versions of the argument from disagreement 
take the semantic or epistemic implications of persistent disagreement on 
moral matters as a basis for saying that there are no moral properties, moral 
terms do not refer to anything objective, or moral knowledge is impossible to 
attain.  Here it will be shown that moral disagreement of a certain sort can 
explain Jeeves!s failure to know whether something is morally  good in a way 
that is detrimental to moral naturalism.  The supervenience of the moral on 
the natural ensures that the application of moral terms supervene on the 
distribution of certain natural properties.  But since there is a significant range 
of variation on what these natural properties could be, a certain type of moral 
disagreement cannot be resolved by solely appealing to more natural facts.  
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11  Stevenson, Ethics and Language, pp. 59-71.  Stevenson argues that 
moral disagreements are persistent and irresolvable because they involve not 
only  disagreement in belief but also a disagreement in attitude.  Stevenson 
takes what he calls the dual nature of ethical disagreement further, he argues 
that moral terms are chiefly emotive in function.
See also D. Loeb, “Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement,” 
Philosophical Studies 90 (1998): 281-303. In what he calls the semantic 
version of the argument from disagreement Loeb points out that “If people 
have widely  differing beliefs about a number of moral questions, perhaps 
charity  requires that we interpret them as referring to different properties, or 
using moral language in some entirely  different, non-referring way  (as non-
cognitivists contend).” (p. 292)
12 Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity pp. 89-94.   Wright is credited with 
putting forward a different version of the argument from moral disagreement. 
This version is usually  called the argument from epistemic inaccessibility 
because it takes the persistence and intractability of moral disagreement as 
evidence for the inaccessibility  of moral facts.  Since it is absurd to postulate 
epistemically inaccessible facts, this argument is supposed to work as a 
reductio of moral realism.  See also William Tollhurst, “The Argument from 
Moral Disagreement,” Ethics 97 (1987): 610-21.  Tollhurst presents an earlier 
and more straightforward argument against moral realism based on the idea 
that one type of  moral disagreement demonstrates that moral beliefs 
understood on the realist model are never justified.
! The argument for the first premise of the world book argument that will 
be given here again makes an appeal to a specific type of moral 
disagreement, namely that type of moral disagreement that shows that the 
disputants are either both justified about their conflicting moral beliefs, or else 
none of them are.  This type of moral disagreement is prefigured in Horgan 
and Timmons"s moral twin earth.  Recall that in chapter 2 it was shown that 
the argument between earthlings and twin earthlings can be expressed in 
terrestrial terms because such a disagreement essentially  depends on the 
conjoint presence of the following features: (1) the disputants use #good" and 
right," or something similar, as their most general terms for moral appraisal 
and commendation; (2) the terms #good" and #right," are used to reason about 
considerations that bear on well-being of individuals and entire communities 
or populations;  (3) people are normally  disposed to act in ways 
corresponding to what is #good" and #right;"  (4) people take the goodness or 
rightness of options to be an overriding consideration in deciding what to 
choose; (5) the disputants apply  the terms #good" and #right" to actions, 
persons, and institutions; and (6) the disputants use moral terms in such a 
way  that their application supervenes on the distribution of natural properties 
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of what they  are disagreeing about.13   In this list, (3) and (4) capture what 
philosophers usually  refer to as the normativity  and the action-guidingness of 
moral terms.  Taken together with (6) it makes a certain sort of moral 
disagreement possible in numerous instances.
! A moral disagreement in which the disputants agree on natural or 
descriptive facts but disagree on what ought to be done because their use of 
moral terms is tracked by different sets of natural properties can arise in 
discussions of many  other moral matters.  The disagreement between A and 
B about capital punishment14 is not an isolated incident; it did not occur only 
because capital punishment is a controversial moral matter.  The relevant 
type of moral disagreement can crop up in other places too.  For instance, 
when people disagree about whether someone known to them is a good man 
much depends not only on how they  conceive of good men and women but 
also on how they  conceive of "good."  Similarly, when people disagree about 
whether someone did the right thing, their dispute hinges not only  on how 
they conceive of the action that was done but also on how their concept of 
"good# works.  If the people who disagree about these mundane moral 
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13  This list is adapted from Mark van Roojen, “Knowing Enough to 
Disagree,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 1, Ed. Russ Shafer-Landau 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), pp. 172-3.
Van Roojen takes most items from this list from what Horgan and 
Timmons themselves stipulate about the disagreement between earthlings 
and twin earthlings, although (1) and (6) are not explicitly  stated in “Troubles 
for New Wave Moral Semantics: the "Open Question Argument#  Revived.” 
But van Roojen also says that he “doubts that Horgan and Timmons have 
listed all of the features of moral terms which account for our ascribing the 
same meanings to any  terms used in the same way (p. 172).”  Whether or not 
the list is complete does not have a direct bearing on the argument that I 
present here.  For as long the example for moral disagreement that I present 
has all the features enumerated in the list and is plausible, it should be 
enough for the defense of the first premise of the world book argument that I 
will present.
14 See pp. 28-31.
matters conceive of moral goodness differently, e.g. if one of them thinks that 
moral goodness involves a duty  to act only  in accordance with a maxim that 
she can at the same time will to be a universal law while the other thinks that 
moral goodness involves promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number, then their disagreement will persist in the same way  that the 
disagreement between A and B about capital punishment would.  It is true 
that not many ordinary folk can give an adequate account of the concept of 
moral goodness which is implicit in their use of !good! and other moral terms, 
and that all but the few who have some knowledge of normative ethical theory 
would disagree about moral matters in this way.  But it cannot be doubted that 
our ordinary  conception of moral goodness allows for the kind of moral 
disagreement being described here.  The material point is that in cases such 
as these it is hard to say  which, if any, of the disputant"s moral beliefs is 
justified.  
# The justification of each person"s moral belief is tied to her conception 
of moral goodness and her use of moral terms, which both partly determine 
whether her moral beliefs are justified.  The moral belief of a Kantian who 
thinks that capital punishment is morally  forbidden will be justified in terms of 
some specific deontological theory.  But since the same applies to her 
utilitarian interlocutor, it is difficult to see how the debate between them can 
be settled.  For the purpose of settling the moral disagreement in question it 
is necessary  to show through some suitably  neutral standpoint which moral 
belief is justified.  If neither moral belief can be justified in this way, or if both 
moral beliefs can be justified by  an appeal to some partly  neutral standpoint 
that imports the essence of the normative theory  to which one party 
subscribes, then the disagreement remains unresolved.  
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! Roughly, the problem that moral disagreement poses for moral 
naturalism is this: if the reason Jeeves could fail to know  whether something 
is morally  good is that most, if not all, moral beliefs are never justified from a 
naturalist standpoint then moral naturalism must be untenable.  If moral 
naturalism is true then it must be possible to successfully  arbitrate between 
disputants like A and B because it"s done all the time in natural science.  This 
is why  naturalists generally  express optimism on long-term convergence of 
opinion on moral matters.  For instance, Brink thinks that since there is virtual 
convergence of opinion about some moral matters like slavery, there is 
reason to believe that we would eventually  reach an objectively  secured 
consensus about most moral matters, just like we do about natural matters. 
Some moral disagreements may still persist but these would be the result of 
one of the following: (a) applying antecedently shared moral principles in 
different circumstances, (b) some moral agents hold systematically mistaken 
moral beliefs, (c) some cases involve options that have equal moral weight or 
incommensurable moral values, and (d) ignorance about some nonmoral, i.e. 
natural, matter of fact.15   But if Brink is right, then it must be possible to say 
how the moral beliefs about which we agree are justified in contrast with the 
way  that other moral beliefs are not.  Obviously, the naturalist cannot say  that 
moral beliefs about slavery, torture for fun, etc., are justified because we 
agree about them.  This would not amount to much.  We agree that ripe 
tomatoes, blood, sunsets, etc., are red because they are red.  They  are not 
red because we all agree that they are.  
! Naturalists like Brink tell us that we gain access to natural moral 
properties in the same way that we gain access to other natural properties. 
Through observation and experience we become aware that certain objects 
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15 Brink, Moral Realism pp. 203-9.
are a certain color and that  people who do certain actions have particular 
effects on our well-being.  For instance, Nicholas Sturgeon thinks that 
naturalists can make an “appeal to the apparent causal role of ethical 
properties in the natural order. ... [since] Most of us can identify  occasions in 
which we think we have benefited by someone else!s goodness or been 
harmed by  their moral faults.”16  Sturgeon also points out that this conception 
of moral properties fits well not only  with common sense but also with a long 
tradition of philosophical thought.  Making inferences about the moral quality 
of actions and persons based on what we observe about them is a route to 
reliable moral knowledge according to the naturalist.  Reasoning about these 
inferences and  making mutual adjustments between them and widely 
accepted moral principles allow us to arrive at a more sophisticated 
understanding of morality, which can be tested through confirmational 
holism.17  Ethical beliefs cannot be tested in isolation from other ethical and 
non-ethical beliefs.  We find the same thing in natural science where 
hypotheses can only  be tested because they  are informed by some widely 
accepted theory.  So perhaps the relevant type of moral disagreement can be 
resolved by using this strategy.    
" But the strategy which emerges from the moral epistemology  of moral 
naturalists would only  work if the relevant analogy  between ethics and natural 
science can be proved.  It cannot work as a promissory  note to the effect that 
we could expect the relevant type of moral disagreement would be resolved 
in a way  that favors moral naturalism.  This means that the naturalist has to 
show that what has worked so well for natural science does in fact work for 
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16 Sturgeon, “Ethical Naturalism,” p. 100.
17  For an account of naturalist coherentism see Sturgeon, p. 105-6 and 
Brink pp. 122-33.  For an account of confirmational holism see Brink pp. 
135-8.
ethics also.  In order to do this, she would have to show that a complex 
theory, if not a paradigm, can triumph over its rivals in ethics in the same way 
that that it does in natural science.  This is where the disagreement between 
well-meaning and well-informed moral agents comes in.  In such a case the 
disputants are unable to go beyond showing that their incompatible moral 
beliefs are consistent with their shared knowledge of descriptive facts.  In 
terms of the moral epistemology  of naturalists, what such a disagreement 
shows is that it is possible that two incompatible ways to understand morality 
cannot be arbitrated by confirmational holism.  The reason for the possible 
failure of this method of settling moral disagreement may  have something to 
do with what kind of explanation can be found for moral phenomena.18  
! In the last section it was shown that moral naturalists need to 
establish that a certain type of naturalistic explanation for morality  exists.  If 
the reason for agreement on some moral matters turns out to be similar to the 
reason for the agreement about when it is appropriate to laugh or to use a 
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18 The possible explanation put forward here is of course inconsistent with 
what moral naturalists expect to find.  Sturgeon thinks that agreement in 
scientific debates is limited in the following way: widespread agreement is 
only  reached among “well-trained, well-informed, competent inquirers (p. 
108).”  So only  the analogous moral case should matter.  He seems to think 
that it is obvious to anyone that if we only  count moral disagreement among 
well-trained, well-informed and competent inquirers settled results can be 
expects.  He gives the example of homosexuality.  The type of moral 
disagreement being discussed here is similar to the one that Sturegon seems 
to have in mind.  The difference about what this type of disagreement implies 
seems to depend on the difference between Sturgeon"s example and mine, 
i.e. homosexuality  vs. capital punishment.  The standoff between naturalism 
and antinaturalism threatens to resurface at this point.  However, it is 
important to note that all that the first premise of the world book argument 
needs is an acknowledgment that the antinaturalist hypothesis about the 
relevant type of moral disagreement is on the same footing as the naturalist"s. 
Until more empirical information on the matter becomes available and/or a 
better argument for or against one position is put forward, the truth of the 
matter is uncertain.  In any  case, for present purposes what matters more is 
whether the second premise of the world book argument can indeed show 
that fallible omniscience, taken together with the explanatory  hypothesis 
given here, implies antinaturalism.  
certain word in a certain context instead of another, then moral naturalism 
cannot handle the relevant type of moral disagreement.  So if our moral 
judgments are systematic and patterned in ways that are similar to the 
patterned occurrence of laughter that Provine observed or the universal 
occurrence of the capacity for language among humans that Pinker 
described, then Jeeves could indeed fail to know whether something is 
morally  good and the reason for it is detrimental to the moral naturalist!s 
position.    
" Tollhurst!s version of the argument from moral disagreement captures 
the problem for moral naturalists very nicely.  In order to see this, consider the 
following:
1. Necessarily, if person P is justified in believing that j, then it is not 
possible for there to be another person Q  who is similar to P in every 
epistemic respect relevant to being justified in believing that j (or not-j) 
and who is justified in believing not-j.
2. Necessarily, if a person P!s belief with regard to proposition j is justified, 
then it is not possible for there to be a person Q who is similar to P in 
every epistemic respect relevant to being justified in believing that j (or 
not-j) and whose belief with regard to j is not justified.
3. Necessarily, if a person P!s doxastic attitude toward an objective moral 
proposition j does not result from a failure to reason correctly  or any 
other (nonmoral) mental defect, then it is not possible for there to be a 
person Q
a. whose doxastic attitude toward j does not result from a failure to reason 
correctly or any other (nonmoral) mental defect
b. who holds the same nonmoral beliefs as P and is equally  justified in 
holding them, and
c. who is not similar to P in every  epistemic respect relevant to being 
justified in believing that j (or not-j).
4. Therefore, if a person P is justified in believing that j, where j is an 
objective moral proposition, then it is not possible that there be a 
person Q who meets conditions 3a and 3b and who believes that not-j.
5. For every  person P and for any  objective moral proposition j that P 
believes, it is not possible that there be another person Q who believes 
that not-j and who meets conditions 3a and 3b.
6. Therefore, no objective moral beliefs are justified.19
Tollhurst thinks that moral realists, who include naturalists, would be inclined 
to reject the third step of this argument.  And he concedes that this premise is 
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19 Tollhurst, “The Argument from Moral Disagreement,” pp. 612-3.
too controversial to be taken as a definitive basis for rejecting moral realism. 
But Tollhurst points out that someone who rejects the third premise of this 
argument from moral disagreement incurs a significant theoretical liability 
since she must posit a moral sense.  But for present purposes it is not 
necessary  to delve into these aspects of Tollhurst!s argument.  What matters 
is to that the argument relies on the kind of moral disagreement that is being 
discussed here and that Tollhurst!s argument from moral disagreement ties up 
nicely  with point about the difficulty  of finding some naturalistic way to 
establish that the moral judgments of one of the disputants in the relevant 
type of disagreement is justified.  
" Ultimately  finding a way  to show that some set of moral judgments are 
justified is like anticipating the possibility  of massive convergence on moral 
matters.  There are reasons for optimism and for pessimism about such a 
possibility.20   And we might only know who is right if more philosophically 
informed empirical research on moral disagreement becomes available.21  In 
the meantime it has been shown here that Jeeves as he has been described 
here is logically  conceivable and that there are good philosophical reasons for 
taking such a conceivable possibility  seriously.  In the next chapter it will be 
explored further why this poses a problem for moral naturalism. 
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20 Even moral naturalists are divided on this matter.  Nicholas Sturgeon is 
optimistic about the prospect of massive convergence on moral matters while 
Richard Brandt expresses doubt about the possibility  of agreement about 
moral matters even under ideal conditions.
Nicholas Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” Essays on Moral Realism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Richard B. Brandt, Facts, Values and Morality, p. 60.
21 For a more detailed exposition and argument for this view that draws on 
Brandt!s ideas see John P. Doris and Stephen P. Stich, “As a Matter of Fact: 
Empirical Perspectives on Ethics,” The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary 
Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 129-37.
Chapter 5
Sizing up the world book argument: 
does fallible omniscience really imply that moral naturalism is false?
! In his lecture Wittgenstein claims that since someone who knows all 
and only natural facts would still be morally  ignorant, moral properties must 
either be supernatural or nonexistent.  In the previous chapters this 
conclusion has been expressed in terms of the denial of the truth of moral 
naturalism.  The premise of the world book argument that warrants this 
conclusion can be stated as follows: if someone who knows all natural facts 
does not know whether something is morally  good, then the moral goodness 
of things must not be a natural matter.  Wittgenstein does not defend this 
premise of his antinaturalist argument at length.  He also seems to think that 
fallible omniscience demonstrates not only  that moral properties are not 
natural but also that there are no moral properties:
If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with 
all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these 
facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition.  The 
murder will be on exactly the same level as any  other event, for instance 
the falling of a stone.  Certainly  the reading of this description might cause 
us pain or rage or any  other emotion, or we might read about the pain or 
rage caused by  this murder in other people when they  hear of it, but there 
will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics.1
Rather than state a simple moral antirealist conclusion as a natural 
consequence of his rejection of the belief that moral properties stand on the 
same level as natural ones, he says that if there are any  ethical facts at all, 
these must be supernatural.  Notwithstanding his preference for a position 
beset with serious problems,2  Wittgenstein concludes that there are no 
79
1 LE pp. 6-7
2 See pp. 41-42.
natural moral properties, and no natural moral facts.  He takes the world book 
argument!s denial of the statement that moral properties are natural to be a 
reductio of moral naturalism. 
" The success of the natural sciences in establishing matters of fact, 
with its concomitant demand for parsimony, led to the wide acceptance of the 
platitude that if some putative fact or property  has no cut and dried correlation 
with a definite set of natural facts or properties, then such putative facts or 
properties must not exist at all.  Wittgenstein seems to think that since there 
is a discrepancy  between a complete natural description of an ordinary, 
noncontroversial moral matter like stabbing an innocent person to death for 
some trivial, self-serving reason and the intuitive commonsense certitude that 
we have about the moral status of such an act, there must be something that 
stands between establishing a definitive correlation between this 
commonsense moral certitude and the natural facts and properties that could 
be enumerated in order to fully  describe it.  In other words, moral properties 
must not be natural if it is possible to fully  describe even those morally 
charged situations about which we are certain, for instance murder, slavery 
and torture for fun, without necessarily  coming to the conclusion that these 
things are morally  wrong.  In this chapter the strength of this line of reasoning 
will be examined more closely.  One particular objection to the second 
premise of the world book argument will be considered.  Roughly, the 
objection goes something like this: it is possible to account for the coherence 
of fallible omniscience and at the same time defend moral naturalism by 
saying that the reason Jeeves does not know whether something is morally 
good is that knowing all natural facts is compatible with failing to have some 
particular practical ability.  
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Natural properties versus moral properties
! Before going on to a discussion of the objection just mentioned it is 
important to look more closely  into the abstract principle behind the crucial 
premise of the world book argument. The second premise depends on the 
following idea: if someone can know all F facts without knowing whether X, 
which can be exhaustively  described by  enumerating F facts, is G, then "X is 
G#  must not be an F-matter.  If Jeeves cannot infer from what he already 
knows that X is G, then the G-ness of X (if it really  is the case) must not be an 
F-matter.  The veracity  of this simple abstract principle can be initially 
demonstrated by  showing its relevance to delineating the different branches 
of natural science.  If it is possible to fully  describe some natural phenomenon 
by  exhaustively  enumerating its underlying chemistry  and fundamental 
physics without necessarily  arriving at the conclusion that such a 
phenomenon is a characteristic behavior of certain life forms, then the fact 
that a certain species behaves in this characteristic way  must not be a 
chemical or physical matter.  
! For example, since there is no chemical or physical means to account 
for macrophysical entities such as individual organisms, species, genes, and 
so on, neither physics nor chemistry can allow  us to see that members of 
species N synthesize the protein that they  ingest in such and such a way. 
Even if it is true that the metabolism of all the members of species N works in 
a unique physical and chemical manner, a complete physical and chemical 
account of the matter could not afford us the kind of understanding that a 
biological account could. A complete description of species N in physical and 
chemical terms would not include the statement that members of this species 
behave in such and such a way in such and such circumstances.  This is 
precisely  because the characteristic behavior of species and the inner 
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workings of different kinds of metabolism is not a physical or chemical 
matter.3  
! The example that has just been given can be replicated in terms of the 
difference between biology  and psychology.  A complete physical, chemical 
and even biological account of the stability  of emotional responses in adults 
of a certain type cannot adequately  account for what psychologists call a high 
aptitude for emotion-focused coping or emotional intelligence.  However, the 
finer details of these examples from the different branches of natural science, 
which could perhaps be extended to the social sciences, need not bother us 
here.  The material point is that even when one domain can be exhaustively 
described in terms of another, a definitive correlation between such a 
description of facts and properties in the domain with more complex 
macrophysical entities cannot be straightforwardly  established.  Of course 
these considerations do not prove that the abstract principle behind the 
premise establishes an insurmountable difference between moral properties 
and natural ones.  That the different branches of the natural and social 
sciences are all natural in a broad but meaningful sense proves that merely 
establishing that morality  can be delineated from the different natural and 
socials sciences would not get the world book argument very  far.  What is 
more, all the different branches of the natural and social sciences are 
reducible to natural or physical terms.  This is why  it was mentioned above 
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3 This is not to say that biology  is not reducible to chemistry, which is in 
turn reducible to physics.  The possibility  of establishing borders between the 
different branches of the natural sciences does not preclude the reduction of 
everything natural in terms of the physical.  That such a reduction is possible 
only  goes to show  that the delineation between chemistry and biology  is more 
for the purpose of taxonomy, and was perhaps devised for a better academic 
division of labor.  The point of discussing the different branches of natural 
science in terms of increasing complexity  rather than in reductive terms is that 
the abstract principle behind WB2 can be used to straightforwardly  establish 
differences between related domains.
that these examples merely  give the abstract principle behind the second 
premise of the world book argument initial plausibility.  
! A more philosophically  relevant application of the abstract principle 
that stands behind the second premise of the world book argument is one 
that we can see in the analogous premise of the knowledge argument.  This 
premise states that if someone who knows all physical facts about color 
vision does not know what it is like to see red, then physicalism about 
conscious experience must be false.  Since Mary  knows all the physical facts 
that can be enumerated to exhaustively  describe the experience of seeing red 
and still fail to know what this experience is like, then such an experience 
must not be a physical matter.  In Mary"s case the intuitive appeal of the 
supposition that she would not know what it is like to see red before she 
encounters a red object for the first time gives an additional compelling force 
to this conclusion.  However, the material point about someone like Mary is 
not the intuitive appeal of her ignorance about what it is like to see red before 
she is released from her black and white room.  It is the coherence of Mary"s 
situation that implies that there must be an insurmountable difference 
between a complete physical description of what it is like to see red on the 
one hand and the actual experience of seeing a ripe tomato on the other. 
That someone who knows all natural facts would fail to know what it is like to 
see red means that such knowledge must exceed knowledge of natural facts 
in some way.  Unlike the previous examples from the different branches of 
natural science, this application of the principle behind the second premise of 
the world book argument hints at a more promising way of establishing a 
clear cut distinction between what is moral and what is natural.  Only  such a 
clear cut distinction could warrant the antinaturalist conclusion of the world 
book argument.
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! But how can an analogous clear cut distinction between morality  and 
nature be established?  This is where a comparison between Jeeves and 
Mary  that focuses on the similarity  between them comes in.  Like Mary, 
Jeeves knows all the physical and mental facts that can be enumerated to 
exhaustively  describe every  morally  good or bad thing.  Also like Mary, he is 
ignorant about something which is closely  related to what he already knows. 
So if it is possible for him to know  all that and still fail to know whether some 
particular thing is morally  good, then the moral goodness of that thing must 
not be entailed by  knowledge of the natural facts that constitute it.  Jeeves"s 
case may not be as intuitive as Mary"s; however, it cannot be denied that his 
situation is at least as coherent as hers.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the idea that someone who knows all natural facts is morally  ignorant 
involves no contradiction.  So if one accepts that Mary"s ignorance about 
what it is like to see red establishes an insurmountable distinction between 
this experience and physical facts about it, then one must also admit that 
fallible omniscience is a logical and coherent idea that provides a good basis 
for inferring that moral properties are not natural.  That is, if one admits that 
the Jeeves"s situation is relevantly  similar to Mary"s then one would have to 
conclude that the world book argument gives us good reason to think that 
there is an important difference between moral properties and natural ones.
An Ability Hypothesis About Jeeves
! One standard reply  to the knowledge argument is an ability  hypothesis 
about Mary.  According to those who put forward this hypothesis, the reason 
she “learns” something new when she is released from her black and white 
room is that she gains a new ability  upon her first encounter with a colored 
object.  David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow  think that upon seeing a colored 
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object for the first time Mary could gain the ability to know how to imagine 
having the experience of seeing a colored object,4 or to remember, imagine 
and recognize colored objects.5  Both Lewis and Nemirow defend physicalism 
against the knowledge argument and at the same time account for the 
coherence of the possibility  that Mary  will learn something new when she 
finally  sees a colored object for the first time by  showing that what she learns 
can be construed as an ability  that is already latent in all the physical 
information that she already possesses.  
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4  Nemirow discusses this objection against the knowledge argument in 
two of his articles:
“But some modes of understanding consist, not in the grasping of facts, 
but in the acquisition of abilities--for example, understanding a language, or 
understanding a rule (in Wittgenstein!s sense).  As for understanding an 
experience, we may  construe that as an ability  to place oneself, at will, in a 
state representative of the experience.  I understand the experience of seeing 
red if I can visualize red.
Now it is perfectly  clear why there must be a special connection between 
the ability  to place oneself in a state representative of a given experience and 
the point of view of experiencer: exercising the ability  just is what we call 
"adopting the point of view of experiencer.!” [Review of Thomas Nagel!s Mortal 
Questions, Philosophical Review 89 (1980), p. 475.]
“Successfully  visualizing a color, for example, engenders the ability  to 
compare the color to other colors.  So visualizing a color permits us to draw 
conclusions (or reason propositionally) about other colors as if we were 
seeing the imagined color.  (I might conclude that the color I am imagining is 
a deeper shade of purple than the color I am witnessing.)  Imagining seeing a 
color thus functionally represents seeing the color in our propositional 
reasoning about colors.”  [“Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of 
Acquaintance,” Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Ed. William G. Lycan 
(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990),pp. 495-6.]
5  Lewis talks about an objection to the knowledge argument similar to 
Nemirow.  Lewis!s version is expressed as follows: 
“If you have a new experience, you gain abilities to remember and to 
imagine.  ...  By  remembering how it once was, you can afterward imagine 
such an experience.  Indeed, even if you eventually forget the occasion itself, 
you will very likely retain your ability to imagine such an experience.
Further, you gain an ability  to recognize the same experience if it comes 
again.”  [“What Experience Teaches,” The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates, Ed. Ned Block (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 592.]
! The ability  hypothesis about Mary  is one form of a general response 
to the knowledge argument based on the idea that she does not gain any new 
propositional knowledge upon her release.  This no-new-propositional-
knowledge response explains away Mary"s prerelease ignorance about what 
it is like to see red by  pointing out the limits of having cognitive access to 
propositional knowledge only.  Knowledge that does not necessarily  translate 
to knowledge how, even though the latter is already contained within the 
former.      
! Similarly, those who want to accommodate the coherence of the moral 
fallibility  of someone who knows all the natural facts and at the same time 
defend moral naturalism against the world book argument might propose an 
ability  hypothesis about Jeeves.  They  could say  that the only  reason why 
Jeeves could know what he does and still fail to know that murder or torture 
for fun is morally  wrong is that he does not have some practical ability  which 
is already  latent in what he knows.  An ability  hypothesis about Jeeves"s 
moral ignorance amounts to saying that the absence of an account of moral 
properties in his world book can be explained away by the claim that he lacks 
some kind of skill or practical ability.  A moral naturalist who wants to defend 
this hypothesis would say  that Jeeves"s moral fallibility  implies that the ability 
to know whether something is morally  good does not depend on propositional 
knowledge about natural facts only.  Rather, it depends on some kind of 
ability; for instance, the ability  to know which natural facts are morally 
relevant.  So the first premise of the world book argument does not imply  that 
there are no moral properties.  It merely implies that knowing whether 
something is morally  good does not solely  depend on having cognitive access 
to the relevant propositional knowledge, or even all such knowledge.  
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! The proponent of the ability  hypothesis has it that Jeeves is morally 
fallible only  because he does not have certain skills or abilities.  But what kind 
of ability  could Jeeves lack?  It"s possible that he cannot imagine himself to 
be confronted with scenarios in which people typically  make moral judgments 
which they  take to be certain, e.g. murder, torture for fun, slavery, etc.  His 
inability  to imagine himself to be confronted with these scenarios could make 
him fail to see which natural features of such scenarios are relevant to its 
moral badness.  Without an imaginative capacity that we all take for granted, 
Jeeves could fail to distinguish between morally  relevant natural information 
and irrelevant information.  Perhaps an integral part of the imaginative 
capacity  that Jeeves lacks is the ability  to take the different perspectives of 
those involved in murder, torture for fun, or slavery.  Since Jeeves knows all 
natural facts he may  not know  what it is like to know things from a limited 
perspective and how to use information from such perspective taking to make 
moral judgments.  So unless Jeeves knows what we go through when we 
imagine youths dousing a cat with gasoline and setting it on fire he cannot 
know whether something is morally  good or bad.6   Or again, unless Jeeves 
87
6 How knowing what we go through when we see someone torture a cat 
or a human being for no apparent reason translates to knowing that such acts 
are morally  wrong is not clear.  It is not obvious, for instance, that having 
firsthand knowledge of  outrage and disapproval over what the youths did to 
the cat would necessarily  translate to having a desire that such acts not be 
perpetrated.  Even if Jeeves does not have firsthand knowledge of outrage 
and disapproval of torture, he has secondhand access to such information. 
Jeeves even knows that virtually  all of us are outraged by  and disapprove of 
torture.  If all this information is not sufficient for knowledge that torture is 
wrong, or what comes to the same thing: the judgment that torture is not 
morally  good, then moral knowledge must not be solely  a function of 
possessing such natural information.  But for the sake of argument and for 
the purposes of developing an ability  hypothesis about Jeeves I am 
supposing here that the judgment that what the youths did to the cat is 
morally  wrong could be secured by  the moral naturalist if she also provides a 
suitable account of the connection between knowing what we experience 
when we see such an atrocity  perpetrated and knowing that such an act is 
morally wrong.
has the ability  to imagine what it is like to be both the killer and the killed he 
may not know  which attendant natural features are relevant to the wrongness 
of murder.  
! It is also possible that Jeeves does not have the ability  to cognitively 
process morally  relevant affect in the way  that we do.  Without this ability 
Jeeves would fail to recognize which among the many  things that he knows 
fall under the rubric of morality.  Morally  relevant affect allows us to see which 
actions or states of affairs fall within the domain of morality.  Guilt, envy or 
desire alerts us to the possible moral significance of the thing which elicits 
such affective responses.  And the ensuing cognitive processing of these 
responses are implicated in knowing whether something is morally  good.  If 
Jeeves does not have both the mechanism for having affective responses 
and the ability  to cognitively  process these responses, then it is no wonder 
that he does not know whether the willful killing of an innocent for trivial, self-
serving reasons is morally  wrong.  The ability to cognitively  process morally 
relevant affect could allow Jeeves to situate himself within the moral domain 
so that he would see murder for what it is.  But since he does not have the 
requisite ability  he fails to recognize not only  that murder is wrong but also 
that there is a domain in which murder, torture for fun and slavery  have a 
distinctive moral status.  
! Taken together, the two abilities that Jeeves putatively lacks present a 
formidable challenge to the proponent of the world book argument.
Reply to the Ability Hypothesis Aboout Jeeves 
! A first line of defense against the ability  hypothesis about Jeeves 
consists in adopting the strategy employed by proponents of the knowledge 
argument who say  that the proposed ability  that Mary  putatively  lacks is 
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neither necessary  nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to see red.7  If the 
ability  to know  how to imagine having the experience of seeing a colored 
object and the ability  to remember, imagine and recognize colored objects are 
indeed neither necessary  nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to see red, 
then it is irrelevant to say  that Mary  does not have these abilities.  These 
abilities can only  explain away  the coherence of the idea that Mary  will learn 
something new when she sees a colored object for the first time if they are 
necessary  and sufficient for knowing what it is like to see a colored object.  If 
the putative abilities are not related to knowing phenomenally  red properties, 
then they are not relevant to the knowledge argument at all.
! A proponent of the world book argument can adopt this strategy  for 
Jeeves.  She can also claim that the abilities that he putatively  lacks are 
neither necessary  nor sufficient for knowing whether something is morally 
good.  For instance, someone with limited imagination but extensive 
experience of morally  relevant cases would know whether something is 
morally  good, especially  if the thing in question is something as obvious as 
murder or torture for fun.  Even if she has not encountered that particular 
case before, what she already knows would most likely  allow  her to see that 
the case before her resembles a number of cases about which she is certain 
in different ways.  From this she can easily  form a judgment about not just the 
novel case before her, but to most new cases that she might encounter. 
Jeeves is an even better informed position compared to such a hypothetical 
moral agent.  He knows not only  all the morally  relevant cases but all moral 
cases that there are.  So even if Jeeves does not have the ability to imagine 
himself to be confronted with different types of morally  charged scenarios, or 
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7 For this response to the ability  hypothesis about Mary  see Earl Conee, 
“Phenomenal Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994), pp. 
138-9.
even the ability  to take the perspective of those involved in them, he must 
always know whether something is morally good.  That is, if there is any  fact 
to know about a morally  charged scenario, Jeeves ought to know them as a 
matter of necessity.  
! The other ability  that Jeeves putatively  lacks is the ability  to cognitively 
process morally  relevant affect.  Presumably  such an ability  would only  be 
helpful to the moral naturalist if the cognitive processing of affect somehow 
tracks objectively  existing moral properties, and if it were really  the case that 
this proposed ability  functions in this way  then Jeeves would know it.  He is 
not limited to our epistemic access to these putative objectively  existing moral 
properties.  If the cognitive processing of affect is indeed our unique mode of 
access to objectively  existing moral properties, then there must be some 
other way  to access these properties.  And if there really  are objectively 
existing moral properties then Jeeves is in an even better position to 
apprehend them.  He would not be prone to make mistakes about processing 
affect, which are a potential source of distorting bias, because he can access 
the putative moral properties through what he knows about our mental 
capacities and the objects which these apprehend.  Neither is Jeeves limited 
to the perspective of an individual or a community"s cognitive processing of 
morally  relevant affect.  He knows about all the different instantiations of such 
processing, so if there really  are objectively existing moral properties that 
underlie these instantiations of cognitive processing of morally  relevant affect, 
then Jeeves must be able to perceive them.  
! In the end, both of the abilities that Jeeves putatively  lacks could only 
become helpful to the moral naturalist who wants to block the second premise 
of the world book argument if it satisfies the following conditions: (a) the 
abilities are necessary  for knowing whether something is morally  good; and 
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(b) these abilities are established as our unique mode of access to objectively 
existing moral properties.  Fulfilling (a) demands considerable philosophical 
work; fulfilling (b) appears to be an empirical matter.  Satisfying both (a) and 
(b) is tantamount to proving the truth of moral naturalism.8  So it seems that 
the moral naturalist has to win the debate against her antinaturalist opponent 
first before this objection to the world book argument can be posed.  What is 
more important, even if both conditions were fulfilled the ability  hypothesis 
about Jeeves would only work if the moral naturalist also denied the 
coherence of the possible moral fallibility of the person who knows all natural 
facts.  Recall that the appeal of the ability  hypothesis about Mary  consists in 
its power to explain away  the coherence of the idea that she will learn 
something new when she is released from her black and white room while 
keeping physicalism intact.  In the case of the ability  hypothesis about 
Jeeves, it could only  manage to keep moral naturalism intact if a separate 
objection to the first premise of the argument is also posed.  So it!s beginning 
to look like posing an ability  hypothesis about Jeeves is not a very  effective 
way of blocking the second premise of the world book argument.
" The best line of defense against an ability  hypothesis about Jeeves is 
to combine the above-mentioned points with an account of an important 
contrast between philosophy  of mind and ethics.    Previously, only  the 
similarities between the knowledge argument and the world book argument 
have been discussed.  Although the strategy behind the two arguments is 
essentially  the same, the difference between the domains in which they  figure 
cause them to bring about widely diverging conclusions.  In the philosophy  of 
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8 The moral naturalist cannot simply assume that the cognitive processing 
of morally  relevant affect is indeed our unique mode of access to objectively 
existing moral properties because this would presuppose that these 
properties exist.  Merely  assuming that there are such properties amounts to 
a petitio.
mind the knowledge argument leads to dualism, which amounts to the claim 
that phenomenally  red experiences are metaphysically  discrete from the 
physical mechanisms from which they arise.  But in ethics the world book 
argument brings about an antinaturalist conclusion, which amounts to a 
denial of the existence of natural moral facts or properties.  In the philosophy 
of mind the reasoning is as follows: if Mary  does not know about it before she 
is released, then it must have a distinct metaphysical existence from what she 
already  knows; in ethics, the reasoning goes something like this: if Jeeves is 
ignorant about it, then there must be no such thing.  This difference can be 
attributed to the difference between what Jeeves and Mary  know and are 
ignorant about.  
! Knowing what it is like to see red is different from knowing whether 
something is morally  good in that the former is an indubitable concomitant of 
visual perception whereas the latter is not an indubitable concomitant of 
knowing natural facts.  Whereas the existence of phenomenally  red 
experiences cannot be doubted, the existence of moral properties, together 
with the possibility of moral knowledge, is controversial.  That is because 
ethics and the philosophy of mind involve distinct sets of assumptions.  When 
it comes to conscious mental experience the point of departure is the unique 
quality  of our subjective or introspective access to seeing colored objects, 
especially  when it is contrasted with an objective and impersonal account of 
what is going on when we have this experience.  Whether our unique 
phenomenal experiences supervene on knowledge of the relevant physical 
facts is what is up for debate.  But when it comes to ethics it is not assumed 
at the outset that there are objectively  existing moral properties and that it is 
possible to know about these.  Whether there are such things as moral 
properties is up for debate.  Instead, the point of departure in ethics is the 
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supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral.  The crucial question is not 
whether Jeeves lacks abilities that we take be crucial to our knowing whether 
something is morally  good, rather the question is whether the abilities that we 
need to participate in the practice of making moral judgments and the activity 
of theorizing about these are connected to natural facts in the right way.
! Because of the difference between ethics and philosophy of mind, 
postulating similar hypotheses about what Jeeves and Mary do not know 
have very  different metaphysical implications.  The possibility  that Mary  will 
not know what it is like to see red casts doubt on the supervenience of the 
mental on the physical, but it does not cast doubt on the existence of 
phenomenally  red experiences.  If anything, the very existence of this unique 
experience is affirmed in the knowledge that it exceeds any  complete physical 
account of it.  In Mary"s case physicalists think that her access to all the 
information about all the physical base properties of seeing red would also 
afford her access to the supervening phenomenally  red experiences. 
Dualists, on the other hand, think that despite the irrefutable connection 
between physical information about color experience and the unique 
subjective quality  of this experience, the former is discontinuous with the 
latter in an important way.  They claim that our tendency to think that Mary  will 
not know what it is like to see red until she actually  sees a red object under 
ideal viewing conditions with adequately  functioning optical faculties, points to 
the metaphysical distinctness of phenomenal properties from physical ones. 
So if Mary  learns something new when she is released from her black and 
white room this would mean that there is some aspect of the mental that 
exceeds the physical.  Regardless of which position one takes, the existence 
of phenomenal properties associated with seeing red is assumed to be 
indisputable.
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! But in the moral case, if Jeeves would fail to know whether something 
is morally good despite being fully  informed about the natural features of that 
thing, this does not imply  that moral properties transcend natural ones.  Since 
the existence of knowing whether something is morally  good does not stand 
on the same level as the existence of phenomenally  red experiences, failure 
to derive the former from knowledge of natural facts implies that there might 
be no such thing as moral properties at all.  The reason Jeeves could fail to 
know whether something is morally  good might be that there is no moral fact 
to know about at all.  This is a possibility  that moral supervenience allows for. 
Within morality  the debate is not about whether moral supervenience is true 
but about how best to account for it.  Moral realists believe that the moral 
supervenes on the descriptive because moral properties are descriptive 
properties.  They  think that the necessity  of saying that two things with the 
same descriptive or natural features have the same moral worth shows that 
the latter stands on the same level as natural properties.  Antirealists, on the 
other hand, think that the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive is a 
limit on what we find intelligible as a sincere utterance of a statement that 
features a moral predicate.   For the antirealist, moral supervenience is a 
conceptual constraint on what kinds of prescriptions, expressions of attitudes, 
etc., are moral judgments.   According to antirealists, that virtually  all of us 
share the same noncognitive responses towards certain things, e.g. murder, 
torture for fun, etc., shows that a long history  of repeated projection of our 
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attitudes over such acts have sedimented into established convention,9  not 
that natural moral properties exist.
! However, it is necessary  for both realists and antirealists to account 
for the fact that the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral or descriptive 
is a conceptual necessity  that is constitutive of morality.  It is a platitude that 
ethical theorists must account for.  Whatever their stance on the existence of 
moral properties or their position on what kind of property  moral properties 
are, realists, antirealists, naturalists and antinaturalists alike must say why  the 
moral supervenes on the descriptive.  The merit of their position depends in a 
large part on the plausibility  of the explanation that they  provide and its 
coherence with the rest of the tenets of their position.  One problem that 
confronts the moral naturalist is that her claim that the moral supervenes on 
the descriptive because moral properties are natural properties is yet to be 
fully  explained.  For instance, it is not clear what is meant by "because# in this 
moral naturalist claim.  The putative equivalence, or at least objective 
correlation, between moral properties and natural ones is based on yet to be 
found empirical evidence.  For all we know such empirical evidence can be 
found.  But in the meantime we already know  that the moral supervenes on 
the descriptive and that someone like Jeeves is logical conceivable so such 
knowledge must not depend on the empirical evidence that the moral 
naturalist is still hoping to find.
! Moreover, Jeeves must know about moral supervenience; he cannot 
know what he does without knowing that we take the supervenience of the 
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9 For instance, our shared deep evolutionary past may  have shaped us in 
such a way  that we approve of cooperative behavior towards conspecifics, 
especially  our own kin, and that we disapprove of unprovoked murderous 
hostility  and needless infliction of pain.  It is true that this fact can be 
appropriated by  moral naturalists and other moral realists for their own ends. 
But they  would need to say  more about the exact nature of the relation 
between moral properties and natural ones before they could do this. 
moral on the descriptive to be constitutive of correct usage of moral terms 
and concepts.  The naturalist contends that moral properties are natural and 
that the right way  to account for moral supervenience is to say  that moral 
properties supervene on natural ones in the same way  that, say, biological 
properties supervene on physicochemical ones.  But since the naturalist 
cannot say  exactly how moral properties are related to descriptives ones then 
she cannot say either how Jeeves could, or even would necessarily, derive 
moral knowledge from what he already  knows.  This means that talking about 
a purported ability  to derive moral knowledge from knowledge of natural facts, 
which Jeeves putatively  lacks, would be problematic also.  So the moral 
naturalist!s ability  objection to the second premise of the world book argument 
comes to naught.
" Simon Blackburn even goes so far as to say  that since moral realism, 
which encompasses moral naturalism, cannot account for moral 
supervenience as well as antirealists could, there is at least one good reason 
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to reject moral realism.10  The reasoning behind Blackburn!s supervenience 
argument against moral realism is as follows: if it is true that through the 
methods of natural science we would eventually  discover which natural 
properties are objectively  correlated with moral properties, then moral 
supervenience appears to be mysterious, or else an inexplicable brute fact. 
In contrast, expressivism fits well with moral supervenience.  According to the 
expressivist we project values onto the world; hence value comes before 
experience.  The supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral or descriptive 
is a logical constraint upon our practice of projecting value, so just like the 
values that we spread onto the natural world moral supervenience precedes 
experience.  
" But it is not necessary  to endorse Blackburn!s supervenience 
argument against moral realism, or to subscribe to experssivism, to show that 
the second premise of the world book argument is true.  It is enough to 
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10  Since he is an expressivist, someone who believes that ethical 
statements do not express beliefs, Blackburn demonstrates that unlike the 
moral realist he can adequately  account for the a priori supervenience of the 
moral on the nonmoral.  Roughly, his supervenience argument against moral 
realism is as follows:
S1" It is a priori that moral properties supervene on natural 
" properties.
S2" If it s a priori that moral properties supervene on natural 
" properties, then a good metaethical theory must explain this.
S3" Moral realism cannot adequately account for the 
" supervenience of the moral on the natural.
S4" Expressivism can adequately account for the supervenience of 
" the moral on the natural.
S5" So the a priori moral supervenience of moral properties on 
" natural properties gives us a reason to accept expressivism 
" and reject moral realism.
S.W. Blackburn, “Moral Realism,” Morality and Moral Reasoning, Ed. John 
Casey (London: Methuen, 1971), 101-24.
recognize the significance of a fundamental presupposition about morality 
that makes Blackburn!s supervenience argument possible.  Moral 
supervenience is not only  neutral between moral realism and moral 
antirealism, it takes precedence in the debate between the proponents of 
these two positions.  Since Jeeves knows all natural facts he must also know 
about this feature of our practice of making moral judgments and theorizing 
about this practice.  Since it is possible for him to know all natural facts 
including this fact about our practice of making moral judgments and still fail 
to know whether something is morally  good, then moral naturalism is in 
trouble.
" Knowledge of all the natural facts gives Jeeves the ability  to have the 
kind of higher order knowledge of natural matters that physicists, chemists 
and biologists have about particles, elements, compounds and organisms. 
But if Jeeves cannot reliably develop moral expertise from what he already 
knows, then the ability to tell the difference between good and bad must not 
be analogous to having such higher order knowledge of natural matters. 
Presumably, Jeeves can formulate an intricate psychological account of our 
world based on what he knows about the fundamental natural facts that 
obtain.  This proves not merely  that the mental is part of the natural world but 
also that the mental is an objective domain in its own right.  If as the first 
premise of the world book argument contends it is possible for Jeeves to 
know all that he does and still fail to know not only  that the willful killing of the 
innocent is wrong but also that there is some moral domain about which there 
are laws that are as hard as any  in the natural and social sciences, then there 




Second Thoughts About the World Book Argument: 
Is it possible to accommodate Jeeves 
within a sophisticated moral naturalist framework?
! Despite what has already  been said in support of the second premise 
of the world book argument, some might still think that it is possible to 
accommodate fallible omniscience within a sophisticated moral naturalist 
framework.  Surely, they  say, it is possible to admit that Jeeves would fail to 
know whether something is morally  good without denying that moral 
properties are natural.  In other words, surely  it is possible to block the 
second premise of the world book argument and still take Jeeves seriously. 
An ability  hypothesis about Jeeves might not be sufficient to block the 
relevant premise but surely  some other hypothesis can get the job done.  To 
put forward such a hypothesis, the naturalist must give an explanation for 
Jeeves"s failure to possess the kind of natural information that would enable 
him to know whether something is morally  good despite his omniscience 
about natural facts.  That is, she must explain why  morally  relevant natural 
information is inaccessible to Jeeves as such even though he knows all 
natural facts.  
! The naturalist has it that the moral worth of something is determined 
by  its morally  relevant natural features.  But how  natural features present 
themselves as morally  relevant may  not be a straightforward matter.  Perhaps 
the best way  to pursue this naturalist response to the world book argument is 
to talk about the distinctive presentation or appearance of morally relevant 
natural information.  A naturalist may  even hypothesize that knowing that 
something is morally  wrong entails having some distinct relation to a natural 
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fact.1  In other words, there might be a unique way  of conceptualizing or being 
related to natural information available to someone who knows whether 
something is morally  good that is not available to Jeeves.  Of course the 
naturalist would also have to explain why  the sort of conceptualization 
available to common folk is unavailable to Jeeves.  But if she can find such 
an explanation, then she could show that despite being interesting and to 
some extent plausible the world book argument does not really  undermine 
moral naturalism.  In what follows, such a response to the new antinaturalist 
argument will be examined in great detail.
The new guise hypothesis about Mary 
! One common response to the second premise of the knowledge 
argument closely matches what the naturalist needs to mount the requisite 
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1  For a development of this response against both the knowledge 
argument and the world book argument see Michael Pelczar, “The 
Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument and the Moral Problem,” 
Synthese 171 (2009): 25-45.  In this article an argument similar to WBA is 
discussed in terms of an "old relatum/new relation# strategy.  This strategy  is 
related to the new guise hypothesis, which is going to be considered here, in 
the following way: whereas the proponent of "new guise# claims that what 
prerelease Mary lacks is knowledge of all the different ways of 
conceptualizing ontological facts, the proponent of "new relation# contends 
that what someone like Jeeves lacks before his moral ignorance is cured is a 
desiderative relation to some natural fact, e.g. a desire that murder, torture, 
etc. not be perpetrated.  The proponent of new relation assumes that 
knowledge of some moral fact, if there be such a thing, is none other than a 
desiderative relation to some natural fact.  By  discussing the situation of 
someone who knows all natural facts, Carrie, Pelczar demonstrates that the 
second premise of the world book argument is false:
"Carrie knows every fact ... is consistent with her failing to desire, for 
example, that genocide not be perpetrated.  But if Carrie does not have this 
desire, then she does not know  that it is wrong to perpetrate genocide. 
(This is so even if the fact that it is wrong to perpetrate genocide is some 
natural fact about genocide that Carrie knows.)  So, the fact that Carrie knows 
every fact--including every  moral fact, if there are moral facts--is consistent 
with her failing to know that it is wrong to perpetrate genocide.  But if she 
does not know that it is wrong to perpetrate genocide, then she suffers from 
moral ignorance.  ... [T]herefore ... even if all facts are natural facts, someone 
could know all the natural facts, yet suffer from moral ignorance (p. 34)."
objection against the analogous premise of the world book argument.2  Like 
the ability  hypothesis, this objection to the second premise of the knowledge 
argument concedes that Mary  would learn something upon her release, but 
unlike the ability  hypothesis it also concedes that what Mary learns is 
propositional knowledge.  The crucial move for this objection is the denial that 
the information that Mary  gains when she encounters a colored object for the 
first time is altogether new to her.  This means that those who pose this 
objection deny  that the new information that Mary  learns is something above 
and beyond the physical facts about color vision that she already  knows. 
Since those who advance this response say  that what Mary  learns when she 
finally  goes out of her black and white room is a new guise of an old fact that 
she already  knew, this strategy  is sometimes called the new  guise hypothesis 
about Mary.  According to this hypothesis, what Mary  learns when she sees a 
ripe tomato for the first time merely  consists in knowing about a new 
presentation or a different packaging of something already  known to her. 
Roughly, the idea is that upon seeing a colored object for the first time Mary 
will learn a new way  to conceptualize an old physical fact because she will 
finally learn firsthand what phenomenal redness is like.
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2 The relevant premises of the two arguments are as follows:
K2! If someone who knew all physical facts about color vision does 
! not know what it is like to see red, then physicalism about 
! conscious experience must be false.
WB2! If someone who knows all natural facts does not know whether 
! something is morally good, then moral naturalism must be 
! false.
! According to Horgan, one of the proponents of the new  guise 
hypothesis,3  Jackson"s knowledge argument commits a fallacy because it 
equivocates on two different senses of physical information.4  Horgan has it 
that what Mary  learns when she sees a ripe tomato for the first time can be 
expressed by a sentence that features an indexical term: 
(R) “Seeing ripe tomatoes has this property;” where #this property" is used to 
designate the property  of phenomenal redness that is instantiated in her 
experience.  Horgan adds that (R) “expresses new information because 
Mary  has a new perspective on phenomenal redness: viz., the first-person 
ostensive perspective.”5  
Being sequestered in a black and white room merely  prevents Mary  from 
having access to a distinct perspective of a physical fact about color, namely 
the fact that a first person experience of seeing it has a distinct phenomenal 
property.  Before her release Mary  knows all about phenomenal redness in 
terms of the first person reports of people who have seen color and the 
corresponding brain states of these people.  But since Mary  herself has never 
seen a colored object she cannot point to that experience from the first 
person point of view.  When she sees the sky  for the first time she becomes 
more fully  enlightened about what her informants are talking about when they 
see a colored object.  But what Mary  learns isn"t the type of new information 
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3  Proponents of the new guise hypothesis about Mary  include Bigelow 
and Pargetter, Churchland, Loar, Lycan, Perry  and many  others.  But for the 
purpose of adopting the new  guise hypothesis for moral naturalism only 
Horgan and Tye will be discussed here.  Horgan and Tye"s versions of the 
new guise hypothesis about Mary  are the most relevant for Jeeves because 
their approach does not hinge on technicalities about phenomenal properties. 
As noted in the previous chapter, different assumptions about phenomenal 
properties and moral properties yield different conclusions about their 
existence.  So strategies that depend on theoretical innovations on the 
character of phenomenal properties are mostly  irrelevant to the naturalist 
versus antinaturalist debate in metaethics.
4  Terence Horgan, “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984): 147.
5 Ibid., p. 151
that is detrimental to physicalism about conscious experience because it 
corresponds to a fact already  known to her from objective information about 
brain states and from secondhand reports from her informants.  
! Horgan points out that it is possible to individuate physical information 
in two ways: (a) in terms of the ontological objects that physical concepts 
correspond to; or (b) in terms of all the different physical concepts there are, 
even if some of these correspond to the same ontological object.  So Mary 
can be said to be fully  informed about the physical information on color vision 
in two ways.  Either she knows all ontological objects in at least one guise or 
she knows all the different concepts that correspond to these objects.  If all 
the knowledge argument shows is that Mary  would learn something new 
when she finally  gets released because the second premise of the argument 
is trading on the distinction between ontological objects and the concepts 
which correspond to these, then physicalism about conscious experience 
remains intact.  All the physicalist needs to defend her position is to show that 
all mental concepts correspond to some physical object.  That some mental 
concepts are only  accessible through a distinct first person perspective does 
nothing to show that there are mental concepts that go beyond the physical. 
So Mary  and others like her are not counterexamples to physicalism about 
conscious experience.
! Michael Tye parses the new guise hypothesis about Mary  in terms of 
an improvement on the ability  hypothesis proposed by  David Lewis.6 
According to Tye, the information that Mary  learns when she sees a colored 
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6  Michael Tye, “Knowing What it is Like: the Ability  Hypothesis and the 
Knowledge Argument, Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays in the 
Philosophy of David Lewis (Boston: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 
pp. 223-38.
object for the first time is best captured by  a disjunction of introspective 
knowing-that and an ability that can be summed up as follows: 
“S knows what it is like to undergo experience E =df Either S is now 
undergoing E and S has indexical knowledge-that with respect to the 
phenomenal character of E obtained via current introspection or S has the 
Lewis abilities with respect to E.”7  
Tye improves on Lewis! response to the knowledge argument by  tying up the 
cluster of abilities associated with knowing what it is like to see red8 with the 
more basic ability  to apply an indexical concept to the phenomenal character 
of an experience of phenomenal redness via introspection.  What Tye calls 
the "more basic!  ability  is inseparable from a direct acquaintance with 
phenomenal redness.9   According to Tye, even if prerelease Mary  is fully 
aware that there is a distinct phenomenal concept "experience of red!  and that 
she can use such a concept when she is not talking about herself, she does 
not know what it is like to experience red until she actually  does so.  From this 
it follows that when she is still trapped in a black and white room Mary will not 
be able to say  or think to herself, while actually seeing a red object, that this 
is what it is like to see red.  Such a statement or thought remains inaccessible 
to her because its meaning or content is only  accessible to someone who has 
seen or is seeing a red object. 
# Like Horgan, Tye counts what Mary  learns when she sees a colored 
object for the first time as a new mode of presentation of an old fact. 
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7 Ibid. 
8 Recall that the particular abilities proposed by  those who pose the ability 
hypothesis about Mary  include the ability  to imagine, recognize, or remember 
color or color experiences.
9  In this respect, Tye!s version of the new  guise hypothesis closely 
resembles what is sometimes called the acquaintance hypothesis about Mary. 
For a version of the latter that fits well with new guise, see Earl Conee, 
“Phenomenal Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994): 
139-41.
Similarly, Tye associates the new concept that Mary  learns with indexical 
thought contents associated with seeing colored objects.  Tye also denies that 
conceptual differences necessarily  mirror worldly differences.  According to 
Tye, “indexical thoughts and thought contents are partly  individuated by  the 
items picked out by  the relevant indexical concepts and partly  by  concepts or 
modes of presentations themselves.”10  This means that when Mary  sees a 
ripe tomato for the first time and exclaims “So this is what it is like to see red!” 
the contents of her thought at that particular moment is the peculiar 
introspectible aspect of her experience.  But at the same time Mary 
immediately  sees the connection between what she learns and what she 
already  knows.  She will discover for herself the basis of the reports of her 
informants, and the subjective quality  of being in the brain state of people 
who see red objects.  If she is so inclined Mary  herself will see that what she 
learns is already latent, although not fully  realized, in what she knew in her 
black and white days.  If this is right, then it could be true that, even though a 
whole world of color experience is unavailable to sequestered Mary, 
physicalism is still right about conscious experience.  The naturalist could 
apply  this old fact/new guise strategy to Jeeves.  If successful, moral 
naturalism could remain intact despite fallible omniscience.
A new guise hypothesis about Jeeves
! To pose a new guise hypothesis about Jeeves, the naturalist needs to 
identify  something that ordinary  folk do as a matter of course that could 
plausibly  be inaccessible to Jeeves.  What the naturalist needs to find is the 
equivalent of seeing ripe tomatoes, sunsets, blood, etc., for Mary, with respect 
to Jeeves.  Unlike Mary  most of us do not know, or even come close to 
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10 Tye, “Knowing What it is Like,” p. 228.
knowing, all physical facts about color vision.  But at every  moment we have 
access to the ostensive first person perspective on color.  So there is distinct 
conceptualization of color that we know about that is unavailable to prerelase 
Mary.  If the naturalist can find such an analogue for Jeeves, then it would be 
possible for her to talk about the distinct guise of morally  relevant natural 
information and thereby  block the second premise of the world book 
argument.
! Jeeves, as he has been described thus far, is similar to sequestered 
Mary  in the following way: he is disconnected from the way that moral agents 
experience and relate to the natural world.  In the same way  that Mary  is 
removed from our ordinary  access to color, Jeeves is removed from our 
ordinary  access to the natural features of things that we judge morally. 
Jeeves"s knowledge of all natural facts implies that he does not have to rely 
on the methods that we employ  to know the natural features things to know 
about what he is judging.  For instance, he does not have to exert effort to 
find facts or to gather data about some particular case in the way that we do. 
Jeeves already  knows all the natural facts that there are so he does not have 
to sift through information or gradually  piece together the big picture in the 
way  that we do.  His omniscience also implies that he is not subject to the 
vicissitudes of misinformation in the way  that we are.  Someone who wants to 
propose a new guise hypothesis about Jeeves can use these similarities 
between him and Mary  to explain why it is that he would fail to know whether 
something is morally  wrong.  Jeeves, as he has been described thus far, is 
not sequestered in the same way  that Mary  is.  But being completely 
detached from the way  that we experience the world is certainly   consistent 
with fallible omniscience.  This is all that a proponent of the new guise 
hypothesis about Jeeves needs to introduce an explanation for Jeeves" failure 
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to know whether something is morally  wrong that is consistent with moral 
naturalism.  !
! Although knowledge of all natural facts does not imply  detachment 
from our experience of the world, the latter is a plausible explanation for 
fallible omniscience that is consistent with moral naturalism.  Jeeves is not 
apt to be mislead by facts because he does not know the "full story# about 
something in the natural world.  But perhaps for the very  reason that he does 
not have to rely  on a firsthand account of the natural features of things, he 
does not know what it is like to be confronted with some act, person or state 
of affairs in a context in which he has to decide what to do and what to think 
about what stands before him.  Neither does Jeeves know what it is like to 
have commitments, long-term projects, etc., in our world.  So he would not 
know what it is like to decide whether he ought to allow people to do certain 
acts or to let certain states of affairs prevail because these acts and states of 
affairs affect the commitments and long-term projects that define his very 
identity.  Consequently, Jeeves does not know what it is like to desire for a 
certain fact not to obtain.11  His detachment from natural world that he knows 
about could cause Jeeves to be completely  indifferent to what happens in it. 
Since having a desire for some fact not to obtain is arguably  necessary  for 
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11 Pelczar takes this desiderative relation to be the relation crucial for the 
knowledge that such and such a fact is not morally  good.  “Necessarily, 
anyone who knows X is wrong desires that X not be done.  ...  The claim is 
not that knowing that X is wrong requires not desiring that X be done.  It is 
that knowing that X is wrong requires desiring that X not be done (p.33).”  But 
Pelczar does not elaborate on what brings about the desire that X not be 
done, he merely  says that when a person who knows all natural facts is cured 
of moral ignorance she acquires a desiderative relation toward certain natural 
facts.  The new guise hypothesis about Jeeves being proposed here also 
relies on the necessity of bearing a desiderative relation to natural facts for 
moral knowledge.  But in contrast with the old fact/new relation strategy, what 
is being proposed here on behalf of the moral naturalist is being grounded on 
moral agents# distinct perspective on the natural world.
knowing whether the state of affairs in question is morally  good, Jeeves could 
be morally ignorant.  
! Maybe Jeeves could be fallible on moral matters although he is 
infallible when it comes to natural science because the former, unlike the 
latter, involves a distinct kind of relation towards knowledge of a natural fact. 
Perhaps Jeeves could only  bear such a relation to a natural fact if he lived in 
the world in the way that we do.  If he remains detached from our situation 
and disengaged with the concerns that come with being in such a situation, 
then he would not know the desires that drive our judgments, much less the 
norms that govern these very  desires.12   It is not just that we desire that 
genocide, murder, torture for fun, etc., not be perpetrated because it 
jeopardizes our plans and commitments.  We ought to desire that murder, 
etc., not be perpetrated even if it were not prudential for us to do so.  And it 
must not be possible to know that murder, genocide, torture for fun, etc., are 
morally  wrong without having the requisite desire and understanding the kind 
of reasoning that governs such desires.13
! To clarify matters, compare Jeeves"s judgment of scientific matters 
based on what he knows compared with his neutrality  on moral matters. 
Natural science involves a normative element because it depends on 
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12 This account of fallible omniscience contradicts the one given in chapter 
5.  But since the new guise hypothesis about Jeeves is meant to be a 
competing account of fallible omniscience, if it turns out to be the right one 
then the world book argument would not be able to establish its antinaturalist 
conclusion.
13 According to Pelczar what a person who knows all natural facts could 
be ignorant about “concerns facts that it is the business of normative ethics to 
describe (p. 44).”  If it is assumed that some normative ethical theory  is true, 
then it is easy to say what kind of desires Jeeves would have.  But if we 
suspend judgment on competing normative ethical theories and Jeeves is 
given the requisite kind of experience, it has yet to be shown what desires 
Jeeves would have and why he would have them.  More on this in the next 
section of this chapter.  
experiments, observation and other forms of data gathering performed by 
fallible and epistemically  limited human beings.  The norms that scientists 
follow regulate such activities and promote responsible belief-formation in the 
scientific community.  But these things are superfluous to someone who 
knows all natural facts.  Unlike ordinary  scientists, Jeeves can sit on armchair 
and theorize about the natural world without lifting a finger.  He does not have 
to gather data, design and conduct experiments or even bother about 
margins of error.  Because he knows all natural facts the possibility  of being 
mistaken about some natural matter does not even arise.  Jeeves knows all 
natural facts and all laws of nature.  Perhaps his omniscience would even 
allow him to have the scientist!s practical power of prediction even if he does 
not move from his armchair.   But if Jeeves has never left his armchair the 
experience of what it is like to be part of the natural world and to desire that 
this or that state of affairs not obtain would be completely  unknown to him.14 
He would not know what it is like to be committed to long-term projects, to 
conceive of himself in terms of valuable experiences, desire that certain 
states of affairs obtain, etc.  And because he does not desire that certain acts 
be committed or states of affairs come to pass he cannot be in the requisite 
desiderative relation towards natural facts.  If it is right that it is not possible to 
know whether something is morally  good without having such a desire, then 
moral naturalists won!t have a problem with Jeeves.
" Here is the distinct perspective on knowledge of natural facts that the 
naturalist could use to mount a new guise hypothesis about Jeeves.  In 
ethics, the first person perspective on what ought to be done is a deliverance 
 109
14  Jeeves may have existing desires in his sequestered state, e.g. the 
desire for a more comfortable armchair, a room with a different view, etc.  But 
having these and other similar desires do not necessarily  translate to having 
desires relevant for knowing whether something is morally good. 
of deliberation on what one knows, what one desires and what norms govern 
these desires.  If Jeeves does not know what it is like to take this perspective 
then it is no wonder that he does not know whether something is morally 
good.  Unlike us, Jeeves has never been in a position in which he has to 
choose between alternative courses of action.  He has never known what it is 
like to see a set of alternatives from the distinctive first person point of view 
that common folk find themselves in on a daily  basis.  Since knowing what it 
is like to take the first person perspective on what ought to be done about 
some moral matter is necessary  for knowing whether something is morally 
good, Jeeves would not know whether something is morally  good.  But this 
does not mean that such knowledge isn!t already  latent in knowledge of all 
natural facts.  
" The new guise hypothesis about fallible omniscience being proposed 
here could be better understood by contrasting Jeeves with Peter Railton!s 
account of a fully  informed moral agent.15   Unlike Jeeves, Railton!s all 
knowing moral agent is competent with reasoning that involves beliefs, 
desires and the norms that govern desires because he begins as an ordinary 
moral agent who has to make moral judgments using limited knowledge of 
the natural world.  Being a reductive naturalist, Railton believes that the moral 
goodness of something can be analyzed within existing or prospective 
empirical theories.  He believes that the central evaluative functions of 
morality  are localized in nature and that empirical research can help us 
uncover which natural properties underwrite these evaluative functions.  More 
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15  Railton!s position is partly  based on Brandt!s reductive moral 
naturalism.  According to Brandt, something is intrinsically good for a person if 
and only  if it is something he would want for himself if he were fully  and vividly 
fully informed about it.
Richard Brandt, Facts Values and Morality, p. 197.
specifically, Railton!s brand of moral naturalism defines goodness in terms of 
the objective interest of society.  To arrive at such a social account Railton 
begins with the objective interest of an individual, which he defines as follows:
Give to an actual individual A unqualified cognitive and imaginative 
powers, and full factual and nomological information about his physical 
and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history, and so 
on.  A will have become 
A+, who has complete and vivid knowledge of himself and his 
environment, and whose instrumental rationality  is in no way defective. 
We now ask A+ to tell us not what he currently  wants, but what he would 
want his non-idealized self A to want--or, more generally, to seek--were he 
to find himself in the actual condition and circumstances of A.16
According to Railton, what A+ would choose for A is what is in A!s objective 
interest.  Railton uses the heuristic tool of conferring full information about 
himself and his environment on a moral agent to show how knowledge of 
natural facts bears on knowing what is good for someone.  Jeeves differs 
from Railton!s A+ in the following way: A+ knows what it is like to be situated 
in a world but Jeeves does not.  So A+ would know what A ought to do and 
what he ought to want for himself because he knows not only all the relevant 
natural facts, he also knows what it is like to be a moral agent.  Having had 
the experience of common folk, A+ knows what it is like to consider different 
courses of action from the first person point of view.    That is why  A+ can 
conceptualize the natural facts that he knows about A in terms of their 
relevance to what A ought to do.
" A moral naturalist like Railton could block the second premise of the 
world book argument by using these differences between Jeeves and A+ to 
pose a new guise hypothesis about Jeeves.  If Jeeves gains the type of 
information that A+ has about conceptualizing natural facts from the point of 
view of a moral agent, then Jeeves could not fail to know whether something 
is morally  good.  He wouldn!t just know what is good for him or what is good 
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16 Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” p. 174.
for A, he would also know what is good for everyone both as individuals and 
as a collective.  The reductive naturalist could then say that fallible 
omniscience does not imply  antinaturalism.  All that fallible omniscience 
implies is that someone can know all natural facts without knowing how to 
engage in reasoning that involves beliefs, desires, and norms about desires 
because he has never known what it is like not to be detached and 
disengaged with the world.   But once we give him that experience, the 
person who knows all natural facts will immediately  see what is good for him 
and what is good for other people.  From there, someone whom we might call 
a non-sequesterd Jeeves, could easily  see what he ought to do when he finds 
himself in some specific situation.  And perhaps if such a person who knows 
all natural facts had enough time, he could write out what each moral agent 
ought to do, much like Brink envisioned when he described an omniscient 
person similar to Jeeves.17
! Michael Smith"s conception of moral facts is similar to the reductive 
naturalists" in some respects.18  Although Smith"s account of moral facts has 
significant affinities with the reductive naturalist"s position, his moral realism is 
informed by  a conception of philosophical analysis that other moral naturalists 
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17 Brink does not agree that moral facts are reducible to natural ones.  But 
according to him someone who knew all natural facts would also know what 
each person ought to do.  
18  Michael Smith, “Realism,” Ethical Theory: An Anthology (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2007), pp. 72-6.
eschew.19   Like Brandt and Railton, Smith grounds his analysis of moral 
goodness on what a fully  informed moral agent would have reason to do if he 
were !well-informed, calm, cool and collected."20  According to Smith, such an 
analysis has the added advantage of weeding out irrational motives for 
action, e.g. a desire to drown the crying baby  in its bath water to stop it from 
crying.21  The demand that we only endorse reasons for action that we would 
have if we were well-informed and fully  rational also allows us to move from 
what is good for someone to what is good for everyone.  Smith believes that 
through rational argumentation on moral matters that makes an appeal to 
what we would have reason to do if we were !well-informed, calm, cool and 
collected" we would eventually  arrive at a massive convergence of moral 
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19  Brink characterizes this particular aspect of his disagreement with 
Smith as a difference of opinion at the metaphilosophical level. 
 
“[W]e disagree about the extent to which it is useful to think of moral, 
metaethical, and (more generally) philosophical theorizing as conceptual 
analysis.  He is an advocate of this perspective; I am not.  I suspect that 
these metaphilosophical differences influence our rather different view about 
the most plausible form of ethical naturalism: I favor metaphysical naturalism, 
whereas Smith rejects metaphysical naturalism in favor of a !network 
analysis" of moral terms.”  [“Moral Motivation,” Ethics 108 (1997): p. 5.]
20 Ibid., p. 74.
21 Ibid.
Unlike Brandt and Railton, Smith develops his moral realist position as a 
response to what he calls !the moral problem," which consists in the following 
inconsistent triad:
(1) Moral judgments of the form !It is right to #!  express a subject"s beliefs 
about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what is right for her to do.
(2) If someone judges that it is right that she #s then, ceteris paribus, she 
is motivated to #.
(3) An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an 
appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in 
Hume"s terms, distinct existences.
[The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p.12.]
Smith solves the moral problem by  making a distinction between motives 
or desires, which are merely  occurrent in subjects, and reasons for action, 
which are considered judgments of moral agents.  By  so doing Smith allows 
for rational criticism of desires.  
beliefs.22  Such a convergence would not be forthcoming unless there were 
moral facts grounded on facts about what we have reason to do.  Since facts 
about what we have reason to do are wholly  determined by  external 
circumstances of moral agents these must be objective, even if they  are 
dispositional in nature.  
! Smith"s account of moral facts can be adopted by moral naturalists 
like Brandt and Railton to develop  an account of natural moral facts that begin 
from the objective interest of one particular individual.  Such a naturalist could 
say  that from this objective interest moral agents can discover through 
rational argumentation what they  all have reason to do if they  were fully 
rational and fully  informed about natural facts.  If Jeeves were allowed to 
have the requisite conceptualization of natural facts by  being localized in 
some part of the world at some particular time as a moral agent, then he 
would begin to see what he and other people have reason to do.  From there 
Jeeves could extrapolate all that he needs to know to be morally omniscient.  
Reply to the new guise hypothesis about Jeeves
! The proponent of the world book argument could begin a reply  to the 
new guise hypothesis about Jeeves by adopting the strategy used by 
property  dualists or phenomenal realists against the new guise hypothesis 
about Mary.  This strategy  consists in saying that conceding that there is 
some physical information that prerelease Mary  lacks that may  be parsed in 
terms of a distinct guise or presentation of natural facts is tantamount to 
conceding that physicalism about conscious experience is false.  According to 
Stephen L. White, there is an important difference between the Morning Star/
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22 Ibid., 76.
Evening Star case and the pain/c-fiber firing case.23  In the former there are 
clearly  two physical properties that correspond to the two descriptions of 
Venus: “the property  of being the last heavenly body  visible in the morning 
and the property  of being the first heavenly  body  visible in the evening.”24 But 
in the case of pain, in order to produce an analogue for the two physical 
properties of Venus that correspond to Hesperus and Phosphorous it has to 
be supposed that the first order property of being painful (which is identical 
with a neurophysiological property, say, C-fiber firing) has two second order 
properties: the mental property  in virtue of which it has an a priori connection 
with the phenomenal character of pain, and the physical property  by  virtue of 
which it can be picked out as the neurophysiological property that it is.  Hence 
property  dualism emerges at the level of second order properties, despite the 
physicalist!s attempt to reduce phenomenal properties to physical ones 
through the old fact/new  guise strategy.  Pain is different from Venus in that 
the former is inaccessible outside a first person point of view.  So if the 
physical property  of being an instantiation of C-fiber firing does not include 
the phenomenal character of pain then the latter must be ontologically, and 
not only epistemically, distinct from the former.
" In the same vein, David Chalmers points out that there is an important 
difference between the a posteriori equivalence between water and H2O, 
genes and DNA, etc., on the one hand, and brain states and phenomenal 
properties on the other.  He says that if someone were fully  informed about 
physical facts relevant to water and genes, that person would be able to 
derive from what she knows that water is H2O and that genes are DNA.
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23  Stephen L. White, “Why the Property Dualism Argument Won!t Go 
Away,” Forthcoming.
24 Ibid.
To explain genes, we merely  have to explain why  systems function a 
certain way  in transmitting hereditary  characteristics; to explain water, we 
have to explain why a substance has a certain objective structure and 
behavior.  Given a complete physical description of the world, Mary would 
be able to deduce all the relevant truths about water and about genes, by 
deducing which systems have the appropriate structure and function.25
But in the case of phenomenal properties even physicalists like Tye and 
Horgan concede that prerelease Mary would not know  what it is like to see a 
ripe tomato.  So there must be an important difference between knowing 
phenomenal properties and knowing that two natural kind terms are co-
referential.  Chalmers adds that if Mary  can know all physical facts about 
color vision and still lack information about the phenomenal character of 
seeing red from the first person point of view, then there must be some belief 
about such an experience that Mary  lacks.  Even if the only  belief that 
prerelease Mary  lacks is one in which she knows that she is now having a red 
experience, the opponent of the new guise hypothesis would turn out to be 
right about the distinct existence of phenomenal properties.  All that 
phenomenal realism26  needs is the admission that there is no a priori 
entailment from the physical to the phenomenal.  Since the new guise 
hypothesis about Mary  concedes that there is !merely"  an a posteriori 
entailment from the physical to the phenomenal when they  concede that 
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25  David J. Chalmers, “Consciousness and its Place in Nature,” 
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 253.
26 Chalmers characterizes phenomenal realism as follows: 
 
“The view that there are phenomenal properties (or phenomenal qualities, 
or qualia), properties that type mental states by  what it is like to have them, 
and that phenomenal properties are not conceptually  reducible to physical or 
functional properties (or equivalently, that phenomenal concepts are not 
reducible to physical or functional concepts).  On this view, there are truths 
about what it is like to be a subject that are not entailed a priori by  the 
physical and functional truth (including the environmental truth) about that 
subject.” [“The Content and Epistemology  of Phenomenal Belief,” 
Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), 
p. 221.]
prerelease Mary  lacks some information about seeing red despite her 
physical omniscience about color vision, then it seems that they are also 
committed to admitting that phenomenal properties have a distinct existence 
from all the physical facts about them.  This conclusion is reinforced by  the 
fact that there is a demonstrable difference between the a posteriori 
connection between phenomenal properties and brain states from an a 
posteriori equivalence between water and H20, genes and DNA, Hesperus 
and Phosphorous, etc.
! The property  dualist and phenomenal realist strategy  against the new 
guise hypothesis about Mary  implies that a similar hypothesis about Jeeves 
also runs into the same trouble.  The moral naturalist proponent of the new 
guise hypothesis about Jeeves claims that the reason he would fail to know 
whether something is morally  good despite his knowledge of all natural facts 
is that he has never seen natural facts from the point of view of someone who 
has to choose what to think or what to do about some moral matter.  The 
sophisticated moral naturalist has it that moral properties are reducible to 
natural properties associated with what is good for a population or what a fully 
rational and well-informed collective has reason to do.  But the moral 
naturalist cannot say at the same time that (a) natural moral properties have a 
distinct mode of presentation unavailable to someone disengaged from the 
world in the way  that sequestered Jeeves is and (b) that once Jeeves is given 
the requisite kind of first hand experience he will automatically  have the right 
kind of desires, without saying how and why these desires are right.  Also, the 
naturalist has to explain why  being non-sequestered could suddenly make 
Jeeves morally  omniscient in the way that favors the naturalist"s 
understanding of moral omniscience.
 117
! To appreciate the naturalist"s problem consider this example: before 
the discovery  of DNA, genes were conceived as factors that determine the 
transmission of traits from one generation to another.  Although the exact 
physical composition of such factors were yet to be known it was 
hypothesized that the whole gamut of trait inheritance in plants and animals 
can be attributed to genes that do not blend with one another although they 
mask one another"s effects from time to time.  After the discovery  of DNA we 
can say  with more confidence that all natural phenomena that could be 
subsumed under the heading #heredity# are reducible to biochemical patterns 
and reactions at the sub-cellular level.  Here we have two concepts that turn 
out to have the same referent and a situation in which such an equivalence 
allows us to reduce one domain to another.  If someone knew all the physical 
facts about genes, then that person would be able to discover from what he 
knows that genes are DNA and that hereditary  phenomena can be reduced to 
the action of DNA.  
! Being fully  informed about the natural features of or the physical facts 
about genes is sufficient for knowledge about DNA and what happens when 
traits are inherited from parent to offspring.  If natural moral properties are 
discoverable in the same way  that we have discovered that the transmission 
of hereditary  characteristics happens through DNA replication, then it is not 
possible for Jeeves to know what he does and still fail to know whether 
something is morally  good.  Being isolated from the experience of common 
folk would not provide Jeeves with the information that he requires to be 
morally  omniscient.  As noted in the previous section, Jeeves"s knowledge of 
all natural facts entails that he would be fully  proficient with deriving higher 
order or more theoretical scientific truths from what he knows even if he does 
not pass through the practicalities that ordinary  scientists do because their 
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data is limited.  So if natural facts are similar to such higher order scientific 
truths, then it is not possible for Jeeves not to know them.  The conceptual 
difference between natural information as it appears to someone with limited 
knowledge of natural facts but firsthand experience of making moral 
judgments, and natural information as it appears to someone who knows all 
natural facts but does not know what it is like to be a moral agent is not 
relevant for Jeeves if moral naturalism is true.  If moral naturalism is false, 
then the new guise hypothesis about Jeeves might explain why  he does not 
make any moral judgments. 
! This initial response to the new guise hypothesis about Jeeves fits 
well with the difference between ethics and philosophy  of mind that was 
brought up in the previous chapter.  Since in the philosophy of mind 
phenomenal properties are taken to be indubitable, disproving the new guise 
hypothesis about Mary  leads to property  dualism or what Chalmers calls 
phenomenal realism.  But in ethics, where the existence of natural moral 
properties is open to question, fallible omniscience taken together with the 
demonstration that such a hypothetical being would necessarily  be fully 
informed about a posteriori truths like the co-referentiality  of certain natural 
kind terms and the reducibility of one domain into another implies that moral 
naturalism is false.  
! This reply to the new  guise hypothesis about Jeeves can be 
developed further through a reconsideration of one of the reasons given for 
his moral ignorance.  Recall the type of moral disagreement that features 
well-informed and well-meaning disputants who accept different moral 
norms.27  In this type of disagreement the dispute is between two persons or 
communities who use moral terms to refer to different sets of natural 
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27 See p. 31.
properties and who subscribe to different normative moral principles.  Such a 
moral disagreement demonstrates that it is possible to know a good number 
of natural facts about some moral matter, know what it is like to be a person 
and to have a perspective, desire that this or that state of affairs obtain and 
still fail agree on the aforementioned moral matter because there are two 
equally  coherent ways of conceptualizing the moral relevance of natural facts. 
This means that even if it is true that the moral relevance of natural facts 
could only  be properly  appreciated when they  are seen from a distinct first 
person perspective, there is no guarantee that all moral agents will see the 
moral relevance of natural facts in the same way.  In Jeeves!s case it is not 
clear what exactly  it is that he is supposed to see when he is no longer 
insulated from our experience of the natural world as moral agents.  The 
moral naturalist cannot maintain that Jeeves will become morally  omniscient 
once he leaves his armchair if she does not show first that the type of moral 
disagreement described above can be resolved by  using only  the means 
available to scientists when they  argue about similar matters, or demonstrate 
how Jeeves would choose between different lives he and all other human 
beings ought to choose because it is what is good for them.  If the moral 
naturalist cannot do this then it is possible that all that Jeeves will discover 
when he is released from seclusion is that he has to choose to stick to some 
established use of moral terms and subscribe to one of the coherent system 
of moral principles available to moral agents.  After all, making such a choice 
is necessary  for survival.  But just because Jeeves chooses one way or 
another does not necessarily mean that his choice has an objective basis.  
" The problem about what Jeeves would choose to desire is 
compounded by the fact that it is difficult for someone like him to 
commensurate all that he knows and find some way to choose between them. 
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David Sobel and Connie S. Rosati present different but not incompatible 
arguments for the claim that merely stipulating full-information for a moral 
agent is insufficient for knowing what is good for such an agent.28   Without 
specifying more clearly  how such an agent is supposed to commensurate 
different options in order to determine which one is best for her, it is not clear 
how she will be able to handle all the information available to her so that one 
or several possible options trump all the others.  Rosati summarizes the 
problem as follows:
To experience life A as the person she would be in A, a person would 
need to take on A!s point of view and thus to have certain motivational 
and cognitive features.  To experience life B as she would be in B, a 
person may  need to have different motivational and cognitive features. 
But the person who is to compare lives A and B will have yet different 
features.  Some of these are cognitive features that correct for or expand 
her actual cognitive powers.  They  are thus features she did not have in 
either life A or B and that would have altered her experience of those lives 
had she had them.  Other features are simply the by-product of the 
processes she must undergo in order to become fully  informed.  Yet her 
features collectively  must enable her simultaneously  to be informed about 
what lives A and B were like for her as the persons she was when living 
them, so that she occupies a point of view that makes each viewpoint 
accessible.  The problem thus more specifically  concerns what features 
might enable a person to be informed in this way.29
In other words, merely  saying that an agent like Jeeves has cognitive access 
to all the lives possible for him and for all humans without saying which, if any, 
of the desires and other motivational features that he has knowledge of ought 
to guide him is not enough to generate the kind of answer that the moral 
naturalist like Railton or Smith hopes to find.  If A and B were like the 
participants in the debate on capital punishment described in Chapter 2, it is 
not clear how Jeeves is supposed to choose which of them is right without 
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28 Connie S. Rosati, “Persons, Perspectives and Full Information Accounts 
of the Good,” Ethics 105 (1995): 296-325.
David Sobel, “Full-Information Accounts of Well-Being,” Ethics 104 (1994): 
784-810.
29 Rosati, “Persons, Perspectives...,” p. 317.
assuming that Jeeves would also know that some normative ethical theory  is 
true in the same way  that scientific theories are true.  But if being omniscient 
about natural facts is compatible with being morally ignorant then it must be 
possible for natural facts to underdetermine the truth of normative ethical 
theories.  So the moral naturalist and the moral realist cannot assume at the 
outset that some normative ethical theory  is true in the same way  that 
analogous theories in the natural or social sciences are true.  
! Sobel raises a separate question about the incoherence of requiring 
someone like Jeeves to be affected by experiencing the different possibilities 
that he knows about while at the same time demanding that he remain 
detached and indifferent towards the different possibilities that he knows 
about.30  Being affected by  the life that one chose to live means identifying 
oneself with the narrative unity  of that life.  If Jeeves knows about all such 
lives but does not identify  himself with any  of them,31 then he must not know 
each life in the same way  that the persons who live those lives know them. 
Consequently, Jeeves must not be able choose between these different lives 
by  relying on the motivational features that come with identifying oneself with 
one of them.  But if so, how does Jeeves choose?  The question remains 
unanswered.  It seems evident, however, that knowledge of all natural facts 
underdetermines such a choice.  If this is right then the new guise hypothesis 
about Jeeves poses more problems for the moral naturalist.  
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30 Sobel, “Full Information...,” p. 804.
31  Both Sobel and Rosati raise questions how, if at all, it is possible to 
attain this kind of knowledge.  For surely  knowing what it is like to be 
sympathetic precludes knowing what it is like to be obtuse (Rosati, p. 318). 
And knowing that it is like to be Amish is incompatible with knowing what it is 
like to choose between the many  different options that society  offers (Sobel, 
p. 801).  So it is not clear what choosing between these options from a fully 
informed but neutral standpoint amounts to.
! Sobel and Rosati"s points about the difficulty  of commensurating 
different options from a neutral standpoint such as Jeeves"s reinforce the 
problem about finding a way  to ground ethical evaluations and imperatives on 
the descriptive.  If one grants that fallible omniscience is plausible it seems 
that one must also grant that natural facts are neutral between moral value 
and disvalue.  And since there seems to be no non-question-begging way  to 
import normative moral principles onto a neutral, fully  informed standpoint the 
moral naturalist cannot bridge the gap between knowing natural facts and not 
knowing whether something is morally  good as exemplified by Jeeves. 
Naturalists may  yet find some way to bridge this gap, but until they  do the 




! I have discussed and defended a new argument against moral 
naturalism in the present work.  Although not entirely  unknown to 
philosophers what I have called the world book argument, which was taken 
from the only  popular lecture delivered by  Wittgenstein, is neither widely 
discussed nor substantially  defended.  The crucial premise of this argument 
states that if someone who knows all natural facts does not know whether 
something is morally  good, then moral naturalism must be false.  The 
imaginative possibility  contained in this premise is often not taken seriously 
because of a widespread but mostly  unexamined suspicion that it could be 
explained away  easily.  One way  of looking at my  defense of the world book 
argument against possible objections against it is as an effort to show that a 
good number of apparently  plausible ways of explaining away fallible 
omniscience do not work.  
! First, there is the tendency  to think that it is only  possible to conceive 
of someone who knows all natural facts but does not know whether 
something is morally  good because of the normative or action-guiding 
dimension of moral terms and concepts.  The discussion of the distinct type of 
moral disagreement, one in which the participants are well-meaning and well-
informed but use moral terms differently, shows that the reason Jeeves is 
conceivable is not that it is not possible to infer the normative from the 
descriptive.  Rather, the reason Jeeves is conceivable is that there is more 
than one way  to infer moral norms from natural facts that seems to be 
justified.  The relevant type of disagreement shows that it is possible to know 
the same natural facts about some moral matter but disagree about its moral 
worth because the participants construe the moral significance of the natural 
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features of the moral matter in question differently.  It is noteworthy  that the 
disputants! use of moral terms are governed by different semantic norms 
because of their adherence to different sets of moral norms.  One neglected 
aspect of ethical theory is the relation between the moral norms to which 
moral agents subscribe and the semantic norms that govern the use of these 
moral terms.  This topic is of course beyond the scope of this work.  But it 
seems to me that some of Wittgenstein!s ideas about what is sometimes 
called the normativity  of meaning and content could be profitably  brought to 
bear on a discussion of the world book argument!s implications for some 
debates in metaethics.  Whatever the outcome of this discussion the attempt 
to explain away  fallible omniscience by  citing the normativity of moral terms 
and concepts is shown to be questionable.  
" Second, there is the claim that to say  that fallible omniscience implies 
antinaturalism begs the question against the naturalist.  Being clearer about 
what is at stake in the debate between the naturalist and the antinaturalist 
partly addresses this question.  Moral naturalists claim that a certain sort of 
explanation for moral phenomena can be found.  Roughly, they  think that 
massive convergence of opinion on moral matters is possible and 
forthcoming because the practice of making moral judgments is not 
dependent on moral instincts that are a mere deliverance of natural selection, 
historical accident and perhaps the willful intervention of moral agents. 
Rather, moral phenomena are undergirded by  objectively  existing natural 
properties that are analogous to the light reflectance properties of certain 
surfaces.  The outcome of this aspect of the debate between naturalists and 
antinaturalists depends at least in part on yet to be discovered empirical 
information on moral disagreement.  Until such information becomes 
available and its philosophical implications for ethical theory  are fully  worked 
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out both the naturalist!s and the antinaturalist!s account of moral phenomena 
stand on more or less equal footing.  This is why  the world book argument 
cannot be refuted by saying that fallible omniscience amounts to a petitio.  
" Third, there is the attempt to draw an analogy  between metaethics 
and philosophy  of mind in a way that justifies the existence of natural moral 
properties.  The crucial move against this line of thinking is to show an 
important disanalogy between moral properties and phenomenal properties. 
Whereas it cannot be doubted that there is such a thing as knowledge of what 
it is like to see a colored object, to feel pain, to smell pungent odors, etc., it is 
not clear whether there really  is such a thing as knowledge of natural moral 
properties.  Since the existence of moral properties is open to question, an 
argument propelled by  a character who is fully  informed about natural facts 
yet deficient in moral knowledge would yield an antirealist metaphysical 
conclusion.  Unlike the knowledge argument, which establishes the discrete 
metaphysical existence of phenomenal properties, the world book argument 
implies that there might be no such thing as moral properties.  Hence the 
attempt to explain away fallible omniscience by  drawing an analogy  between 
phenomenal properties and moral properties fails.
" Refuting the world book argument by drawing an analogy  between the 
philosophy  of mind and metaethics can be parsed in terms of the claim that 
knowledge whether something is morally  good is already latent in knowledge 
of all natural facts.  But since it is not clear how someone who knows all 
natural facts can import normative moral principles onto his neutral standpoint 
in an uncontroversial way, it is difficult to establish that moral knowledge is 
already  latent in knowledge of natural facts.  It seems that doing the latter 
requires commensurating the different points of view of varied moral agents 
from an impersonal and perspectiveless standpoint; and this sounds 
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impossible if not altogether contradictory.  So again, the attempt to explain 
away fallible omniscience fails.  
! Where does all these leave us?  It is clear that in the world book 
argument we have found an interesting and provocative argument against 
moral naturalism that deserves serious consideration and further discussion. 
Moral naturalists may  yet find a way  to explain away  the possibility  of knowing 
all natural facts without knowing whether something is morally  good.  But in 
the meantime they  cannot rely  on mere knowledge of all natural facts to 
vindicate their conception of moral properties.  What is more, naturalists, and 
perhaps all moral realists, cannot rely  on full-information or ideal advisor 
accounts of moral goodness until some suitable answers to the problems 
posed by the world book argument are found.  
! In the foregoing discussion of the new  argument against moral 
naturalism, there are some closely related and interesting philosophical 
problems that were ignored.  For instance, it is not at all it is not clear whether 
fully  informed ideal advisors could influence the evaluative judgments of non-
ideal moral agents.  In some of his stories Wodehouse explores the 
relationship between an epistemically  limited gentleman and his well-informed 
butler to humorous effect.  In some of the passages from these stories the 
aforementioned philosophical problem is brought out very well: 
I reached for the umbrella and hat, and was heading for the open spaces, 
when I heard Jeeves give that soft cough of his and, turning saw that a 
shadow was about to fall on what had been a day  of joyous reunion.  In 
the eye which he was fixing on me I detected the aunt-like gleam which 
always means that he disapproves of something, and when he said in a 
soupy  tone of voice "Pardon me, sir, but are you proposing to enter the 
Ritz hotel in that hat?#  I knew that the time had come when Bertram must 
show that iron resolution of his which had been so widely publicized.
! In the manner!of head-joy  Jeeves is not in tune with modern 
progressive thought, his attitude being best described, perhaps, as 
hidebound, and right from the start I had been asking myself what his 
reaction would be to the blue Alpine hat with the pink feather in it which I 
had purchased in his absence.  Now  I knew.  I could see at a g. that he 
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wanted no piece of it.
! I, on the other hand, was all for this Alpine lid.  I was prepared 
to concede that it would have been more suitable for rural wear, but 
against this had to be set the fact that it unquestionably  lent a diablerie to 
my appearance, and mine is an appearance that needs all the diablerie it 
can get.1
Whether rational persuasion could resolve the standoff between (Bertram) 
Wooster and Jeeves is unclear.  It is possible that becoming better informed 
would not necessarily  make Wooster agree with Jeeves.  Since it is possible 
to know a great deal of natural facts but not make any  evaluative judgments, 
it is also unclear whether having an evaluative opinion is a function of 
knowing more facts.  Exploring all these possibilities and the reasons that can 
be given for them together with their implications for the world book argument 
and ethical theory, however, requires a separate work.   
128
1  P. G. Wodehouse, The Jeeves Omnibus (New York: Barnes & Noble, 
1992), p.14.
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